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Executive summary  
Following the 9/11/2001 terror attacks in the US, Central Asia moved into the focus of the 
worldwide efforts aimed at crisis prevention and the fight against terrorism. If the region 
was no longer perceived merely as the faraway periphery of the crumbled Soviet empire, it 
now came to be seen as a geographic intersection between East and West, as a boundary 
line between religious fundamentalism and the secular world, as a poorhouse among the 
post-socialist countries in transition, and as a potential source of instability. This fore-
grounded the question as to what development policy and, concretely, development coop-
eration can contribute to stabilizing Central Asia. The present study addresses this question 
from the perspective of German development cooperation. In conceptual terms, it draws on 
the discussion in development policy on crisis prevention and conflict resolution and ap-
plies it to the region of Central Asia. 
Crisis prevention and conflict resolution in development cooperation 
In the past ten years the issue of crisis prevention and conflict resolution has become firmly 
entrenched as an element of the debate on development. The German government in 2000 
elaborated a comprehensive strategy on “Crisis Prevention and Conflict Resolution,” in this 
way assigning special significance to the field of action as a cross-cutting, interministerial 
task. Development policy here has the function: “to help prevent and reduce the structural 
causes of conflicts in affected countries by improving economic, social, ecological, and 
political conditions, and to promote mechanisms for nonviolent conflict resolution.” The 
BMZ has acted on this demand by making “peace development and conflict prevention” 
into one of the sectoral priorities of German bilateral development cooperation and at the 
same time by establishing the issue complex as a cross-cutting task of development policy 
as a whole. 
The intention of crisis prevention is not to seek to prevent every potential social conflict. 
Rather, crisis prevention is focused on conflicts that have the potential to escalate into 
collective violent strife, down to and including war. Preventive policy must start out by 
addressing, over the long term, the root structural causes of social conflicts and, over the 
short term, the modes in which such conflicts are acted out (the reason why the field has 
come to be known by the dual term “crisis prevention and conflict resolution”). The para-
digms “structural stability” and “human security” may be regarded as positive target no-
tions of a development policy geared to crisis prevention; taken together, they aim both at 
protecting the individual and at the social and institutional framework conditions required 
to reach this end. 
Every development strategy for regions with significant crisis potentials should be pre-
ceded by a basic decision on whether and how development cooperation should seek to 
immediately influence a given conflict constellation. Viewed in ideal-typical terms, the 
choice involved here is to work “in, on, or around conflict.” Experience indicates, however, 
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that a conflict-sensitive development cooperation will be able to fall back only on the first 
of the two options. Conflict-related impact analyses have shown that in acute or potential 
conflict situations every form of external help is conflict-relevant. Any attempt to “work 
around conflicts” in crisis regions, putting on as it were a mien of neutrality, is as a rule 
bound to fail. A conscious decision should be made between the remaining alternatives – to 
take a targeted approach to conflicts (working on conflict) or to give due consideration to 
their existence as a framework condition (working in conflict). Either approach may be 
legitimate. Yet a deliberate choice is the only real way to avoid false expectations and 
unintended negative impacts. No appropriate decision will be able to be reached without 
subjecting development cooperation measures in potential crisis regions, in advance, to 
targeted conflict impact analyses.  
Moreover, it must be recognized that development cooperation geared to conflict preven-
tion not only offers chances to positively influence the course of events, but that its im-
pacts are inevitably limited. The decisive factors here are the willingness and the will of 
the actors involved on the ground to accept peaceful solutions to existing conflicts. Ex-
ternal crisis prevention will only have chances of success if it uses its instruments to take 
up, to strengthen, and, wherever called for, to supplement locally existing approaches and 
capacities, but without substituting for or superimposing itself on them. To be successful, 
crisis-prevention-oriented development cooperation must be embedded in a coherent over-
all political strategy on the donor side. 
The causative and triggering factors of crisis developments are as a rule complex. There is 
no such thing as a certain forecast of when a conflict will escalate into a crisis. On the other 
hand, certain factors have in the past proven to be particularly conducive to conflict. For 
this reason the present study uses, for its concrete conflict analysis of Central Asia, crisis 
indicators from five fields of analysis: governance, economy, socio-cultural factors, 
security, and external factors. Analytically, we can distinguish here between three problem 
levels, which result in different approaches to crisis-prevention policy: (a) structural causes 
of conflict, which call for long-term, structurally oriented measures; (b) the capacity of a 
society to engage in constructive conflict resolution, which calls for short- to medium-term 
measures targeted to the character of political decision-making processes; and (c) conflict-
aggravating security risks which require above all short-term action geared to containment. 
Against this background the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, DAC, in its 
2001 guidelines “Helping Prevent Violent Conflict,” has identified seven fields of action 
that can and should be used by development cooperation to make a meaningful contribu-
tion to crisis prevention and conflict resolution: 
● establishing crisis prevention and conflict resolution as a long-term, cross-cutting 
task; 
● factoring in security as a basis for development; 
● promoting regional cooperation; 
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● supporting peace processes, justice, and reconciliation; 
● building partnerships for peace; 
● involving the private sector; 
● countering negative economic forces. 
Political, socioeconomic, and sociocultural framework conditions in the Cen-
tral Asian countries in transition 
The Soviet legacy has left deep traces in the Central Asian republics; and even today this 
legacy continues to shape their politics, economies, societies, and cultures. At the same 
time, a retrospective process of return to older traditions can be noted here. All five Central 
Asian republics are formally democracies, though in fact their political regimes are domi-
nated by more or less authoritarian ruling elites. Repression against opposition and the 
media have recently been increasing throughout the region. The machinery of government 
is marked by corruption and clientelism. 
In economic terms, the Central Asian republics went through a severe crisis in the first half 
of the 1990s that was exacerbated by the disintegration of the Soviet economic area. It was 
only in 1996 that a gradual economic recovery got underway. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Uzbekistan are today classified by the World Bank as low-income countries. 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are vying for the leadership role in the region. While Uzbeki-
stan, with its population of some 25 million, is in this respect the larger country, Kazakh-
stan (15 million), with its major oil and gas reserves, is the richer nation. One central prob-
lem in the region is the borders between the republics, which were arbitrarily drawn under 
Soviet rule. Of minor importance in the Soviet Union, these borders have, since independ-
ence, cut apart historically grown cultural and economic spaces. At the same time, many 
boundary lines have even today not yet been clearly defined. One issue closely associated 
with the border question is the situation of ethnic minorities, whose status in relation to the 
titular ethnic group has deteriorated in most of the republics since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. 
Since 1991 there have been repeated attempts to improve and widen regional cooperation, 
but most of them have failed for lack of a willingness on the part of the governments con-
cerned to see their scopes of action curtailed. Besides Turkmenistan, which pursues a 
course of almost complete isolation, Uzbekistan in particular has also sealed itself from its 
neighbors. 
Uzbekistan, the geographic heartland of Central Asia, has an ethnically relatively homo-
geneous population with a very high percentage of young people. President Karimov rules 
the country in a largely authoritarian manner. Human rights organizations report systematic 
torture in Uzbek prisons as well as suppression of civil liberties. Islamic and other religious 
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practices are tolerated only in the form approved by the state. Religious groupings which 
do not fall in with this line are regarded as extremist organizations steered from abroad and 
are ruthlessly persecuted. Bombings and other attacks between 1999 and 2000, which were 
presumably the work of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), have contributed 
their part to a stiffening of this policy. The worldwide efforts to fight terrorism after Sep-
tember 11, 2001, have also worked in the same direction. Even though the IMU was weak-
ened considerably by the war in Afghanistan, where it had its areas of retreat, the Uzbek 
government continues – today more than ever – to feel justified in pursuing its repressive 
course. Economically, Uzbekistan is dependent on gold and cotton exports, which are used 
to subsidize a post-Soviet economic system that has made little progress on reforms. More-
over, cotton-farming, with the water scarcity and soil salinization it entails, has led to a 
dangerous ecological situation. The country’s stagnant economic picture is reflected in a 
deteriorating social situation. Estimates are that the incomes of about 30 % of the popula-
tion are below the absolute poverty line, and the situation in individual regions of the coun-
try (Khorezm, Karakalpakstan) is even considerably worse. 
In relative terms, Kazakhstan is the richest Central Asian country, and at the same time 
the one with the most positive economic development. The main reasons for this are siz-
able revenues from the export of mineral oil and natural gas as well as the country’s wealth 
in other mineral resources (coal, nonferrous metals). Kazakhstan early pinned its hopes on 
free-market reforms and further integration in the world economy, a policy designed to 
attract foreign investment into the country’s raw materials sector. Kazakhstan has assumed 
a burdensome ecological legacy from the Soviet era, for which the progressive drying up of 
the Aral Sea and the contaminated arms-testing facilities around Semipalatinsk are only the 
most dramatic symbols. Economy and state are dominated by a relatively small elite, with 
president Nazarbayev at its peak. In the course of the 1990s the political system grew 
increasingly authoritarian, and civil-society activities are tolerated only to the extent that 
they involve no political demands. Unlike the case of Uzbekistan, in Kazakhstan Islam is 
not a politically significant factor and has more the character of a popular tradition. 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan has developed from a glimmer of 
hope for successful democratic and market-oriented transformation to a problem child of 
the region. Following independence, the territorially small, very mountainous country was 
the Central Asian republic that set the most clear-cut example for post-socialist reforms 
geared to democracy and market economy. The country’s socioeconomic situation has, 
however, become very problematic, since the collapse of industry and the decline in agri-
cultural production experienced in the first half of the 1990s has not been followed by a 
sustainable upswing with positive impacts for a large share of the country’s 5 million 
inhabitants. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan has the highest foreign debt of the CIS countries 
(in relation to GDP). According to official information, in 2001 52 % of Kyrgyzstan’s 
population was poor, and the southern part of the country and the rural population in gen-
eral are disproportionately affected. Development of promising branches of industry is still 
in its infancy. Viewed in political terms, following independence Kyrgyzstan initially 
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experienced the development of a landscape of civil-society actors that was pluralist and 
more comprehensive than in other Central Asian countries. However, since the mid-1990s, 
and influenced by what he saw as growing social and political tensions, President Akayev, 
who was seen as a symbolic figure for democratic change in the years of upheaval (1990 to 
1992), has arrogated more and more powers to himself and enlarged his control over the 
state. The Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley was affected by the attacks launched by the 
IMU in 1999 and in 2000. Subsequently the government stepped up its pressure on the 
opposition as well as the critical media and the human rights situation has deteriorated. 
Even so, in regional terms Kyrgyzstan continues to have a more diverse political landscape 
and a larger measure of freedom of speech than its Central Asian neighbors.  
In political, but above all in socioeconomic terms, Tajikistan has been hard hit by the 
aftermath of the 1992-1997 civil war. According to World Bank information, in 2000 
Tajikistan was among the world’s 11 poorest countries. One part of the immediate tasks 
still facing the country is reconstruction of essential infrastructure. The country, with its 
population of approx. 6.5 million, is run by a government under President Rahmonov 
which has included representatives of the “democratic” and “Islamic” opposition since the 
1997 peace agreement. Nevertheless, there is only a limited measure of genuine pluralism 
and democracy. Establishment of functioning government structures in all parts of the 
country is likewise a task that still has to be mastered. Traditional factors like regional and 
local particularisms, handed-down modes of power distribution, and clan membership play 
an important role in this connection. It is generally agreed that the civil war – aside from a 
seemingly ideological debate between democratizers, Islamic reformists, and inert post-
communist forces over the country’s post-Soviet course – also amounted to a struggle 
between rival regional clans for hegemony in Tajikistan’s political-administrative system. 
The fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan generally contributed to further stabilizing the coun-
try’s security situation. But the problem of drug trafficking remains virulent, since the 
country is located on the main transit route between Afghanistan and Europe. Furthermore, 
tensions between President Rahmonov and the “opposition” members of government over 
some central issues of power-sharing have recently escalated. 
Turkmenistan is the most closed and isolated of the Central Asian countries. Seen in 
terms of its total population (some 5.5 to 6 million), it is one of the three “little” countries 
of Central Asia, although the size of its national territory is comparable with that of Uz-
bekistan. The country has sizable natural gas and mineral oil reserves which constitute the 
main source of revenue of the state and the overall national economy. Agriculture is domi-
nated by cotton-farming, which, as in the case of Uzbekistan, is associated with massive 
environmental problems. President Niyazov, who governed the republic even before na-
tional independence, has, since 1991, established the most undemocratic and least reformed 
regime in the entire area that once made up the Soviet Union. In economic terms, the So-
viet economic system has largely been conserved. The government has used heavy public 
subsidies to keep the population’s standard of living at a higher nominal level than in most 
other Central Asian republics. The country’s high degree of dependence on raw materials 
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for government revenue is, however, a reason for major concern as to how long a strategy 
of this kind can be pursued in view of the fact that urgently required infrastructure mainte-
nance investments have not been made for years and there is no reason to anticipate any 
growth of export revenues in the foreseeable future. President Niyazov has led Turkmeni-
stan into almost complete isolation. Citizens are largely refused permission to travel 
abroad. There are as good as no civil-society activities, free expression of opinion, or po-
litical representation of interests. The only more or less organized opposition is to be found 
only in exile, and the country is dominated by a brutal surveillance apparatus. The govern-
ment appears to have no strategy designed to set a development perspective against feared 
pent-up political conflicts, social discontent, and ecological crises. 
Conflict and crisis potentials 
At present, Central Asia appears to be a region of fragile stability. One positive note is that 
none of the five countries is presently in the throes of acute violent conflict. There is no 
immediate reason to fear an outbreak of violent internal conflicts in the short term, and 
there are no signs of any impending international conflicts. In the long run, however, the 
region is faced with considerable risks stemming from the negative dynamics of the con-
flict potentials to be observed in most Central Asian countries. Structured with a view to 
the fields of conflict analysis, we come to the following results: 
● All of the countries in Central Asia have massive deficits in the field of governance. 
The governments are beset by substantial legitimacy deficits which are aggravated by 
a lack of legal security for citizens in their dealings with government authorities. 
There is little scope for pluralism, especially in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Not 
only is the interplay between state and society poorly suited to bringing emerging con-
flicts to a solution accepted by contending actors, it often even contributes toward ex-
acerbating conflicts or escalating the modes in which they are played out. Indeed, ow-
ing to particularly low levels of civil conflict-resolution competence, the worst scenar-
ios may even have to be feared precisely for the allegedly most stable countries, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
● In economic terms, all of the Central Asian countries are still suffering from the 
consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a situation which for most people is 
bound up with a loss of elementary material security. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
still face the greatest structural changes. While income poverty has, within just a few 
years, become a mass phenomenon in all Central Asian countries, some small popula-
tion groups have risen substantially in material terms. This situation is exacerbated by 
enormous regional income disparities within these countries as well as by the unequal 
endowment of their people with the three central resources fertile land, clean water, 
and a healthy environment. This situation of competition harbors considerable intraso-
cietal conflict potential. 
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● Looking at socio-cultural factors, the main concern is the political instrumentaliza-
tion of cultural, ethnic, and other differences. The picture in Central Asia is mixed in 
this regard. Active and systematic official public discrimination against ethnic minori-
ties has until now remained the exception, even though members of the main national 
ethnic groups often enjoy informal advantages and are given cultural support. How-
ever, the cleavages between various ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other characteris-
tics are often cross-cutting in nature and are not particularly well suited for purposes 
of political mobilization. In the recent past, though, there have been some locally lim-
ited violent conflicts that have erupted along local-regional identities. The most diffi-
cult problem is the way in which the Central Asian governments have dealt with re-
surgent religiosity among their populations. In the early 1990s stigmatization of Is-
lamic groups and the Islam-oriented opposition as extremists contributed only to radi-
calizing such groups in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
● The picture that emerges in the field of security is a worrying one. The civil war in 
Tajikistan, drug- and arms-trafficking, violent crime in the business milieu, and wide-
spread possession of firearms create a problematic background for efforts to raise civil 
conflict resolution to the level of a standard. The situation is particularly aggravated 
by the state of the security forces. Thanks to their corruption, their involvement in or-
ganized crime, and their particularist political agendas, they represent for many citi-
zens more a source of insecurity than security. In all, the type and structure of prob-
lems in the security sector raise doubts as to whether any effective mechanisms would 
in fact be available to counter a violent escalation of conflicts due to persistent dete-
rioration of the economic and political framework and the heightened conflicts of in-
terest this generally entails. 
● With regard to external factors, the countries of Central Asia are embedded in a 
regional and international setting that, while it poses no immediate threats, does in-
volve a number of risk factors. Viewed in regional terms, the national borders, with 
their economic, social, and security implications, as well as disputes about water, con-
stitute the central conflict potentials between the Central Asian republics. The security 
situation in Afghanistan also has immediate effects on Central Asia. Central Asia is 
also linked with Russia, where a large number of migrants, most of them illegal, are 
working, mostly to support their families at home. Another external factor with risk 
potential must be seen in commodity prices. Furthermore, attempts to exert external 
influence, including investments in Caspian oil, the presence of Western and Russian 
armed forces, and foreign aid, are not free of (possible) negative implications. 
From the perspective of the three problem levels “structural conflict causes,” “constructive 
conflict-resolution capacity,” and “conflict-aggravating security risks,” the following crisis 
potentials must be noted for Central Asia on the whole:  
● Structural conflict causes: Central Asia is marked by persistent and substantial 
social and economic uncertainties; for many people, widespread income poverty is a 
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new, difficult experience; income disparities have grown considerably; there are great 
regional disparities within the Central Asian countries; social infrastructure (health-
care, education) has deteriorated; a large cohort of young people is faced with unem-
ployment and lack of perspectives; fertile land is growing ever scarcer due to popula-
tion growth and environmental degradation; poverty and environmental damage are 
causing more and more diseases; national borders have cut apart historically grown 
sociocultural and economic spaces; natural resources are distributed very unequally 
between the Central Asian republics; certain (regional, ethnic, religious, etc.) identity 
groups feel that they are systematically discriminated against or persecuted. 
● Constructive conflict-resolution capacity: As conflict mediators, government 
institutions suffer from legitimacy deficits, corruption, and weaknesses in implemen-
tation capacities; the legal system enjoys very little confidence among the population; 
civil-society activities are in the main weakly developed and are at times massively 
obstructed; government intolerance toward and use of force against the opposition are 
provoking counterviolence; government denial of the existence of legitimate conflicts 
encourages conflict escalation; a Western aid (major investments, military, DC) ex-
perienced as overly regime-oriented may serve to undercut the mediator role of do-
nors in conflict situations. 
● Conflict-aggravating security risks: The intrasocietal threshold for the use of force 
is becoming lower; the state security forces spread uncertainty, not security; the civil 
war in Tajikistan has led to widespread circulation of arms there as well as in 
neighboring regions; organized crime (drug-, arms-trafficking) is undercutting the 
state monopoly on power and promoting the expansion of an illegal economy; acute 
crises in one country may spread rapidly to neighboring countries; dependence on 
exports of raw materials can lead to unforeseeable socioeconomic tensions; the high 
foreign debt of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is encumbering the population with addi-
tional burdens. 
Looking at the situation country for country, however, we can make out some clear-cut 
differences: 
Under the present conditions Uzbekistan harbors, over the long run, the greatest crisis 
potential in Central Asia. Here serious structural problems (an economic development 
stagnating at a low level in an setting urgently in need of reform, a large and extremely 
young population, a high population density in the habitable parts of the country, a lack of 
government sources of revenue that are secure over the long term) are exacerbated by a 
serious lack of cooperative conflict-resolution mechanisms and a repressive government 
policy that contributes to the escalation of violence. Its central geographical location links 
the country with almost all potential regional flash points in Central Asia, and in particular 
with the Ferghana Valley and Tajikistan. 
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Kazakhstan, with its lower poverty levels, lower population growth, and larger agricul-
tural area, and its more stable economic situation, has the relatively lowest level of poten-
tial structural causes of conflict of all the Central Asian countries, even though the massive 
ecological challenges facing it are a factor to be reckoned with. The capacity of state and 
society to resolve conflicts constructively is not particularly marked, but the existence of a 
broader spectrum of civil society does, in principle, amount to a potential for cooperative 
efforts to find solutions to pressing problems. Kazakhstan is geographically further re-
moved from some of the region’s crisis-aggravating security risks than the other Central 
Asian countries, although an increasing openness to violence in society, the country’s 
problematic security forces, and a high level of dependence on commodity exports must be 
seen as problem factors. 
Kyrgyzstan is faced with major structural conflict potentials. In most parts of the country a 
slow economic upswing has as yet had hardly any positive effects on the mainly very poor 
population. No solution has yet been found for the country’s high national debt. Tensions 
between the south and the north have increased, and the events of 1990 have clearly indi-
cated that violent conflicts could break out along ethnic cleavages. The Ferghana Valley 
closely links Kyrgyzstan with its neighbors Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – and is associated 
with regional security problems like drug-trafficking. Despite the recent political distur-
bances, however, Kyrgyzstan does have the relatively best social preconditions for civil 
conflict resolution and participatory solutions of all the Central Asian countries. This could 
prove to be a decisive advantage in cases where the concern is to avert escalation of violent 
conflicts. 
Since 1997, following the civil war, Tajikistan has developed more positively than many 
observers dared to hope. Even so, it remains Central Asia’s poorest, most underdeveloped, 
and most traumatized country. Directly bordering on Afghanistan, it is also (still) faced 
with the greatest challenges to its external security. In no other country of the region is the 
state’s monopoly on power so fragile. At the same time, though, no other Central Asian 
country has made greater progress on the road from violent conflict to civil conflict resolu-
tion. One risk is, however, that this situation might induce President Rahmonov to con-
clude that he might be able to gradually revise the compromises reached on the issue of 
power-sharing. 
Turkmenistan is faced with structural problems similar to those in Uzbekistan, although, 
for the time being at least, the country is able to benefit from more or less secure export 
revenues that can be used to mitigate negative socioeconomic impacts, and Turkmenistan 
is under less population pressure than its neighbors. However, the president’s authoritarian 
and arbitrary one-man rule constitutes a massive conflict factor sui generis. At the same 
time, there is no room whatever in Turkmenistan for the development of legitimate con-
flict-resolution capacities.  
Looked at in regional terms, two crisis potentials can be identified as possibly virulent 
transboundary problems: on the one hand, widespread water scarcity, which, far from 
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being merely a possible source of cross-border distribution conflicts, is today already gen-
erating negative ecological effects on agriculture and the living conditions of people in 
degraded zones like the Aral Sea region; on the other hand, there is the geographic focus of 
the Ferghana Valley. In its combination of structural, process-related, and conflict-
aggravating crisis potentials, this area is more exposed than any other in Central Asia. 
What we find here, in narrow confines, is a dangerous combination consisting of the socio-
economic and demographic pressure exerted by Uzbekistan, the status – in Kyrgyzstan’s 
view – of a structurally weak, ethnically highly heterogeneous periphery that eludes central 
control, Tajikistan’s poverty and security problems in a zone of border-crossing ecological 
degradation – and these problems tend to reinforce each other mutually. 
German bilateral DC with the Central Asian republics  
The “Central Asia strategy of the BMZ” of December 18, 2001, is the central conceptual 
basis of official German development cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. 
Crisis prevention is cited here prominently as the explicit objective and justification of a 
stepped-up German commitment. With reference to the political conditions given there, 
Turkmenistan is, at present, not included in this cooperation. The other countries are re-
garded as partner countries of German DC. Proceeding from an in-depth and critical look 
at the political and economic situation, the BMZ plans to support the countries of Central 
Asia “in their social and economic development toward democracy and market economy.” 
Beside the bilateral approach, a regional approach is being pursued to reach this goal. In 
all, the BMZ defines three fields of cooperation, each of which consists of several compo-
nents: 
● Strengthening democratic structures and the rule of law: legal advice programs; 
building civil society and strengthening democracy; decentralization; the media. 
● Supporting economic reforms and poverty reduction: economic-policy advice; 
reform of the banking system; development of vocational training systems; promo-
tion of business and trade and business startups; employment programs; food-for-
work programs; health services. 
● Fostering cross-border cooperation: anti-desertification activities; drinking-water 
supply; regional solutions for water problems. 
Aside from official DC, there are plans to involve the German political foundations as well 
as private-sector organizations in the first field named in particular. 
The BMZ’s Central Asia strategy is additionally bolstered in political terms by the “Ger-
man Government Central Asia strategy” of March 18, 2002. In essence, this document 
reaffirms the same strategic goals, referring to creation of democratic and transparent 
political structures as its basis. The document also cites as an aim “the development and 
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application of effective strategies and instruments of crisis prevention, peaceful conflict 
settlement and post-conflict peace-building.”  
In the process of concentrating official German DC on selected priority areas, the BMZ 
reached agreement with the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uz-
bekistan to define economic reform and market systems development (WIRAM) as the 
priority area of German DC in these countries. In the case of Tajikistan agreement was 
reached on including basic education as an additional, second priority. Another instrument 
is a regional support approach used to conduct cross-border measures, including measures 
aimed at promoting democracy. 
In practice there are as yet only a very limited number of points of contact between the 
political objective of crisis prevention and peaceful conflict resolution in the Central Asia 
strategy and the WIRAM priority area. While WIRAM, as a relatively comprehensive 
priority area, sets the stage for a broad range of activities, a conceptual integration of the 
cross-cutting task of crisis prevention and conflict resolution into the WIRAM priority area 
has – independently of Central Asia – yet to be accomplished.  
Viewed in terms of the three fields of cooperation identified in the BMZ’s Central Asia 
strategy, i.e. democracy / rule of law, economic reform / poverty reduction, and cross-
border cooperation, the instruments involved may be said to show a marked imbalance. 
The by far largest share of funds is made available for one component of these three fields 
(economic reform), while the other components, which would be of particular significance 
from the point of view of crisis prevention, are considerably more poorly endowed. Thus 
far attempts have focused on giving more weight to the field of the promotion of democ-
racy by supporting the activities of the German political foundations. 
Crisis prevention and conflict resolution in the Central Asia strategies of other 
donors 
The most important multilateral donors in Central Asia include the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the European Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The 
bilateral donors with major DC commitments in the region include in particular the US, 
Japan, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK. Among the multilateral donors, only the Euro-
pean Union and – in a qualified sense – UNDP have until now made crisis prevention and 
conflict resolution focal points of their strategies. Furthermore, as an organization special-
ized in crisis prevention, the OSCE is playing an important role in Central Asia. The de-
velopment banks are at best only indirectly relevant here. The picture is different when we 
look at the bilateral donors. The US, Switzerland, and the UK have made crisis prevention 
and conflict resolution an essential element of their strategies for cooperation with the 
Central Asian republics. Only Japan has until now lagged behind in this regard. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
The present analysis of the conflict and crisis potentials in Central Asia has made it clear 
that the region is faced with substantial risks and is in need of measures with crisis-
prevention effects. The strategies of the German Government and the BMZ take this need 
into account. At the instrumental level, however, German DC has difficulties in translating 
the highly comprehensive aspirations expressed in its political strategies into concrete 
measures. The present study assumes that the priorities decided on will not be under con-
sideration over the medium term and therefore proposes focusing on three points to bolster 
the objective of crisis prevention and conflict resolution: 
Use of the instruments of crisis prevention and conflict resolution: The present DC 
portfolio for the region should be subjected to a conflict impact analysis. As a complemen-
tary measure, it would be helpful to conduct an analysis of existing conflicts and crisis 
potentials involving the most important German DC organizations; this should also be 
continued on a regular basis. A well-founded decision on the question of “working in, on, 
or around conflict” could also be made on this basis. The selection of new measures 
should, finally, also be based on conflict-related impact analyses. This analysis process 
would have to be accompanied by targeted capacity-building measures on crisis prevention 
and conflict resolution for the relevant DC staff both on the ground and in Germany. 
Design of WIRAM: Within the WIRAM priority area, more efforts could be undertaken to 
tackle “more political” issues bound up with the framework conditions for economic re-
form. Projects with a marked component in rural areas and a high level of participation by 
the local population should be strengthened and enlarged. In regions which are marked by 
high levels of tension and in which an illegal economy has become established (trafficking 
in drugs, arms), measures with a high employment effect could contribute to “recivilizing” 
the economy. The pending formulation of the priority strategy for the Central Asian repub-
lics should reflect a focus of this kind within the overall priority area. 
Design of the regional approach: In the long-term, funds should be shifted from the 
bilateral portfolios to the regional approach in order to be able to support new measures in 
the field of promotion of democracy that have relevance for crisis prevention. More efforts 
should be undertaken to gain a stronger involvement of private-sector organizations in 
addition to the German political foundations; the former could, for their part, cooperate 
with nonstate partners on the ground. Special attention should be accorded to the impor-
tance of informal rules and networks in the societies in transition in Central Asia. Measures 
in this area could contribute considerably to gaining a better understanding of conflict 
situations and would, in connection with conflict-related impact analyses, have positive 
repercussions on other projects as well. Efforts to implement regionally conceived meas-
ures across countries should not be reduced – despite foreseeable resistance. Efforts should 
also be made to harness the existing local potentials of the sciences as an important integra-
tive force in the region. 
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Above and beyond these points of departure, the BMZ should seek more coordination with 
other donors on approaches in Central Asia. Efforts aimed at joint crisis analysis could 
represent a first step toward defining priorities and the broad guidelines needed for a divi-
sion of labor. A more marked presence of the BMZ in partner countries would be important 
here. 
As far as individual countries are concerned, Uzbekistan is, in the long run, the region’s 
most important country. But in view of the fact that the political framework there severely 
restricts any attempts to influence circumstances on the ground, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
also have an important role to play for development cooperation in Central Asia. A long-
term stabilization of the situation in these two countries neighboring on Uzbekistan – and 
in particular in the Ferghana Valley – would be an important contribution to preventing 
social or political disturbances from spreading to the overall region. 
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Introduction 
Following the 9/11/2001 terror attacks in the US and the ensuing war to topple the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan, Central Asia1 moved into the focus of the worldwide efforts aimed 
at crisis prevention and the fight against terrorism. The region was no longer perceived 
merely as the faraway periphery of the crumbled Soviet empire and instead came to be 
seen as a geographic intersection between East and West, between religious fundamental-
ism and secular world, and at the same time as a poorhouse among the post-socialist coun-
tries in transition and as a potential source of instability. This foregrounded the question as 
to what development policy and, concretely, development cooperation (DC) can contribute 
to stabilizing Central Asia. 
The present study addresses this question from the perspective of German development 
cooperation. The study came about in the framework of a research project on terrorism 
prevention conducted at the German Development Institute (GDI) in 2002/2003 and com-
missioned by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 
The study centers on the question of the strategic orientation of German development 
cooperation in Central Asia under the aspect of crisis prevention and conflict resolu-
tion. In conceptual terms, it thus draws on the discussion in development policy on crisis 
prevention and conflict resolution and applies it to the region of Central Asia. 
Aside from an evaluation of documents and scholarly literature, the study is based on 
interviews which the author conducted at the relevant German institutions as well as in the 
course of two exploratory trips to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in Novem-
ber/December 2002 and Tajikistan in March 2003. A workshop conducted in Bonn in 
early July 2003 with representatives of German governmental and nongovernmental DC 
institutions set the stage for a broad exchange of views and information on some of the 
important results of the research project. The author wishes to take this opportunity to 
extend his thanks to all of his interview partners at home and abroad for their cooperation 
and for the frankness they showed in speaking with him. The institutions visited in this 
connection are listed in the Annex. 
The political framework given in Turkmenistan made it impossible to include the country 
in the study in the same way as the other countries of the region. Indeed, the BMZ is at 
present, and for the same reason, not engaged in a bilateral development dialogue with the 
Turkmen government. Most other bilateral and multilateral donors have likewise either 
indefinitely suspended projects in Turkmenistan or are operating a conditionalized mini-
mum program. 
                                                                
1  Here, as in what follows, the term Central Asia refers to the five former Soviet republics Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
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The set of analytical instruments on which the present study is based was developed and 
established in recent years in the framework of a comprehensive debate on crisis preven-
tion and conflict resolution in development cooperation. Chapter 1 sums up only the most 
important findings of this discussion, specifies some of the objectives and principles of 
crisis-prevention-oriented DC derived from the discussion and presents some of the analy-
sis categories used for crisis potentials, and lists a number of fields of action and points 
of departure for crisis prevention in development cooperation.  
Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to the presentation and analysis of crisis potentials in Central 
Asia. Chapter 2 discusses some of the important political, socioeconomic, and socio-
cultural framework conditions in the region and the individual countries concerned. 
Chapter 3 takes a systematic look at individual conflict categories. The results of this 
conflict analysis are summed up in an overview at the end of Chapter 3. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with donor strategies in Central Asia. Chapter 4 presents 
the principles, instruments, and priorities of German DC in the countries of Central 
Asia and the region as a whole and draws an interim balance concerning crisis prevention 
and conflict resolution. Chapter 5 looks into the strategies of other – multilateral and 
bilateral – donors with a view to assessing the significance the latter attach to crisis pre-
vention and conflict resolution. 
Proceeding from here, Chapter 6 derives some conclusions and recommendations for 
German DC. 
1 Crisis prevention and conflict resolution as tasks of 
development cooperation 
1.1 The relevance of crisis prevention and conflict 
resolution 
In the past ten years the issue of crisis prevention and conflict resolution has become firmly 
entrenched as an element of the debate on development policy. Since the end of the East-
West confrontation war and armed conflict2 in all parts of the world have stepped out of 
the shadow of the Cold War. As a rule destructive impacts of violent conflict are an im-
mense burden for the countries affected. In the great majority of cases the principal vic-
tims of armed conflicts are the civilian population. The humanitarian dimension of 
violent conflicts is aggravated by the long-term impacts of such conflicts on the develop-
                                                                
2  The term “armed conflict” refers to violent strife that remains below the threshold of war. See 
AKUF (2001). 
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ment of the societies affected. Such conflicts reverse development successes, thwart 
development chances, deepen poverty, and encourage disregard of human rights. 
Against this background UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 called on the interna-
tional community to move “from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.”3 In 
doing so, he was picking up on a topic initiated in 1992 by his predecessor Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali in his “Agenda for Peace.”4 For its part, the German government in 2000 
elaborated a comprehensive strategy on “Crisis Prevention and Conflict Resolution,” which 
assigned special significance to this field of action as an interministerial task.5 In the “Pro-
gram of Action 2015” adopted one year later, the German government formulates its con-
tribution toward the goal of halving extreme poverty worldwide, addressing the issue of 
support for crisis prevention and peaceful conflict resolution as one of 10 “priority areas 
for action” in the field of poverty reduction.6  
The September 11 terror attacks in the US have imparted a new urgency to the debate on 
crisis prevention and civil conflict resolution. This is not to say that the rationale for a 
policy of prevention has changed. Indeed, the possible points of departure had already been 
identified prior to these events. But since then the Western industrialized countries have 
seen themselves confronted with the necessity to redefine the conditions for peace and 
security. The terror attacks in the US have made plain how closely intertwined the immedi-
ate security of the rich industrialized nations is even with violent regional conflicts far 
removed from them. Terrorist groups speculate that they will be able to attract young peo-
ple from crisis regions who see themselves cheated of their life perspectives by decade-
long conflicts and the destruction of livelihoods they entail. Persistent armed conflicts 
promote the emergence of war economies, lead to a culture marked by openness to vio-
lence, and create potential areas of retreat in so-called failing states, i.e. in countries in 
which governmental authorities have lost control over substantial parts of their national 
territory. Each of these factors enlarges the scopes of action of terrorist movements. 
Crisis prevention and conflict resolution are for these reasons not only a task of humanitar-
ian and development policy, they also, and at the same time, have a security-related aim. In 
the competition between ministries for ever scarcer budget resources, this is an important 
additional argument in favor of strengthening policies geared to crisis prevention. In in-
strumental terms, it is development policy that has an important role to play in working 
toward effective prevention over the long term. This is one of the implications of the 
German government’s comprehensive strategy on “Crisis Prevention and Conflict Preven-
                                                                
3  Annan (1999). 
4  Boutros-Ghali (1992). 
5  BMZ (2000). 
6  BMZ (2001a, 36–39). 
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tion,”7 and it has found practical expression, among other places, in the substantial share of 
resources from the German “Anti-Terror Package” allocated to the BMZ . 
1.2 Definition and elucidation of the concepts: crisis 
prevention and conflict resolution 
In a general sense, crisis prevention refers to the avoidance of major violent conflicts that 
threaten escalate and destabilize entire societies or significant parts of them. In other 
words, crisis prevention can and should not seek to avert any and every potential social 
conflict. Conflicts between social groups that assume the form of differences in interests 
and opinions, indeed even conflicts of a fundamental nature, will occur in every society. 
Nor can conflicts of interest between states always be avoided. Especially in times of rapid 
social change and social development, like those typical of developing countries and na-
tions in transition, conflicts are more than likely to occur. But steered into constructive 
channels, such conflicts are an important condition needed to impart impulses to the politi-
cal decision-making process that may be of use in bringing about changes of course that 
have become necessary. 
Crisis prevention is therefore focused on conflicts that have the potential to escalate 
into collective violent strife, down to and including war. The primary concern is to 
prevent violence, not to avoid conflicts per se.8 It is important to distinguish two ap-
proaches here: on the one hand, long-term crisis-prevention measures aimed at the deeper 
causes of potentially violent conflicts, such as growing economic disparities or political 
oppression; on the other hand, promotion of forms of civil conflict prevention geared to 
strengthening the ability of societies to settle existing conflicts constructively, i.e. without 
recourse to destructive means, and/or to avoid any violent escalation of conflicts in critical 
situations.9 With a view to underlining the fact that preventive policy must start out by 
addressing, over the long term, the root structural causes of social conflicts and, over the 
short term, the modes in which such conflicts are acted out, the field of action concerned 
here has come to be known as “crisis prevention and conflict resolution” (also, “crisis 
prevention and civil conflict resolution”).10 
                                                                
7  BMZ (2000, Section 1.6). 
8  While the term commonly used in the English-language literature – including the OECD / DAC 
Guidelines – is “conflict prevention”, it is as a rule pointed out that what is meant is the preven-
tion of violent conflicts. See OECD / DAC (2001, 22 and 86) 
9  See Klingebiel (2001, 1); Mutz (2002, 17).  
10  Other terminological distinctions are also to be found in the relevant literature, although they, 
too, are keyed to the same state of affairs: “causative,” “cause-oriented,” or “structure-oriented” 
crisis prevention on the one hand; “operational,” “actor-oriented,” or “process-oriented” crisis 
prevention on the other. See Mutz (2002, 31); Fahrenhorst / Musto (2002, 171). 
 Crisis Potentials and Crisis Prevention in Central Asia 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 31 
1.3 Crisis prevention and conflict resolution in development 
cooperation: objectives and principles 
The German government’s comprehensive strategy on “Crisis Prevention and Conflict 
Resolution” assigns to development policy the function: “to help prevent and reduce the 
structural causes of conflicts in affected countries by improving economic, social, eco-
logical, and political conditions, and to promote mechanisms for nonviolent conflict 
resolution.”11 The BMZ has acted on this demand by, among other things, making “peace 
development and conflict prevention” into one of its at present ten priorities of bilateral 
development cooperation and at the same time by establishing the issue complex as a 
cross-cutting task of development policy as a whole.12 
Effective prevention policy is not only in need of a negative paradigm – prevention of war 
and violent conflict – it also needs a realistic and at the same time generalizable positive 
notion of peace, one to which options for action and concrete measures can be oriented. 
The terms “structural stability” and “human security” were introduced into the devel-
opment debate to describe an objective of this kind.13 While the concept of “human secu-
rity” focuses on the individual’s interest in protection against existential risks such as 
violence and illness, but also against ecological disasters and economic collapse, the term 
“structural stability” refers to the social and institutional level. What is meant here is a 
package of mutually reinforcing goals: social peace, acknowledgement of human rights and 
the rule of law, social and economic development. A major role in the achievement of 
these goals is played by dynamic and representative political institutions that are capable of 
shaping processes of change and settling conflicts by peaceful means.14  
The concept of structural stability may raise some questions to the extent that authoritarian 
regimes are often inclined to reinterpret the term stability in the light of their own security 
needs, raising it to their paramount objective of government and misusing it to legitimize 
human rights violations and political oppression.15 This is why it is important for a devel-
                                                                
11  BMZ (2000, Section 1.6). Emphasis, here as below, added by the author. 
12  As early as 1997 the BMZ for the first time expressly specified crisis prevention as a goal “to be 
incorporated in existing strategies and procedures as well as in current and planned development 
projects” (BMZ 1997, 10). 
13  To cite an example: the DAC Guidelines “Helping Prevent Violent Conflict” (OECD / DAC 
2001, 17 and 19). See also Leonhardt (2000, 19). 
14  OECD / DAC (2001, 17). 
15  In its essence, though, the term structural stability is refers to a systemic notion of stability. What 
this means is precisely not immutability and stasis but the permanent “reproductive capacity” of 
the social system, and this presupposes a permanent adaptability on the part of all the institutions 
involved. Immutability, on the other hand, is a source of instability. For an in-depth discussion of 
the strategy, see Mehler (2002), Klingebiel (2002). 
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opment policy geared to the goal of “structural stability” to avoid any misunderstandings 
over the democratic and participatory substance of the goal envisioned. Not every system 
of government and every political regime is worth preserving per se. Indeed, in many 
countries structural stability is conceivable only as the outcome of a comprehensive reform 
process that replaces existing structures of power and dominance with other structures 
oriented to social balance and political participation. The goal of structural stability may 
therefore also call for promotion of precisely those forces that are working for change – 
assuming of course that they are doing so by nonviolent, peaceful means. 
Crisis prevention and conflict resolution are not only relevant for measures that are imple-
mented specifically for the purpose. Rather, conflict-sensitive development cooperation is 
based on the principle that any form of external assistance can influence conflict situations 
and change the course of conflicts. Such impacts are often unintended. This can entail 
positive, but also negative, consequences. The central concern of the “Do no harm” prin-
ciple is to avoid the latter. Originally a lesson drawn from negative experiences made in the 
field of humanitarian aid, “Do no harm” is an important principle for any external interven-
tion under crisis conditions. This calls on the one hand for complex impact assessment 
(conflict-related impact analysis), and on the other hand it is important not to lose sight 
of the fact that the processes involved in promoting development are just as important as 
the results, and that the perception of these processes by the actors concerned is no less 
important than the facts themselves.16  
At the same time, it must be recognized that development cooperation geared to crisis 
prevention not only offers chances to positively influence the course of events but also that 
the impacts of such development cooperation are inevitably limited. External influence 
can help to set conflict-alleviating processes in motion and at the same time be used to 
mediate in conflict situations. But the decisive factors are the willingness and the resolve of 
the actors involved on the ground to accept a peaceful solution to existing conflicts and/or 
to eliminate the root causes of such conflicts. As in all of development cooperation, local 
ownership is essential.17 Accordingly, the expectations placed in the set of instruments of 
crisis prevention and conflict resolution have no choice but to remain realistic and modest 
in outlook. 
Every development strategy for regions with significant crisis potentials should be pre-
ceded by a basic decision on whether and how development cooperation can and should 
immediately influence a given conflict constellation. Viewed in ideal-typical terms, the 
choice involved here is to work “in, on, or around conflict” - i.e. to make the prevention 
or containment of crises the immediate object of the strategy (on conflict); or to seek, 
without losing sight of the connection between aid programs and conflict potentials, to 
                                                                
16  On this and the following paragraphs, see OECD / DAC (2001, 23–28). 
17  See Anderson / Spelten (2000, 11): “There is no ’imported peace.’“ 
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minimize the risks inherent in aid measures (in conflict); or, finally, merely to attempt to 
immunize measures against negative effects of conflicts (around conflict).18 Any attempt 
to “work around conflicts” in crisis regions, putting on as it were a mien of neutrality, is, 
however, as a rule bound to fail. Proceeding on the principle that in acute or potential 
conflict situations every form of external aid is conflict-relevant, a conflict-sensitive devel-
opment cooperation would thus be restricted to the first two options. Either approach may 
be legitimate. Yet a deliberate choice is the only real way to avoid false expectations and 
unintended negative impacts. Here, too, it is essential to subject development cooperation 
measures in potential crisis regions, in advance, to targeted conflict-related impact analy-
ses. 
External crisis prevention will only have chances of success if it uses its instruments to 
take up, to strengthen, and, wherever called for, to supplement locally existing approaches 
and capacities, but without substituting for or superimposing itself on them. The essential 
point here is to seek, and to develop, dialogue with all of the actors involved. Support for 
free media and provision of independent dialogue forums are important instruments here. 
The important role that women may play in violent conflicts as “stakeholders” of peace is a 
factor that should be borne in mind in this connection; for most combatants in armed con-
flicts are men, while women are disproportionately affected by the suffering experienced 
by the civilian population. 
To be successful, crisis-prevention-oriented development cooperation must be embedded in 
a coherent overall political strategy. This requires coordination between the ministries of 
donor countries as well as a coordinated approach involving as many bilateral and multilat-
eral donor institutions as possible in a crisis region. A coordinated approach that brings 
together the strengths of different donor countries and various instruments to form some-
thing on the order of a comprehensive crisis-prevention strategy is most likely to prove 
able to contribute to preserving peace and bringing about structural stability and security 
for the people concerned. 
1.4 Root causes of conflict, and crisis indicators 
Effective crisis prevention presupposes that potential conflict causes are known as such and 
perceived at an early stage. This condition is anything but trivial, for the root causes and 
triggers of crisis-like developments are as a rule complex. There is no such thing – and 
never will be – as a certain forecast of the conditions under which a conflict will escalate 
into a crisis. Even though every crisis has its genesis, and seldom comes as a surprise for 
the professional observer, it is simply not possible to formulate a catalogue of unfailing 
indicators that could be used to reliably predict the emergence of a manifest crisis.19  
                                                                
18  DFID (2002, 22). 
19  See Mutz (2002, 20f). 
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On the other hand, it is entirely possible to formulate plausible hypotheses concerning the 
circumstances that are particularly conducive to the emergence and escalation of violent 
conflicts. Factors that have proven particularly conducive to conflict include, for instance, 
growing socioeconomic inequalities, lack of chances for political participation, fragile 
governmental and insufficient civil-society structures, political violence and repression, or 
competition for scarce resources. Ethnic, religious, or cultural cleavages can serve to exac-
erbate conflict situations; once established, “markets of violence” can contribute to per-
petuating violent conflicts.20 
A recently published World Bank study on the causes and consequences of violent intra-
state conflicts points especially to economic causes as important risk factors for societies.21 
According to the study, countries that are faced with an economic downturn, are dependent 
on exports of raw materials, and have low but highly unevenly distributed per capita in-
comes are particularly vulnerable to civil war. On the other hand, one striking fact here is 
that, for instance, marked ethnic or religious diversity per se does not in any way mean an 
above-average risk for a given society. 
The conflict analysis undertaken in the present study on Central Asia is oriented to a cata-
logue of crisis indicators proposed by Manuela Leonhardt in an analysis of the EU’s coop-
eration with the ACP countries and consisting of factors from the four fields of analysis: 
governance, economy, sociocultural factors, and security.22 The analysis furthermore 
includes a fifth category, “external factors,” which contains both direct interventions and 
indirect effects (see Box 1).23  
These indicators, which will be used in what follows to analyze conflict potentials, can at 
the same time be assigned to three problem levels that are oriented to the points of depar-
ture required for crisis-prevention-oriented policy: (a) structural causes of conflict, (b) the 
capacity of a society to engage in constructive conflict resolution, and (c) conflict-
aggravating security risks. In other words, the analysis includes both long-term, structur-
ally oriented aspects and short- and medium-term, process-oriented aspects of crisis pre-
vention as well as factors that tend to aggravate crises and prolong conflicts. 
                                                                
20  See Klingebiel (2001). 
21  Collier et al. (2003, esp. 3–4) 
22  Leonhardt (2000, 19–27). 
23  Leonhardt subsumes external factors under the category ’governance’, which seems rather arbi-
trary in view of the fact that individual manifestations of this factor (e.g. problematic trade rela-
tions or capital exodus) may very well be of an economic nature. It would therefore appear rea-
sonable to me to form a new, separate category. See also the set of instruments used for Tension 
and Conflict Impact Assessment (TCIA) in Klingebiel et al. (2000). 
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1.5 Fields of action and points of departure for crisis 
prevention in development cooperation 
Crisis prevention and conflict resolution in DC are keyed above all to intrasocietal causes 
of conflict. This is not only a result of the division of labor between development policy 
and “classic” foreign policy, under which the sphere of official diplomacy is reserved for 
the latter. Concentration on intrasocietal tensions is also bound up with the perception that 
most wars since 1945 have been intrastate, not international, in nature. In 2001, for in-
stance, this was the case for 28 of 31 wars throughout the world.24 Even so, external influ-
ences on intrastate conflicts are a factor that cannot be denied. Many civil wars are closely 
linked with political tensions or interests in neighboring countries, and effective conflict 
regulation and durable crisis prevention are in any case not to be had without inclusion of 
regional actors outside the countries immediately affected. This state of affairs must be 
accorded consideration in strategies of prevention-oriented development policy. 
Based on the root causes of conflicts and the paradigm of “structural stability” and “human 
security,” we can specify a number of fields of action in which development cooperation 
                                                                
24  AKUF (2002). 
Box 1: Fields of conflict analysis, and individual crisis indicators  
• Governance 
 Î Government legitimacy and good governance 
 Î Pluralism and participation 
 Î Conflict-resolution mechanisms  
• Economy  
 Î Problems in coming to terms with transformation and rapid change  
 Î Growing socioeconomic disparities  
 Î Competition for natural resources  
• Sociocultural factors 
 Î Political instrumentalization of cultural and other differences  
• Security  
 Î Legacy of violence 
 Î Arms proliferation and irregular armed units  
 Î Uncontrolled state security forces  
• External factors 
 Î Negative effects of external intervention 
 Î Negative effects of the regional/international setting  
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can contribute to preventing crises. The DAC Guidelines, which list seven points of depar-
ture, provide a useful pattern to start out with. They will be explained briefly in what fol-
lows:25 
● Mainstreaming crisis prevention and conflict resolution as a long-term cross-
cutting task: The aim should be to integrate a perspective of crisis prevention and 
conflict sensitivity into development cooperation as a whole. This implies two central 
tasks: to gain a deepened general understanding of conflicts and the way they are 
influenced by external aid; and to integrate conflict analyses, risk assessments, and 
conflict-related impact analyses as standard components of the planning and im-
plementation of measures. The development of country strategies in particular should 
meet this demand. Only a strategy based on a realistic conflict analysis can help to 
prevent negative impacts of external influence and foster peaceful conflict-resolution 
mechanisms. Two important points of departure for the practice of development co-
operation are therefore adequate staff qualification (training and advanced training 
of internal and external staff as well as counterpart staff, with the aim of conflict sen-
sitization) and functioning mechanisms for a regular and operational communication 
and secure processing of crisis-relevant information as contributions to early warn-
ing. One important consideration in this context is the presence on the ground of Ger-
man DC in partner countries, in that a more pronounced presence on the ground can 
help to abbreviate the paths between information (early warning) and reaction (early 
response) and facilitate the coordination with other donors essential to gaining a 
measure of effective influence. 
● Security as a basis for development: Security of persons, property, and public 
goods, and protection of human rights are fundamental preconditions for sustainable 
development and poverty reduction. Development cooperation should aim to help 
create the conditions needed to enable government institutions to guarantee security 
in such a way as to foreground, not the self-interests of the security sector or the ma-
chinery of state, but people’s need for protection from existential threats. To cite an 
example, targeted security-sector reforms and safeguards to ensure civil govern-
ment control over security forces are highly important factors in connection with ef-
forts aimed at “better governance.” Encouragement of open discussion processes in a 
society about existing security needs and efforts aimed at strengthening relevant 
analysis capacities in governmental and civil-society institutions can contribute to 
developing a security culture geared to the needs of people. In post-war situations 
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants call for high levels of atten-
tion, as do the closely related tasks of landmine clearance and light-weapons con-
trol. Here development cooperation can as a rule provide no more than a partial con-
tribution alongside those made by other policy fields on the donor side (internal-
                                                                
25  OECD / DAC (2001, 31–74). 
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affairs, defense policy). Policy coherence and coordination with other donors are for 
this reason all the more important in this sensitive field. 
● Supporting regional cooperation: Even though the great majority of violent con-
flicts take place within states, in many cases there is also an important regional di-
mension in play. This applies for the origins, interests, or resources of conflict par-
ties, and this in turn also means that strategies of peacekeeping, crisis resolution, and 
prevention also have to bear the regional dimension in mind. Regional stability is an 
important contribution to durable intrasocietal peace. Crisis factors that have inherent 
transboundary impacts – we need think here only of expulsion, ecological degrada-
tion, or the spread of infectious diseases – can in any case only be dealt effectively 
with on the basis of regional approaches. Development cooperation must therefore 
accord proper attention to the regional dimension of conflicts and crises and 
support regional cooperation in its efforts aimed at crisis prevention. Besides sup-
port for official cooperation of the kind engaged in by organizations dedicated to re-
gional economic or security integration, this also includes efforts to strengthen cross-
border contacts at the level of civil society, business, and science and culture. Exter-
nal actors must, however, closely observe whether the concrete conditions given 
permit any helpful regional cooperation in the first place. To cite an example, re-
gional organizations dominated by one state or unable to reach agreement on a joint 
approach due to a situation of competition between important member countries are 
unlikely to prove effective as mediators between conflict parties.26  
● Promoting peace processes, justice, and reconciliation: Active promotion of peace 
processes is a task central to preventing the emergence of new crises and any relapse 
into violence. Development cooperation can help create incentives that make it more 
attractive for all conflict parties to seek nonviolent solutions than to revert to vio-
lence. Support for local capacities and initiatives dedicated to finding civil settle-
ments of local conflicts is a factor essential to securing peace on a broad social basis. 
In this sense civil-society organizations committed to reconciliation and nonviolent 
cooperation are also important target groups for external assistance. Striking the right 
balance between justice and reconciliation is one of the most difficult, and at the 
same time most important, tasks of every peace process, one that can, in the end, be 
taken on only by the conflict parties themselves. Development cooperation can, how-
ever, provide important impulses by furnishing tools, offering dialogue forums, and 
bringing the experiences made by other societies into the peace process. Reconcilia-
tion in the face of past injustice will have better chances, the more visibly the present 
is marked by the experience of justice. This is the reason why efforts to strengthen 
democratization and suitable participatory structures are an element central to 
the success of any peace process. 
                                                                
26  See Carnegie Commission (1997, 147).  
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● Building peace partnerships: External donors should be prepared to enter into a 
long-term engagement in the field of peace development both with state and non-
state actors in crisis regions and among one another. As far as state partners are con-
cerned, resolute and swift assistance is needed precisely in areas where the state is 
“weak,” no longer able to fulfill its essential protective functions, and a country may 
therefore be faced with the threat of drifting into violent conflict. In the case of re-
pressive regimes, however, the question of a proper stance is a difficult one to an-
swer. Here, from case to case, it will be necessary to come to balanced decisions be-
tween the need to keep open channels of influence and the need to protect and en-
force the interests of repressed population segments. Credible partnerships with civil-
society organizations are for this reason an important complementary activity. To the 
extent that such partnerships represent a strong and organized civil society, they may 
be important contact partners in deciding whether to conditionalize development co-
operation even against the will of the government concerned. Experience does, how-
ever, also show that complete isolation of a regime can seldom be seen as a construc-
tive contribution to conflict deescalation. This is one more reason why it is highly 
important to work for a coordinated strategy involving bilateral and multilateral 
donor institutions. 
● Working together with the private business sector: Most businesses in crisis 
regions have a vital interest in peace and stability. A development cooperation capa-
ble of winning, and activating, the private business sector as a stakeholder of civil 
conflict resolution in a given society is in possession of a good chance to apprecia-
bly broaden the effective base of its conflict-prevention work. With the jobs, regu-
larly paid wages and salaries, and the basic social infrastructure they provide, large 
companies can make important contributions to the social stability and quality of life 
in crisis regions. External support can serve to tie pro-peace activities of individual 
private businesses, including investments in social or health-related projects or edu-
cational measures, into larger contexts. At the same time, companies should be sensi-
tized for possible conflict-aggravating impacts stemming from their business activi-
ties. Development cooperation can support government institutions in their efforts to 
establish and enforce social and ecological standards. Another important contribution 
to supporting a culture of civil conflict resolution may be seen in forums that in-
clude domestic and foreign businesses, the state sector, and civil society and pro-
vide all of the parties concerned with an opportunity to reach agreement on principles 
of mutual engagement. 
● Working to counter negative economic forces: Crisis prevention must at the same 
time come to terms with the problem that wars and violent conflicts are often sus-
tained by strong economic interests and increasingly defined by these interests, the 
longer an armed conflict lasts. Arms-trafficking, exploitation of and illegal trade in 
resources in the shadow of violent conflicts, “privatized” state institutions, protection 
provided by private “security firms” in cases in which the state is no longer able to 
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provide such protection – these are some of the manifestations of a political econ-
omy of violence. It is therefore essential to elaborate a clear analysis of the economic 
background of conflicts and the resulting interest situations. This is also important to 
avoid situations in which the activities of external donors may unintentionally pro-
mote actors who are not interested in civil conflict resolution. Furthermore, in help-
ing to establish anti-corruption standards development cooperation can also play a 
role in bringing about more transparency in government institutions. Here, too, an 
important factor is coordination between donors and coherence between various pol-
icy-making ministries and agencies as a means, for instance, of inducing multina-
tional corporations to refrain from any involvement in the business of violent con-
flict. 
When, where, and in what way these points of departure can be put to reasonable use de-
pends, among other things, on which phase of the conflict cycle a crisis region is in at a 
given point of time. In principle, we can distinguish three conflict phases:27  
● The phase of emergence and escalation: The concern in this phase is to address the 
root causes, to establish conflict-regulation mechanisms, and to avert violence. 
● The phase in which a violent conflict is played out: Here the focus is on contain-
ment and termination of violence. The scopes of action open to development coop-
eration are accordingly often restricted in this phase. Increasingly, however, it is 
coming to be realized that even the humanitarian aid usually provided in this phase 
must be more closely dovetailed with development-policy goals. 
● The phase of de-escalation and consolidation: The central tasks here are to cope 
with the conflict aftermath and to engage in efforts aimed at reconciliation and pre-
vention of any new escalation of violence. 
Apart from this highly simplified scheme of phases, which is not meant to conceal the fact 
that that developments on the ground may take a precipitous course, reversals are entirely 
possible, and different regional situations may often be encountered in one and the same 
country at the same point of time, a concrete decision on suitable points of departure and 
approaches will depend on both the given conflict situation and the setting in which devel-
opment cooperation is positioned. 
                                                                
27  Klingebiel (2001, 2). 
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2 Political, socioeconomic, and sociocultural framework 
conditions in the Central Asian countries in transition  
2.1 The overall region 
The Soviet legacy 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991 constitutes the key reference point for the 
recent political, economic, and social development of all five Central Asian republics. Only 
when, after the attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991, a renewal of the Soviet state 
had proven unviable did the political elites of the Central Asian Union republics set them-
selves the goal of “independence” as a new national idea. Once the Soviet ideology had 
disintegrated, they sought in this way to legitimize themselves as the rulers of the newly 
emerged states – with their overall population of some 57 million people. 
The Soviet legacy has left deep traces in all five Central Asian republics. Even today this 
legacy continues to shape their politics, economies, societies, and cultures and represents a 
rallying point even where divisive factors have long begun to make themselves felt and a 
policy of conscious delineation is the order of the day. This distinguishes the Newly Inde-
pendent States from their Asian neighbors to the east and south of the territories that once 
made up the Soviet Union. It must, however, be noted that the processes of “assimilation” 
between the post-Soviet countries and their neighbors are progressing, albeit at an uneven 
pace. In Tajikistan in particular the 1992-1997 civil war played a major role in accelerating 
the dissolution of the structural patterns typical of the Soviet Union28 and in many respects 
brought the country closer to Afghanistan (weak central authority, particularisms based on 
regional clan structures, links to militant Islamist groups, area of retreat for Afghan anti-
Taliban fighters). The national language, closely related to Persian, also constitutes a bar-
rier vis-à-vis the Turkic languages spoken by Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Kazakhs, a 
barrier, though, that has until now been overcome with the help of Russian, the region’s 
lingua franca. 
Internal situation 
Eleven years after independence, all five republics are formally democracies, though in fact 
the political regimes are dominated by more or less authoritarian ruling elites that had 
already had active leadership positions under the Soviet system and which are adept at 
shielding themselves from competition and show little interest in accepting political 
change. In Tajikistan power struggles between rival elites led to a civil war in 1992 that 
                                                                
28  The civil war itself in turn, as well as the geographically small-scale, clan-related structure which 
it was to take on, is a good illustration of the thesis that of all the Central Asian republics, Taji-
kistan may have been the one least permeated by the Soviet system. 
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was ended only in 1997 with the aid of outside mediation. In recent years, intensified by 
the terror attacks in the US, repression against opposition and media has grown 
throughout the region, often under the pretext of combating Islamist and terrorist activities. 
In its World Report 2003, Human Rights Watch speaks of a “deepening human rights 
crisis in Central Asia.”29  
Economic development 
In economic terms, the Central Asian countries, like other former Soviet republics, went 
through a severe crisis in the first half of the 1990s that, depending on the country con-
cerned, led to accumulated GDP contractions on the order of 20 to 60 %. It must be noted 
here that the starting situation faced by these countries was worse than that in the greater 
part of the rest of the Soviet Union. In 1990 Kazakhstan had a per capita GDP 8 % below 
the Soviet average, the figure for the other four republics ranged between 30 and 50 %.30 
Together with Azerbaijan, the latter had the lowest per capita incomes recorded in the 
Soviet Union.31 Transfers from the Union budget long served as an important source of 
income in the region. The classic problems bound up with post-socialist economic trans-
formation in Central Asia were thus exacerbated by the “burdens of imposed independ-
ence.”32 The disintegration of the Soviet economic area left in its wake a number of 
economies that were in no way geared to political independence:33 
● Trade and the movement of goods were faced with entirely new boundaries that now 
served to interrupt the region’s elementary economic relations. 
● Suppliers were cut off from producers, as were producers from their markets. Yet 
since none of the Central Asian republics has open access to the sea, and all impor-
tant transportation links were traditionally aligned to Russia, the countries of the re-
gion have found it more than difficult to develop new trade relations. 
● In the Central Asian republics the Soviet “division of labor” led to a forced develop-
ment of certain specific economic sectors (above all cotton, natural resources indus-
try), which left these countries, now become independent, with economic structures 
that were in part marked by very low levels of diversification. 
● Direct and indirect subsidies for private households, public budgets, and enterprises, 
an important element of the Soviet system, diminished to a trickle, even though after 
                                                                
29  Human Rights Watch (2003, 282). 
30  Havlik / Vertlib (1996, 147). 
31  Pomfret (1999, 395). For more in-depth information on the issue of poverty Central Asian, see 
Müller (2003, Chapter 4). 
32  See Mangott (ed.) (1996). 
33  Linn (2002). 
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independence Russia initially made substantial transfers to the region until the ruble 
area was gradually dissolved in the course of 1993. 
● Access to water and energy resources was no longer a matter to be taken for granted. 
Only some of these countries have mineral oil and natural gas resources, while others 
have water resources. The old allocation procedures were no longer in effect, new 
ones had not yet been developed. Ad hoc arrangements replaced fixed agreements 
and constituted an obstacle to long-term planning. 
● Once the Soviet state machinery had broken down, new, functioning administrative 
structures had to be created. 
● A large share of the Russian-descended population left the region, a development 
which cost it many well-trained workers and experts. 
Some much-discussed ideas on creation of a new common Central Asian economic area 
have until now failed, mainly for lack of mutual trust and because of differences over 
approaches to economic transformation policies. Numerous agreements on a coordinated 
reform policy in the framework of the CIS that were concluded between 1992 and 1994 
have not been put into practice.34 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have in the 
meantime joined Russia and Belarus in the “Eurasian Economic Community” (EAEC, 
formerly a customs union), which provides in principle for free trade among member 
states. In fact, however, this agreement, too, is being undercut, in part by a temporary 
reintroduction of official customs tariffs (following the Russia crisis), in part by corrupt 
customs officials, in part by high-handed local authorities.35  
It was only in 1996 that a gradual economic recovery got underway in Central Asia. At 
the beginning of the new decade Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the slowest reformers, had 
reached approximately the GDP figures they had recorded in 1989 (2001: 105 % and 96 %, 
respectively), while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia’s most extensively reformed 
economies, remained far removed from these figures (84 % and 71 %, respectively), and 
Tajikistan, the region’s poorest country in absolute terms, is, in addition, still grappling 
with the consequences of the civil war (56 %).36 The relatively better record posted by 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is generally attributed to two causes: For one thing, both 
countries are still faced with the need to implement substantial structural adjustment meas-
ures that have already largely been adopted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. For another, 
the economic statistics made public by Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan must be read with 
some caution. For both countries, international financial institutions have expressed reser-
                                                                
34  Havlik / Vertlib (1996, 149). 
35  EBRD (2002b). 
36  EBRD (2002a). 
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vations concerning the reliability of the data that have been made available.37 It is, how-
ever, plausible to assume that the 1998 Russia crisis hit Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which 
are more closely intertwined with the Russian market, harder than the other countries of the 
region. 
Based on the figures for 2000, the World Bank currently rates three of the Central Asian 
republics – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan – as low-income countries with annual 
per capita incomes below US $ 755. According to this classification, Tajikistan is even one 
of the world’s 11 lowest (per capita) income countries. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the 
countries of the region best endowed with natural resources, are categorized as lower-
middle income countries.38  
Distribution of power between the Central Asian republics 
Demographically, Uzbekistan (with a population of some 25 million) and Kazakhstan 
(some 15 million) are the heavyweights in Central Asia. Both countries are vying for the 
leadership role in the region and encounter one another with a certain measure of mistrust. 
While Uzbekistan has the larger and ethnically more homogeneous population, thanks to 
its oil and gas reserves Kazakhstan has the more powerful and productive economy. The 
three smaller republics of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan – each with a popula-
tion of 5 to 6.5 million – are doing their best not to be drawn too far into the orbit of their 
larger neighbors. Both of the latter, but Uzbekistan in particular, are accused of seeking to 
establish themselves as hegemonic powers in Central Asia, and even of – possibly – har-
boring ambitions of enlarging their own territory at the expense of their smaller Central 
Asian neighbors. 
Borders 
Speculations of this kind are fueled above all by the course of the borders of the Central 
Asian republics, some of which continue to be in dispute and must be seen as one of the 
most problematic aspects of the Soviet legacy.39 In essence, the territories concerned were 
allocated in the 1920s to the Union republics which, despite its rhetoric to the contrary, 
Moscow treated as administrate units. Neither practicable and clearly defined and legally 
claimable borders nor historical ties played any particularly pronounced role in the process. 
The main consideration was the Moscow leadership’s aim of assigning Central Asia’s 
ethnically and culturally heterogeneous population to politically manageable territorial 
units, without allowing any one of these republics to assume an undisputed leadership 
position on the basis of its resources, strategic location, or other major influential factors. 
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38  World Bank (2002a, 19–20). 
39  For in-depth information on this question, see ICG (2002a). 
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These new borders were drawn with a view to creating interdependencies, but at the same 
time demarcations were put in place that lay the groundwork for incessant claims of one 
republic against the other. The framework defined by the Soviet system served to mask 
these conflict potentials in that the borders themselves were of little inherent importance 
and, to make things even more complicated, the Stalinist terror of the 1930s deprived the 
various population groups of their identity-forming leadership elites. Furthermore, over the 
course of time many new “transboundary” structures and linkages emerged without the 
people affected being aware of their cross-border character. Living and working in differ-
ent republics, crossing borders to attend school, roads connecting two towns that crossed 
from one republic to the next and back – all this was part and parcel of everyday life in the 
Soviet Central Asian republics. When the Soviet Union dissolved, this situation gave rise, 
over night as it were, to serious problems. Uzbekistan, located geographically in the center 
of the region, has unsettled border disputes with all four of its former Soviet neighbors. 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are also faced with open disputes. 
One particularly problematic situation is found in the Ferghana Valley, one of the most 
densely populated areas in the region. Here, in roughly 5 % of the area of Central Asia, 20-
25 % of the region’s population is settled. The valley, which extends over some 200 x 100 
km in a semi-mountainous landscape on the upper course of the Syr-Darya river, is split up 
between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and further fragmented by complicated 
boundary lines and a number of exclaves. Population growth, unemployment, and a young 
generation without prospects for the future have made this region, with its large number of 
identity groups sharing a tiny geographic space, into one of Central Asia’s major potential 
trouble spots. As early as in 1989 and 1990 violent conflicts erupted between various 
groups in the Kyrgyz and Uzbek parts of the valley, claiming a toll of several hundred 
lives. In the further course of the 1990s unrest flared up again and again. In 1996 and 1997 
rioting and a violently suppressed prison revolt on the Tajik side claimed several hundred 
lives.40 The Ferghana Valley has now moved into the center of the crisis-prevention 
efforts of external donor organizations and international institutions. 
In 1999 and 2000 tensions between Uzbekistan and its two neighbors escalated in the 
Ferghana Valley. The government in Tashkent accused Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan of 
failing to take adequate measures against the activities of the militant Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU), whose stated aim is to topple the Uzbek leadership. With attacks on 
police posts, adductions, and other acts of violence that, according to official sources, in 
2000 alone claimed the lives of over 200 members of the regular army and the IMU, the 
movement, which had its logistic base in Afghanistan and infiltrated the region via Tajiki-
stan, spread profound uncertainty among the governments of all of the three republics 
involved. Claiming a need and a right to defend itself against further incursions of IMU 
fighters from neighboring countries, Uzbekistan imposed a visa requirement for Tajik 
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citizens, reinforced its border defenses, and mined part of the border. The situation dees-
calated only when the anti-terror war in Afghanistan markedly weakened the IMU, its 
leader, Namangani, was killed, and at the same time international pressure was exerted on 
the governments involved to come to an understanding. In early October 2002 Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan announced, on the fringes of a meeting of the Eurasian Economic Commu-
nity in Dushanbe, that fundamental agreement had been reached on 86 % of the 1,283 km 
border separating the two countries.41 Viewed in the context of the overall region, this is 
no more than a first step. 
Regional cooperation 
Efforts aimed at improving security cooperation in Central Asia had intensified even prior 
to the terror attacks in the US, not least in response to activities of groups in the region that 
were overtly extremist or perceived by the governments concerned as extremist. A regional 
forum that could well grow in importance in the future is the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). The organization, which evolved from a group initiated in 1996 as 
the “Shanghai Five” (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, China, and Russia), was origi-
nally created to settle some open questions regarding the course of the borders separating 
China and the former Soviet Union. The organization met it original purpose by adopting a 
number of confidence-building measures. In June 2001 Uzbekistan, which does not share a 
border with China, was accepted as a new member of the organization, which took the 
opportunity to give itself a new name and a new orientation. The SCO assumed the func-
tion of a security organization dedicated to the transboundary issues of separatism, extrem-
ism, and terrorism. It is still too early to say whether and to what degree the organization 
will prove able to contribute to resolving as yet unsettled border disputes in the region. 
Skeptics note critically that following the 9/11 terror attacks in the US, Russia and China in 
particular sought to use the SCO to reassert some of their influence in Central Asia and to 
constitute a counterweight to the US, which had set up military bases in, among other 
places, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.42 Uzbekistan, a country involved in most of the open 
border disputes, was in turn reported to be more interested in bilateral agreement in which 
it could bring its demographic weight to bear in talks with its smaller neighbors and to 
view the multilateral option merely as a kind of reinsurance against terrorist activities 
should the US withdraw from the region.43 
                                                                
41  Abdullo (2002). 
42  Wacker (2002). 
43  Pannier (2002). 
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Table 1 presents an overview of the most important regional organizations in which the 
Central Asian republics are involved. The large number of organizations named should, 
though, not be misinterpreted: all of the Central Asian governments are intent on seeing 
to it that their scopes of action are not unnecessarily restricted by multilateral obligations. 
De facto, the cooperative rhetoric of publicity-minded summit meetings continues to be 
accompanied on all sides by extensive measures aimed at sealing off one country from 
the others. 
2.2 Uzbekistan 
Due to its population of roughly 25 million and its geographic location, Uzbekistan is the 
core country of Central Asia. Unlike the situation in its neighboring countries, Uzbeki-
stan’s population is relatively homogeneous. Ethnic Uzbeks are estimated to account for 75 
to 80 % of the country’s citizens, with Russian, Tajik, Kazakh, and Tatar population 
Table 1: Membership of Central Asian republics in regional cooperation organizations  
 SCO EAEC CSTO CICA ECO CACO 
Kazakhstan X X X X X X 
Kyrgyzstan X X X X X X 
Tajikistan X X X X X X 
Turkmenistan     X  
Uzbekistan X   X X X 
SCO =  Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with Russia and China) 
EAEC = Eurasian Economic Community, formerly Customs Union (with Russia and 
 Belarus) 
CSTO = Collective Security Treaty Organization (with Russia, Belarus, and Armenia), 
 formerly Treaty on Collective Security  
CICA = Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (with 
 Afghanistan, China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, Palestinian National  
 Authority, Russia,Turkey) 
ECO = Economic Cooperation Organization (with Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan) 
CACO = Central Asian Cooperation Organization, formerly Central Asian Economic 
 Community  
Source: EU (2002, 55); own researches  
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groups, the largest minorities, accounting for shares of three to five percent.44 Uzbekistan 
is intertwined ethno-demographically with its neighbors mainly through the fact that some 
2.5 million ethnic Uzbeks live in the neighboring CIS republics. A certain percentage of 
Afghanistan’s population is likewise Uzbek. 
In the 1980s Uzbekistan experienced the greatest population growth in the entire Soviet 
Union, an average of 2.6 % p.a. Over the past decade the country’s cumulative growth 
amounted to another roughly 25 %. Accordingly, Uzbekistan today has a relatively young 
population. Some 60 % of the population are below 25 years of age, 35 % below 15 years. 
The present annual growth rate is roughly 1.6 % (roughly 400,000 persons). 
With its 2.1 million inhabitants, Tashkent, the capital, is Central Asia’s largest metropolis 
and by far the country’s biggest city. Other centers with populations between 100,000 and 
400,000 include Samarkand and Bukhara – the magnificent symbols of Central Asian 
history and culture – Nukus south of the Aral Sea, and Namangan, Andijon, Ferghana and 
Kokand in the Ferghana Valley. 
Large expanses of Uzbekistan are covered by sandy deserts and dry steppelands and are 
accordingly sparsely populated. The Ferghana Valley, on the other hand, the Uzbek part of 
which is linked to the rest of the country to the west by a narrow land corridor, is an an-
cient agricultural zone and one of Central Asia’s most fertile regions. Monocultural, irriga-
tion-intensive cotton-farming involving a heavy use of pesticides and generating substan-
tial amounts of industrial wastewater have, however, come together to create a dangerous 
ecological situation along the Syr-Darya, which is one of Central Asia’s main rivers, pass-
ing through and supplying the valley before flowing on through Kazakhstan and emptying 
into the Aral Sea. Water scarcity has already been the cause of some isolated local con-
flicts. Bloody conflicts between Uzbeks and Turk-Meshetes in the Ferghana Valley in 1989 
were motivated, among other things, by water disputes. Persistent population growth and a 
growing pollution of the region’s drinking water with toxic substances give every reason to 
anticipate that problems will be exacerbated over the long run.45  
                                                                
44  In all of Central Asia data on populations and their ethnic composition must be viewed with 
caution. Most official statistics are estimates based on Soviet census data from 1989; due to 
ethnically differentiated migration, incomplete coverage, illegal immigration, and other factors, 
these data are little more than rough estimates. And deliberate, politically motivated manipulati-
ons also play a certain role. This is the reason why the literature on this question tends to contain 
quite divergent data. The figures used here were selected from various sources on grounds of 
plausibility. This is not to say anything about their reliability. Some useful general information 
can be found in: Götz / Halbach (1996), EBRD (2001a-b), EBRD (2002b-d), CIA (2002). 
45  Introductions containing the most important basic historic-geographic and political information 
on all five Central Asian republics can be found in Götz / Halbach (1996), Mangott (ed.) (1996), 
Halbach (2002a), Moder (2002). 
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Politically, Uzbekistan is ruled in largely authoritarian fashion by President Islam Kari-
mov. Under the declared maxim of according “stability” precedence over democratization 
with a view to avoiding the emergence of chaotic conditions like those experienced in 
Tajikistan, the Uzbek leadership has largely suppressed any political opposition. Formally, 
there are five political parties represented in the Uzbek parliament. In fact, though, these 
parties are all close to the government, if indeed they were not founded on the immediate 
initiative of the president himself. Neither in parliament nor in the media or other vehicles 
of public opinion is there any critical discussion of the government’s policies. The coun-
try’s media, in any cases largely state-run, are controlled, demonstrations are as a rule not 
approved. Opposition politicians as well as Islamic clerics who do not subscribe to the 
state-tolerated variant of Islam are persecuted and jailed as extremists. Human rights or-
ganizations report systematic torture in Uzbek prisons, a practice which is claiming more 
and more lives.  
Since 1999 and 2000 at the latest, when there was a bomb attack on the government build-
ing in Tashkent and military incursions into Uzbek territory by the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan staged from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Uzbek government has regarded 
Islam extremists as the major security threat facing the country. The formation of the inter-
national anti-terror coalition after the terror attacks in the US and the downfall of the Tali-
ban government in Kabul, which had provided logistic support for the IMU, has, for the 
time being, eliminated the movement’s threat potential. A movement that many observers 
see as more influential and significant than the IMU in the long term is the radical Islamist 
– but as yet non-violent – Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation, or more completely: Hizb ut-
Tahrir al Islami, Party of Islamic Liberation), which seeks to recruit its followers not (like 
the IMU) among the poor rural population but among urban intellectuals and which has 
made Uzbekistan the pivotal point of the movement in Central Asia.46 The Uzbek govern-
ment has taken the activities of the Islamists as well as the military struggle against terror 
as an occasion to get even tougher with domestic opposition and other dissidents. Thou-
sands of actual and supposed supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir and other religious or political 
organizations are today being detained in Uzbek prisons.47  
The Uzbek government is today pursuing a policy of gradual economic reform. Its stated 
intention is to prevent economic breakdown and social hardships of the kind observed in 
other countries in transition. True, in the wake of the dissolution of the ruble zone initial 
efforts were undertaken to implement some elements of an IMF-supported macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural adjustment program, but two years later the government aban-
doned this course and turned to a strategy of forced import substitutions accompanied by 
                                                                
46  For more information on Hizb ut-Tahrir, see Rashid (2002, 151–175). In Germany Hizb ut-
Tahrir was banned by the Federal Minister of the Interior in January 2003. 
47  Human Rights Watch reports that the figure ranges, “according to conservative estimates,” 
between 6500 and 7000; Human Rights Watch (2003, 382). 
 Crisis Potentials and Crisis Prevention in Central Asia 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 49 
strict foreign-exchange controls, government regulation of exchange rates, and a dirigistic 
structural policy. The country’s dialogue with the international financial institutions has 
been disrupted since then. 
Official statistics show for post-Soviet Uzbekistan the lowest decline in economic output 
among all of the CIS countries. The country was, however, able to profit from a set of 
relatively favorable starting conditions: 
● Sales of Uzbekistan’s main traditional exports, cotton and gold, proved able to be 
redirected, with relatively few problems, from the internal Soviet economy to the 
world market, a move that entailed opportunities to earn foreign exchange. 
● Uzbekistan’s gas and oil reserves and developed grain industry have freed the coun-
try from reliance on any major need to import goods in the energy and food sectors. 
● Due to Uzbekistan’s relatively low degree of industrialization (and, accordingly, a 
level of urbanization lower than in most of the other former Soviet republics), the ini-
tial “deindustrialization” generally associated with the process of post-Soviet trans-
formation has impacted the country less severely than it has others. 
● In infrastructural terms, Uzbekistan is better developed than its Central Asian 
neighbors. 
For a protracted period following independence, the strategy adhered to by the government 
was to devote substantial public resources to a late-comer industrialization and to use 
massive transfers and regulatory measures to prevent a breakdown in public-sector invest-
ments in the education and social sectors of the kind experienced by most other post-
socialist countries in transition. These measures were undertaken mainly at the expense of 
the rural population. While the Soviet collective farms (kolkhozes, sovkhoses) were largely 
transformed into forms of private property, the old system was conserved in the form of 
government-imposed cultivation and delivery targets. Producers were required in particular 
to sell their cotton crops to the state at fixed, low prices, and the government in turn ex-
ported a large share of output at world-market prices. While this had the desired fiscal 
effect, it at the same time prevented the necessary restructuring and modernization of 
farms, prolonged ecologically questionable monoculture practices, and constituted an 
obstacle to a reorientation of agricultural production. Employees were paid extremely low 
wages, which were often not even disbursed in cash, a practice that drove producers into 
illegal cross-border trade. In 2002 the government reduced official producer sales require-
ments to 50 % of the crop and held out the prospect of a complete lifting of quotas. It is by 
no means certain that this will happen in the near future in view of the massive interests of 
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government officials in retaining the status quo and the chances of illegal enrichment it 
holds out.48 
Viewed in terms of society as a whole, we can speak here of a system of redistribution that 
entails comprehensive transfers from the rural population to the benefit of the urban (indus-
trialized) centers. The associated, substantial ecological, health-related, and social burdens 
borne by the rural population (due to extensive irrigation, intensive use of pesticides, and 
the low skills levels of rural workers)49 have prompted many observers to ask what the 
long-term consequences of this policy will be. Moreover, in recent years poor cotton crops 
due to persistent drought and declining world-market prices have also pointed clearly to the 
system’s short-term vulnerability to crisis. On the other hand, there are still close limits set 
to any expansion of private-sector initiative, the main reason being that government regi-
mentation and corruption in the bureaucracy and security forces constitute a substantial 
disincentive.  
The stagnant economic picture is reflected in a deteriorating social situation. The findings 
of a poverty study recently conducted for the World Bank have not yet been published; but 
preliminary estimates are that the incomes of roughly 30 % of the population are below the 
absolute poverty line. Having denied even the existence of a poverty problem for years, the 
Uzbek government has now committed itself vis-à-vis the World Bank to the goal of pov-
erty reduction and signaled its willingness to formulate a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP).50 Thanks to its cooperation with the anti-terror coalition, the Uzbekistan govern-
ment has, since late 2001, been able to entertain hopes for a more sympathetic reception by 
the international donor community. In 2002, however, efforts aimed at reaching a new 
agreement with World Bank and IMF failed to reach a breakthrough because the govern-
ment continues to cling to its present official exchange-rate policy.51 
Even though it may appear that Uzbekistan, due to its population makeup, is faced with 
less deep-seated ethnic problems than its other Central Asian neighbors, it is possible to 
identify a number of regional fracture lines that are not without political and social mo-
ment. Above all, we can identify three competing regions:52 
● the southern region, with its Islamic cultural centers of Samarkand and Bukhara; 
                                                                
48  This section is largely based on information obtained in background interviews held in Tashkent 
in November 2002. See also EBRD (2001a, 12–17); World Bank (2002b, I–II). 
49  See also Müller (2003, 42). 
50  World Bank (2002b, II and 2). 
51  Interview with David Pearce, World Bank, country representative for Uzbekistan, on 21 Nov. 
2002 in Tashkent. 
52  Mangott (1996, 131). 
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● the largely agricultural, in tendency Muslim-traditionalist, Ferghana Valley to the 
east of the country; 
● the traditional trade metropolis Tashkent and its surrounding countryside (in adminis-
trative terms: the city and region of Tashkent). 
The southern region has played a dominant role among the country’s political elite for 
decades. Like all of his predecessors since 1959, President Islam Karimov, who was the 
leader of the Uzbek Communist Party prior to independence, comes from the south of the 
country. However, observers note that today the president’s position is “strong” only to the 
extent that he is able to provide for balance and stability in the rivalry between the coun-
try’s most important regional leadership groups. 
Compared with the three regions named above, especially Khorezm-Uzbek (region: 
Khorezm, capital: Urganch) and Karakalpak (Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, 
capital: Nukus) in the northwest of the country often feel neglected and forgotten by the 
center. Their region, however, is particularly hard hit by crisis factors like the scarcity of 
the water borne by the main southern river, the Amur-Darja, and the ecological disaster 
stemming from the dried-up Aral Sea.  
Over the long run, the fact that a growingly serious social situation overlaps with regional 
identities and competition between rival elite groups represents, in the view of many ob-
servers, the major crisis potential facing Uzbekistan today. The country’s geographic loca-
tion, its population size, its ethnic overlaps with its neighboring countries, and the recruit-
ments efforts of radical Islamist groups could in this case contribute to an alarming deterio-
ration of the crisis situation in the region as a whole. 
2.3 Kazakhstan 
In economic terms, Kazakhstan is the strongest of the Central Asian republics. At the same 
time, its population (some 15 million) is the region’s most ethnically heterogeneous. The 
people that gave the country its name, the Kazakhs, assumed majority status only in the 
course of the past decade, when some 2 million persons, most of them of Russian and 
German descent, left the country. Russians, who have mainly settled in the north of the 
country close to the Russian border, have since then, together with a smaller number of 
Ukrainians, formed the country’s second largest population group, accounting for a share 
of some 30–35 %. The south and east are populated in particular by ethnic minorities from 
the neighboring Central Asian republics as well as from China (Uigurs); some 375,000 
Uzbeks represent the largest group. In Kazakhstan a migration-related population decline 
in the 1990s, a trend running counter to that experienced in the neighboring Central Asian 
countries, is expected over the longer term to be followed by population growth. 
In territorial terms, Kazakhstan is over twice as large as the four other Central Asian repub-
lics together. Located at the center of the Eurasian landmass, is Kazakhstan the world’s 
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largest landlocked country. Its largest population concentrations are found in the north 
along the Russian border as well as in the south, especially in the business metropolis of 
Almaty (1.5 million residents), which was the country’s capital until the government was 
relocated in Astana in late 1998. The greater part of the countryside is steppeland, and is 
very thinly settled. 
Kazakhstan shares with Russia the world’s longest continuous land border between two 
countries (6.800 km). Owing to its geographic location, population composition, and eco-
nomic interdependencies, it is highly important for Kazakhstan to maintain good relations 
with Russia, and the relations between the country’s two major population groups are of 
central importance in this regard. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, a reform oriented Gor-
bachev adherent, took over the leadership of the Kazakh CP in 1989 and was elected presi-
dent of the Republic of Kazakhstan in December 1991, a short time before the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. He has promoted a policy of balance between a new national identity 
reverting back to Kazakh traditions and concerns expressed by a diminishing Russian 
population minority. True, this was unable to prevent the emigration of many Russians, 
who were hardly even conscious of the internal Soviet border until Kazakhstan attained 
independence, and who unexpectedly found themselves in a “foreign” country. But more 
severe ethnic tensions of the kind that seemed to be emerging in 1986 when the Soviet 
leadership installed a Russian as CP boss in Almaty, a move that led to vehement pro-
tests,53 have been spared the country until now. Even so, many Russians have complained 
about a “Kazakhization” of political and economic leadership positions as well as in the 
country’s administrative apparatus.54  
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union Nazarbayev has proved to be one of the most 
active proponents of a policy of more marked economic and security integration in the 
framework of the CIS. This position distinguishes Kazakhstan from the two other large 
Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which are mainly interested in a 
policy of delimitation and economic self-sufficiency. At the same time, the Kazakh gov-
ernment has also made overtures toward the international financial institutions and made 
further progress with market-oriented reforms than most of its Central Asian neighbors. To 
stabilize its new currency, Kazakhstan was able, in 1995, to fall back on the support of the 
IMF in the framework of a consolidation program.  
Kazakhstan’s economy is based in large measure on coal, oil, and gas production, ferrous 
and nonferrous metals, electric power, and agriculture (mainly grain and livestock produc-
                                                                
53  This move amounted to a break with the decades-old practice of filling the most important 
political position in a Soviet republic with a representative of the country’s main ethnic group. 
The appointment of Nazarbayev, an ethnic Kazakh, only three years after these events was thus 
seen as a return to the normal state of affairs. 
54  See Masanov et al. (2002). 
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tion). The economy is thus heavily reliant on raw materials, which, while they bring for-
eign-exchange revenues, have not yet been adequately exploited as sources of employment 
and value added in the manufacturing sector. The orientation of the country’s rail and 
pipeline networks to Russia made it difficult for the newly independent country to regear 
its raw materials industry to the world market after it became independent. Accordingly, 
Kazakhstan was until recently heavily dependent on economic developments in Russia. 
Since 1998, however, the share of Kazakhstan’s exports to Russia and the other CIS coun-
tries has markedly declined (from 40 % in 1998 to an estimated 20 % or less in 2001).55 
Kazakhstan has succeeded in attracting sizable investments of foreign oil companies to 
further develop the production of its Caspian oil; these investments are also earmarked for 
a long-term diversification of export routes. The country’s overall crude oil reserves are 
estimated at 30 million barrels, a volume somewhat higher than Mexico’s and roughly 
45 % as high as Russia’s reserves. A certain percentage of the state revenues stemming 
from the sale of oil are placed in a fund for future development. However, critics note that 
the uses to which the government puts its export revenues is not subject to sufficient trans-
parency. 
Together with Russia, Kazakhstan has inherited the severest ecological legacy left by the 
Soviet Union. The dried-up Aral Sea in the west and the areas around the former Soviet 
weapons testing ground in Semipalatinsk in the east, which was devastated by tests with 
nuclear weapons and biological and chemical agents, are only the most dramatic symbols 
of a situation that is on the whole more than disquieting. The country’s dependence on the 
production of raw materials, in many cases associated with massive environmental degra-
dation, and a possible intensification of irrigated agriculture give little reason to hope for 
improvement in the future. A growing number of environmental initiatives and NGOs see 
themselves faced with narrow scopes of political action. 
In Kazakhstan the first years of the process of transformation have led to a dramatic in-
crease in income disparities. In the triangle defined by raw materials rents, privatization, 
and corruption, the country has earned a dubious reputation as an “Eldorado for windy 
wheeler-dealers.”56 And a small number of winners of the transformation processes must 
be weighed against the largest share of the population, who have had to bear the brunt of 
negative transformation shocks (inflation, depreciation of savings, uncertain payment of 
wages and salaries, low incomes, deterioration of social infrastructure, and so on). Follow-
ing the 1998 Russia crisis, which took Kazakhstan out of a brief phase of economic recov-
ery (beginning in 1996) and threw it back into recession, the Kazakh economy began to 
grow again, in 2001 by 13.2 % , the highest increase recorded among the CIS countries.57 
Official figures indicate that in parallel to this development the poverty situation has eased 
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somewhat since 1998.58 At the same time, the government’s scopes for a targeted social 
policy have broadened somewhat. The 2003 budget gave rise to expectations that the gov-
ernment was undertaking greater efforts to meet its self-defined obligation to contribute to 
reducing poverty and more equitably distributing public-sector earnings. 
Internally, Nazarbayev’s regime took on increasingly illiberal traits in the 1990s. While the 
country does have a number of oppositional political parties and a good number of civil-
society organizations, which recently have become increasingly active, this does not mean 
that the population is involved in political decision-making processes. Rather, many ob-
servers have noted tangible growth in government pressure on the opposition and a deterio-
rating human rights situation. In 1995 Nazarbayev prolonged his term of office per refer-
endum, in early 1999 he called advanced elections at short notice and was reelected to 
office for seven years, winning a majority of some 82 % of the votes cast. The 1995 refer-
endum in particular, but also the 1999 elections, were far removed from any democratic 
standards, and opposition candidates cannot be said to have been given a fair chance. The 
president, using manipulated election procedures, has brought the parliament, which is in a 
weak constitutional position in any case, largely under his control. It is the president’s 
prerogative to appoint and dismiss regional administrative heads. But on the other hand, a 
certain amount of progress has been noted in reforms aimed at widening the competences 
of local administrative structures. 
The most important segments of media landscape in Kazakhstan are dominated by mem-
bers or confidants of the president’s family, who are also said to control eleven of the 
country’s largest banks.59 The Nazarbayev clan may thus be seen as symbolic of a kind of 
government machinery that, carrying on with Soviet traditions, uses leadership positions 
for purposes of personal enrichment and consolidation of power, cashing in on privatiza-
tion and the post-Soviet raw materials boom to pocket huge rents. The country’s future 
development will, it appears, be marked by a contradiction between the declared aim of 
market-based liberalization and stepped-up investments in the SME sector on the one hand 
and – an important obstacle to this policy – a pronounced inclination toward state dirigism 
abetted by a corrupt public administration on the other. In addition, the scopes of action 
open to a reform-oriented economic policy are, in the view of political observers, up 
against substantial limitations posed by powerful veto groups within the new elite, which 
are in a position to profit from persistent intransparency and structures that deviate from 
accepted notions of the rule of law.60  
In material and social terms, Kazakhstan is marked by a striking north-south disparity. 
Thanks to higher industrial incomes going back to the Soviet era, the population of the 
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north, which has traditionally been largely Russian, has been distinctly more prosperous 
than the Kazakh population living in the country’s more agrarian south. These sharp in-
come disparities have continued until today.61 The regional north-south division of the 
country is overlain by the historic-traditional subdivision of ethnic Kazakhs into three so-
called hordes which go back to the age of Kazakh nomadism and are, in the view of some 
observers, even today of some political-social significance:62  
● The south of Kazakhstan is settled by the Great Horde, which has traditionally pro-
vided the leadership elite and even today most clearly embodies a Kazakh national 
identity. 
● Northern and central Kazakhstan is the territory of the Middle Horde, which is more 
Russified in cultural terms and accordingly less nationally conscious. 
● The west of the country is home to the Lesser Horde, which has traditionally been 
poor and had little influence on the makeup of the Kazakh elite, though it is now 
gaining economic ground because of the oil and gas reserves in its region. 
Unlike the case of Uzbekistan, in Kazakhstan Islam is not an important political factor. 
While the end of the Soviet era led to a revival of Islamic traditions in Kazakhstan as well 
(a phenomenon similar in many ways to the revival of Orthodox traditions observed among 
the Slavic population), historic-cultural conditions have not provided a fertile breeding 
ground for a radical Islam accessible to politicization: as nomadic tribes, the Kazakhs were 
Islamized at a relatively late point of time and suffused the new creed with elements of 
their ancient natural religions. The country lacked the urban centers needed for regular 
religious instruction and the formation of dogmatic schools. Today Islam has more the 
character of a popular tradition and is thus quite unsuited for extremist attempts to redefine 
its meaning. 
However, the Kazakh government is concerned about the growing number of Central 
Asian migrant workers that are attracted to the country by the relative prosperity differen-
tial between Kazakhstan and its neighbors to the south and are seen as more accessible to 
Islamist agitation. In 2001 and 2002 some Hizb ut-Tahrir followers were arrested for dis-
tributing pamphlets in the south of Kazakhstan. Those arrested included Uzbeks, who were 
immediately deported to Uzbekistan and there sentenced to lengthy prison terms. 
2.4 Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan, one of Central Asia’s territorially “small” countries, is located in a mountain-
ous area. 90 % of the country’s territory is 1500 meters or more above sea level. Roughly 
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half of its territory is suited for agricultural uses, but only 13 % is cropland. Accordingly, 
the agricultural sector is dominated by livestock-farming. Traditionally, most Kyrgyz lived 
as mountain nomads. Even today the ruggedness of the land poses obstacles to communica-
tion and exchange between the country’s different regional population groups. Attempts 
under Soviet rule to restrict nomadism contributed even further to consolidating regional 
and tribal identities. The fragmentation caused by local tribal identities is further aggra-
vated by a large-scale regional and sociocultural division of the country into “north” and 
“south” as well as by the heterogeneous composition of the country’s overall population 
and the territorial fragmentation found in the southwestern Ferghana Valley. 
According to official information, in 2000 some 65 % of Kyrgyzstan’s population of 
roughly 5 million were ethnic Kyrgyz. Uzbeks and Russians, which account for 13.8 and 
12.5 % of the population, respectively, are the country’s largest minorities.63 While the 
Russian-descended population is found for the most part in the capital Bishkek in the north 
as well as in some smaller industrial centers, the Uzbek population is largely settled in 
relatively closed areas in the Ferghana Valley, with its center of Osh. Interethnic rivalries 
between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz gave the months-long violent conflicts which took place in 
the region of Osh in the summer of 1990, and at times escalated into regular pogroms, the 
external semblance of a nationality conflict. The factors responsible for the violence, how-
ever, must be sought mainly in the region’s deteriorating socioeconomic situation, which 
was (and – though population growth is declining somewhat – still is) marked by high 
population growth, youth unemployment, land scarcity, and inadequate housing. 
Kyrgyzstan’s political history since 1990 is a graphic and typical illustration of the mixing 
of resource- and power-related conflicts, with the identity projections and mobilization 
potentials for stereotypes that result from them. The strife in Osh, which developed out-
wardly along ethnic lines, at the same time provided an outlet for the frustrations of a 
population group that sees itself as fundamentally disadvantaged within Kyrgyzstan. As far 
as incomes, social and economic development levels, or the quality of healthcare or educa-
tion institutions are concerned, the southern regions of the country lag far behind the north. 
In historical-cultural terms, the north can be seen as a marginal zone of the Islamic culture 
area in which, not unlike the case of the neighboring country of Kazakhstan, Islam was late 
to gain a foothold and amalgamated with the pre-Islamic traditions held by the region’s 
nomadic pastoral tribes. In the wake of the Russian-czarist colonization of the country, this 
region, with its capital of Bishkek, was exposed earlier and more intensively than others to 
modernization pressure stemming from Russian settlers. The “south,” in particular the 
ethnically mixed Ferghana Valley, was Islamized at an earlier point of time and is more 
marked by the traditional way of life typical of settled farmers. This region, generally 
referred to somewhat imprecisely as “the south” but meaning the country’s southwestern 
region, which, – from the perspective of the north – lies beyond the central range of the 
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Tian Shan mountains and embraces, like a pair of tongs, the Uzbek and Tajik areas of the 
Ferghana Valley, has for centuries been something like a melting pot for the cultures of its 
Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik populations. 
The most recent political crisis in Kyrgyzstan, which is linked with the name of the provin-
cial town of Aksy (or Ak-Suu), likewise started out in the country’s “south.” The arrest of a 
critical member of parliament, Azimbek Beknazarov, in January 2002 on questionable 
charges triggered a growing protest movement that had its origin in Beknazarov’s constitu-
ency of Aksy in the province of Jalal-Abad. Parallel to the court proceedings, in the spring 
and summer of 2002 demonstrations and other protest actions led to a spiraling escalation 
which was marked by violence and in the course of which a total of five demonstrators 
were killed by the police. Outrage over the authorities’ ruthless conduct and demands for 
punishment of those responsible both in the region and at the government level increas-
ingly became linked with further-reaching political aims. While the rhetoric of prominent 
opposition politicians depicted the so-called “Aksy movement” as emblematic for a con-
flict between a repressive government and a democratic opposition, the government itself 
denounced its adversaries as troublemakers and “destabilizing elements.” Many observers, 
by contrast, saw the conflict as an expression of the estrangement between a southern 
population which regards itself as disadvantaged in socioeconomic terms and deprived of 
any real political participation and representation and an allegedly corrupt political elite in 
the north which dominates the government.64 In early 2003 the external conflict axis 
shifted to the dispute surrounding a new constitution, which was subjected to a vote in a 
controversial referendum on a proposal advanced by President Akayev. Even so, concerns 
about a widening north-south division of the country, including fears that Kyrgyzstan could 
break down into two parts, have not been allayed. 
The political situation must be viewed in the context of problematic economic development 
and widespread poverty.65 The first years of independence were accompanied by a collapse 
of industry and a substantial decline in agricultural production. Its small size and pattern of 
sectoral specialization entailed particularly difficult problems for Kyrgyzstan when the 
economic relations that typified the Soviet Union collapsed. By 1995 the country’s GDP 
had declined by over 50 %. The economic reforms initiated in 1993, which were quite 
extensive compared with those undertaken in the other Central Asian republics (and were 
more instrumental in damping hyperinflation than in any other of the CIS countries) led, 
beginning in 1995, to uneven economic growth, with annual rates ranging between 2 and 
10 %.66 Owing to its low initial development level, Kyrgyzstan continues to be one of the 
CIS’s lowest-income countries. With its per capita incomes of US $ 270 in 2002, Kyr-
                                                                
64  Interview with Filip Noubel, senior analyst, International Crisis Group, Bishkek, 26 Nov. 2002. 
For more in-depth information on the conflict, see ICG (2002b). 
65  On poverty in Kyrgyzstan, see Müller (2003, 34–37). 
66  Figures from EBRD (2002a). 
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gyzstan ranks 184th among the 207 countries covered by the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators 2002. Among the CIS countries, only Tajikistan has lower figures for 
income.67  
According to official sources, in 2001 52 % of Kyrgyzstan’s population was poor (with 
18 % living in extreme poverty). The rural population is especially hard hit. If the latter 
accounts for a 65 % share of the overall population – an exceptionally high figure for post-
Soviet conditions – it at the same time accounts for 80 % of the poor population.68 In other 
words, while nearly two thirds of the rural population (64 %) must be seen as poor, the 
corresponding figure for town-dwellers is less than one third (30 %). This distribution has 
particularly negative impacts for ethnic Kyrgyz, who account for a disproportionately high 
percentage of the rural population.69  
In the twelve years between 1990 and 2002 Kyrgyzstan developed from a glimmer of hope 
for successful democratic and market-oriented transformation to a problem child of the 
region. Following independence Kyrgyzstan was the Central Asian republic that set the 
most clear-cut example for reforms geared to democracy and market economy. President 
Akayev, who in 1990 was elected president by the country’s supreme soviet, was seen as a 
shining exception among his Central Asian counterparts, a fact that was generally ex-
plained with reference to his professional origins, for he was a former president of the 
republic’s academy of sciences and thus a member of the “intelligentsia,” and not, as in 
most other cases, a member of the inner Party power elite. Endowed with a mandate in a 
1991 election which gave him – running without opposition – 95 % of the votes cast, 
Akayev announced a course of far-reaching democratization and markets reforms. 
As a pioneer of market-based reforms, Kyrgyzstan received substantial funds from pro-
grams of the international financial institutions in the 1990s. The hope was that it would be 
possible to use external assistance to help this structurally weak, geographically secluded 
country on its way to a successful process of structural change. In 1998 the country was the 
first Central Asian republic to be admitted to the WTO. Still, a tangible, sustained upturn 
for the population has yet to materialize. The major burdens imposed by structural deficits, 
crime, corruption, and poor governance have taken their toll on the reform process and led 
to a situation in which the donor community has increasingly been faced with the question 
of whether the Kyrgyz government is in fact pursuing a clear reform strategy. Today Kyr-
gyzstan is the CIS country with the highest level of external debt (measured as a proportion 
of GDP). The country’s overall foreign debt amounts to some US $ 1.5 billion.70 This 
further curtails the government’s – in any case low – financial latitude, even though a 
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restructuring of the country’s debt was successfully negotiated at the Paris Club in March 
of 2002. Kyrgyzstan’s most important creditors are Russia, Japan, Turkey (a nonmember 
of the Paris Club), and Germany. However, the major shares of the country’s public debt 
abroad (around two thirds) is held by the multilateral donors World Bank (IDA), ADB, 
IMF, and EBRD.71  
The low growth rates posted by Kyrgyzstan’s economy (the EBRD estimated a rate of 
2.0 % for 200272) are not high enough to give the population a sense that their life situa-
tions are being tangibly improved. The country’s most important foreign-exchange-earning 
industry is gold exports. The gold deposits in the country’s largest mine (Kumtor), which 
were developed only in the 1990s by a Canadian-Kyrgyz-consortium, are expected to be 
depleted as early as 2008.73 One hope for the future is development of the country’s energy 
industry on the basis of water power; but if this is to happen, Kyrgyzstan will have to find a 
durable solution to its water conflict with its neighboring countries. Plans to develop qual-
ity tourism in the scenic region of the Issyk-Kul, one of the world’s largest mountain lakes, 
have no prospects of success unless a certain measure of political and social stability is 
achieved for the region as a whole. Approaches aimed at a new, comprehensive long-term 
strategy of the kind formulated in the Comprehensive Development Framework adopted in 
2001 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper adopted in late 2002 are referred to by 
critical voices – even within the government – as little more than illusion, since the inter-
ministerial consultation process was inadequate and the country’s bureaucracies have no 
sense of commitment to the goals set out in the documents. 
Looked at in political terms, Kyrgyzstan experienced the development of a comprehensive 
and pluralist landscape of nongovernmental organizations, social interest groups, and 
political parties at an earlier point of time than in other Central Asian republics. The origins 
of this development lay in the Soviet era, and under President Akayev the new structures at 
first offered more freedom of action than in any one of Kyrgyzstan’s neighboring coun-
tries. This initial situation woke the interest of many Western institutions that had set their 
sights on promoting civil-society structures in the region. Funds from the European Union, 
the United States, and some major private foundations (above all the Soros Foundation) 
were committed to buoying the activities of a large variety of social organizations. 
A number of different parties are represented in Kyrgyzstan’s parliament, which was 
elected in unscheduled elections in February 1995, and once again in March 2000. In 1995, 
when Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan had already established the referendum 
as a method of prolonging the president’s terms of office, i.e. of holding on to power, 
President Akayev was confirmed in office in a general election. Even so, in this period 
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Kyrgyzstan, too, started to widen the president’s powers, a move that was initially justified 
with the goal of maintaining the country’s stability under the pressure of mounting prob-
lems. In the years that followed, pressure was increased on prominent opposition figures 
and the critical media, and the latitudes of political organizations were undermined by 
spying activities and questionable court proceedings. Structures with a democratic façade 
have increasingly become instruments of an authoritarian, power-based rule. During the 
parliamentary and presidential elections held in February and October 2000, the OSCE 
reported serious irregularities that were carried out at the expense of opposition candidates. 
The referendum of February 2, 2003, which, according to official figures, brought the 
government a broad majority for its proposed bills – while the opposition called foul, 
claiming election fraud – contributed, in the short term, little to stabilizing the country’s 
political institutions. 
The Kyrgyz response to the violent attacks launched in 1999 and 2000 by the IMU in the 
province of Batken along the border to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan led to a further deteriora-
tion of the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan. Arrests of and blanket accusations against 
followers of Islamic groups for allegedly supporting terrorist activities or engaging directly 
in terrorist acts did nothing to strengthen confidence in the lawfulness and reasonableness 
of the country’s penal proceedings, even though the measures taken in Kyrgyzstan are not 
comparable with the repressive policies indulged in by the government of Uzbekistan. 
Despite this unsatisfactory situation and the growing concerns of human rights organiza-
tions over future developments in Kyrgyzstan, the country continues to be marked by a 
more diverse political and civil-society landscape and a greater measure of freedom of 
opinion and pluralism than its Central Asian neighbors. In other words, some important 
points of departure for an open discussion of social problems as well as for cooperative 
forms of conflict resolution continue to be given. 
At the same time, there is no doubt that there are real security problems in the country’s 
southwest region. Even though the IMU may have been seriously weakened by its in-
volvement in the Afghanistan war on the side of the Taliban, its activities in previous years 
were instrumental in establishing transboundary trafficking in drugs and arms as an illegal 
business in the border region between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In addition, 
the country’s desperate economic situation in the early 1990s drove many farmers into 
opium production.74  
2.5 Tajikistan  
In political, but above all in socioeconomic terms, Tajikistan has been hard hit by the af-
termath of the 1992-1997 civil war. The World Bank indicates that, measured in terms of 
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per capita GDP data, Tajikistan ranked, in 2000, among the world’s 11 poorest countries.75 
According to government information, 83 % of the population live below the poverty line. 
The World Bank estimated the country’s unemployment rate at over 40 %.76  
Tajikistan, with its population of roughly 6.5 million, is today ruled by a coalition govern-
ment led by former-Communist President Emomali Rahmonov and including representa-
tives of the “democratic” and “Islamic” opposition. And yet even this coalition represents 
only part of the country’s political identity and interest groups. Despite the plurality repre-
sented in the government, it is far too early to speak of genuine pluralism and democracy 
here. The country’s political institutions are too weak, large segments of the population are 
too vulnerable at risk, and the wounds inflicted by the civil war are still too fresh. Estab-
lishment of functioning governmental structures in all parts of the country is a task which 
has still to be mastered. For instance, in the autonomous republic of Gorno-Badakhshan in 
the east of the country, which takes up one third of the country’s territory, the central gov-
ernment is for all practical purposes not present. 
Viewed at a superficial level, the violent conflict that broke out in the first year of national 
independence occurred along a rift “between the dominant ’old-Communist’ nomenklatura 
and a broadly diversified opposition movement that subscribed to democratic, national, and 
even Islamic ideals and was inspired by ’glasnost’ and ’perestroika.’“77 Behind this level 
of “modern” political objectives, however, the factors determining the motives and actions 
of the participants were traditional ones, like regional and local particularisms, challenges 
to the traditional distribution of power and rival clan associations, as well as interference 
by political forces from neighboring countries. This complicated constellation of overlap-
ping interests deepened the conflict in the years of the civil war and again and again sub-
stantially hampered attempts to implement ceasefire and peace accords reached with the 
help of international mediation.78 For this reason, too, the peace agreement finally reached 
in 1997 long appeared to be extremely precarious. Presidential and parliamentary elections 
in November 1999 and February 2000 led, however, to a regular involvement of the 
“United Tajik Opposition” in the government and thus to a continuation of the course of 
reconciliation.  
In a debate over constitutional amendments, the president recently injected some new 
points of contention into the political discussion, provoking the anger of at least parts of the 
opposition. The core point as far as political power is concerned is the president’s aim of 
amending a constitutional provision that would prevent him from running again for office 
at the end of his present term (1999-2006). Critics see in these efforts a violation of the 
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basic provisions of the peace accord.79 On the other hand, many observers see no viable 
alternative to the current president. Their main argument is that broad segments of the 
security apparatus are controlled by the president not primarily ex officio but on the basis 
of personal loyalty. A potential competitor, it is noted, would therefore hardly be in a 
position to ensure the integration of the security forces needed for a peaceful development. 
After the Afghanistan war the country moved to the forefront of efforts to stabilize the 
overall region of Central Asia. To be realistic, though, reconstruction work since the end of 
the civil war must likewise be viewed in the context of the various cleavages in Tajik 
society.80 Whether framework conditions sufficiently consolidated and stable to allow for 
the implementation of long-term DC measures are now in place is a question that has yet to 
be answered. In any case, donor measures involved in the selection of partners, sectors, and 
regions will have to be highly conflict-sensitive in nature. 
The unstable security situation in parts of the country, above all along the southern border 
to Afghanistan and in the northern regions extending into the Ferghana Valley, had, up to 
the summer of 2001, some palpably negative effects on Tajikistan’s neighbors Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan . IMU fighters were, largely without interference, able to prepare in Tajiki-
stan for the attacks they carried out in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The presence of interna-
tional troops in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan has, at least in the near term, served to defuse 
this situation. However, Tajikistan continues to be a staging area for smuggling weapons 
and drugs to other Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan sees Tajikistan, like Kyrgyzstan, as 
a country in which its vital national interests are at stake. In no other country is the absolute 
number and share of the Uzbek minority population (some 25 %)81 as large as it is in Taji-
kistan, and, conversely, an estimated one million ethnic Tajiks live in Uzbekistan. In the 
Tajik civil war Uzbekistan took sides with the official government under President Rah-
monov, coming out for a clearly anti-Islamic option, and played a direct military role both 
in the framework of the CIS protection force and in the fighting between the parties to the 
civil war. Later, Uzbekistan also backed a peace accord as a means of putting an end to the 
persistent unrest along its southwestern border. Still, Uzbekistan’s policy toward Tajikistan 
is not always transparent, or indeed predictable, and the government in Tashkent views 
with some mistrust the power-sharing arrangement with Islamic forces in place in 
Dushanbe. 
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2.6 Turkmenistan  
Seen in terms of its total population (some 5.5 to 6 million), Turkmenistan, together with 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, belongs to the group of the three “little” states in Central Asia, 
although the size of its national territory is comparable with that of Uzbekistan. Like Uz-
bekistan, Turkmenistan has also experienced enormous population growth in the last dec-
ade, the exact extent of which is unclear due to statistical problems, although the country’s 
population may have increased by 50 % within a period of only ten years.82  
90 % of Turkmenistan’s territory is desert, only 4 % is arable land. The country has sizable 
natural gas and mineral oil reserves (particularly along the Caspian Sea) which represent 
the main source of revenue of the state and the overall national economy. Agriculture is 
dominated by cotton-farming, which, as in Uzbekistan, is bound up with massive environ-
mental problems due to irrigation-related water consumption and the salinization of soils 
brought about by the use of artificial fertilizers and pesticides. Extensive use of the waters 
of the Amur-Darja links Turkmenistan directly with the silting of the Aral Sea, even 
though the country does not border directly on it. 
After 1991 President Saparmurat Niyazov, who even prior to independence governed the 
republic as CP secretary, set up the most closed, most undemocratic, and least economi-
cally reformed regime in the entire post-Soviet area.83 Not even the nominal beginnings of 
a political pluralism were able to develop in this repressive climate. The CP, renamed as 
the “Democratic Party” but not reformed, is the only “party” in the country, and decisions 
are taken exclusively at the top level of the state. In late 1994 Niyazov, who is the center of 
an extreme, official personality cult, was the first Central Asian president to extend his 
term of office by referendum instead of through a regular election. According to official 
information, Niyazov received 98.3 % and 99.5 %, resp., of the votes cast in polls held in 
1990 and 1992 - with a turnout of 99 % - conducted without any rival candidates. In the 
meantime he has as had himself proclaimed “president for life.” 
In economic terms, Turkmenistan has largely preserved the Soviet economic system. Only 
small and microenterprises have been privatized. Both the raw materials sector and the 
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manufacturing industry continue to be state-owned. The granting of private land titles to 
individual farmers has not gone beyond an experimental stage, and, according to EBRD 
information, the practice not seldom serves to enrich local elites. While privatization of 
cattle-farming has led to an expansion of livestock holdings, for lack of fodder this practice 
has become a threat to the country’s cotton and wheat crops.84 Exchange rates are fixed by 
the government, imports and exports are state-regulated. 
The government has used heavy subsidies for electricity, water, gas, food, and other goods 
to keep the population’s standard of living at nominal levels higher than those in the other 
Central Asian countries (except Kazakhstan).85 Substantial growth figures for the national 
economy have also been recorded (primarily in the raw materials and agricultural sectors) 
following a long phase economic recession that came to an end in 1998. The country’s 
heavy dependence on production of raw materials as a source of public revenue does, 
however, give cause for major concerns over how long a strategy of this kind can be sus-
tained. As in all countries in transition, massive infrastructure maintenance investments 
would be required in Turkmenistan, and modernization and restructuring is called for in all 
sectors. For a number of reasons, however, it does not appear to be possible, in the foresee-
able future, to achieve an expansion of the volume of the country’s exports in any of the 
relevant sectors that would be needed to earn additional investment capital.86 
Looking at foreign policy, President Niyazov has led Turkmenistan into a state of self-
imposed and nearly complete isolation. While the country is a member of the CIS, it shows 
very little interest in participating, in this framework, in cooperation or even becoming 
involved in efforts aimed at regional integration. Only with Russia does Turkmenistan 
entertain close links in the military sector. Cross-border trade is systematically subverted 
with a view to maintaining the country’s highly subsidized prices.87 The country’s isola-
tion is further intensified by a restrictive visa policy for both foreigners and citizens of the 
country (exit visas). 
In 2003 President Niyazov deliberately risked a grave diplomatic crisis with Russia when 
he attempted to force Turkmen citizens of Russian descent to abandon, at short notice, their 
Russian citizenship (and thus their greater freedom to travel) by threatening to revoke their 
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Turkmen citizenship (including all of the civil rights it entails). Political and economic 
pressure from Moscow induced the Turkmen side to make certain concessions, but rela-
tions are still marred by profound annoyance in Russia.88 
Despite the repressive methods employed by the regime, the population, mostly due to 
pressing social or economic hardships, has repeatedly mounted spontaneous demonstra-
tions or other manifestations of its discontent in recent years. Thus far the authorities have 
invariably responded with further repression. There are for this reason no signs of civil-
society activities, broader manifestations of popular opinion, or a representation of political 
interests. The only more or less organized opposition to President Niyazov can be found 
abroad, although it, too, appears unable to launch any decisive political activities. At the 
end of 2002 this opposition was deprived of one of its most important leadership figures 
when the former foreign minister, Shikhmuradov, who had sought asylum in Moscow in 
2001 and founded an opposition movement there, was unexpectedly arrested in Turkmeni-
stan and sentenced, in November 2002, to life in prison, in court proceedings reminiscent 
of Soviet show trials, for alleged involvement in an assassination attempt on Niyazov. The 
circumstances of the attempted assassination and the arrest provoked, among other things, 
a diplomatic crisis with Uzbekistan, which was accused by the Turkmen side of supporting 
the alleged attempted coup in Ashgabat. 
Turkmenistan’s political “stability” depends solely on the person of the president and his 
autocratic rule and is thus a risk factor of considerable magnitude. The events of December 
2002 demonstrate that the Niyazov regime is able to suppress resistance in the short run 
and to maintain a semblance of outward stability which has prevented the outbreak of any 
massive crises. In the long run, however, the government appears not to have any strategy 
to work out a development perspective that might serve to defuse the anticipated accumula-
tion of political conflicts, social discontent, and ecological crises.  
3 Conflict and crisis potentials 
3.1 Governance 
Government legitimacy and good governance 
All of the governments in Central Asia have substantial legitimacy deficits, even though 
these may differ in extent from country to country. One of the key weak points here is a 
widespread tendency to massively manipulate elections, assuming they take place at all. 
Here Kyrgyzstan was the most positive case for a long time, although the 2000 elections 
took the country back a number of disquieting steps. Kazakhstan has shown comparable 
deficits for some time now. In the opinion of the OSCE, the elections held in Tajikistan in 
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1999 and 2000 were likewise marred by major problems, although the final outcome, the 
formation of a coalition government, also entailed considerable progress in the country’s 
peacebuilding efforts. On the other hand, Turkmenistan obviously ranks at the lower end of 
the deficit scale, in close company with Uzbekistan.  
A second weak point of most Central Asian governments is the widespread disdain shown 
by government authorities for required procedures as well as for respect for institu-
tional competences and their limits. Government authorities regularly subordinate formal 
rules to considerations of expediency, without being checked by sanctions, and this vitally 
impairs their political legitimacy and undermines citizens’ confidence in government insti-
tutions. One noteworthy factor in this regard is Tajikistan’s positive development since the 
civil war; the formation of a functioning coalition and the need which this implies to seek 
compromise has earned the government a certain “procedural legitimacy” that is more 
weakly developed in the other Central Asian countries. Both aspects, election-based le-
gitimacy and procedural legitimacy, are roughly in line with the ’political process’ criterion 
used by Freedom House, alongside other criteria, as a gauge of the progress toward democ-
ratization made by countries in transition. Freedom House’s assessment comes up with the 
followig picture expressing the distinctions between the five countries: 
Among all of the post-socialist countries in transition, comparably low values were found 
only for Belarus (6.75), Azerbaijan (5.75), and Georgia (5.00). 
Another indicator for lack of government legitimacy may be seen in whether or not a gov-
ernment is massively, even possibly by violent means, challenged by sizable forces in a 
society, which is for the most part the case when significant groups of a society see them-
selves faced with political repression or persistent discrimination. The extreme case was 
given in the civil war in Tajikistan. In this regard it is impossible to asses today’s situation 
with any degree of certainty, although the major legitimacy problem appears to have been 
defused effectively by the formation of the present coalition government. On the other 
hand, events in Uzbekistan (bomb attacks, attacks by the IMU) and in Turkmenistan (as-
sassination attempt on the country’s president) indicate that the governments have lost a 
good measure of their legitimacy among segments of their populations. The suppression 
of the insurgents by military or police has contributed little to coming up with to a long-
Table 2: Freedom House – rating of the political process in Central Asia 
Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan 
5.25 5.75 6.25 6.75 7.00 
Scale from 1 (high) to 7 (low) 
Source: Freedom House (2002, 21) “Political Process Rating” 
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term solution of the underlying problem. On the contrary, the repressive line pursued by 
the Uzbek government against any expression of Islamic religiosity not sanctioned by the 
state is creating, in the long term, more problems than it “solves.” The legitimacy of the 
governments of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as well is not unreservedly acknowledged by 
all parts of their populations. Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Russians in Kazakhstan often feel 
highly underrepresented in political terms. In both countries, however, the strategies still 
prevalent are geared to bringing about change in political power structures in the frame-
work and with the means of the existing system. Questioning the legitimacy of the ruling 
government or its policies is not tantamount to challenging the legitimacy of the state as a 
whole. 
Even as regards the ability of their governments to carry out government tasks effectively, 
efficiently, and in the interest of the population (good governance), the Central Asian 
countries turn out to be poor performers when compared to the other countries in transi-
tion. A lack of effective public and institutional control as well as the use of government 
resources to serve particularist interests (clans, regional interest groups, and the like) must 
be seen as particularly grave deficits here. In the case of Tajikistan the problem of exercis-
ing government control over the whole of the country’s territory is an additional ag-
gravating factor. In Kyrgyzstan the arm of government power does not reach particularly 
far in some regions (above all in the province of Batken). The paternalist approach to 
politics pursued by the governments of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan suggests, at first 
glance, that the matter of good governance might be better attended to in these countries. 
On the other hand, though, it has also been observed that government organs are unlikely 
to be particularly responsive without the pressure exerted by organized social actors. One 
helpful illustration of the differentiation among the Central Asian countries is provided by 
another assessment conducted by Freedom House, the Governance and Public Administra-
tion Rating (Tab. 3). 
Here again, the Central Asian countries are the lowest-ranking group among the countries 
in transition, this time together with Belarus (6.50) and Azerbaijan (6.00) and just ahead of 
Russia (5.25). Except for the slightly changed ranking due to governability problems in 
Tajikistan, the most striking difference to the political process rating is the lower dispersion 
of values. The countries involved are more similar to one another. This may indicate that as 
Table 3: Freedom House – Rating of governance and public administration in Central Asia 
Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan 
5.50 5.75 6.00 6.00 6.75 
Scale from 1 (high) to 7 (low) 
Source: Freedom House (2002, 21) “Governance and Public Administration Rating” 
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an “input” of the political system the political process is more subject to change based on 
formal political standard-setting than the “output” variable good governance. In other 
words, in addition to the political will called for, fewer influenceable factors such as infor-
mal action routines and networks run counter to any tangible improvement of governance. 
This assumption is supported by Freedom House’s corruption rating:  
As we see, the values are very close together, closer than on any other criterion of trans-
formation rated by Freedom House. Relatively differentiated values for government legiti-
macy and – as will be discussed below – pluralism and participation evidently have little 
influence on the measure of corruption – the indicator par excellence for the continuing 
influence of informal action routines and informal networks in government organs. 
Pluralism and participation 
The picture appears to be particularly differentiated as far as political liberties and the 
degree of organization of civil society found in the societies of Central Asia are concerned. 
Here too, all Central Asian countries rank at the lower end of the scale among the countries 
in transition, although sizable qualitative differences can be observed. Turkmenistan 
neither has sufficient legal foundations for social plurality and participation, nor does 
the political regime allow any activities with a thrust in this direction. In Uzbekistan 
the situation is similar, although the country is far less isolated (travel, Internet), and 
foreign institutions, like the German political foundations, have a certain leeway to offer 
forums for discussions and constructive debates on socially relevant issues that are con-
ducted without government control – but with government involvement. This means that 
these institutions are in a position to serve as catalysts for a slow process of change in areas 
which – unlike e.g. the question of acceptance of free media – give the government no 
fundamental reason to fear for its governance capacities. In Kyrgyzstan in particular the 
presence of external institutions has fostered the development of a diverse landscape of 
political and other civil-society organizations. This diversity – even though, in the eyes 
of some local observers, it may be overly donor-induced – is one of the most important 
long-term stabilization factors in a country forced to come to grips with pronounced socio-
economic problems and centrifugal tendencies. While the more or less illiberal course 
pursued by the president in recent years has obstructed possibilities to participate in the 
Table 4: Freedom House – Rating of corruption in Central Asia 
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan 
6.00 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.25 
Scale from 1 (high) to 7 (low) 
Source: Freedom House (2002, 21) “Corruption Rating” 
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political decision-making process and kept opposition groups out of the struggle for power, 
it has not yet led to a fundamental questioning of pluralism and rights of participation. The 
media landscape here, which is more diverse and freer than in the other Central Asian 
countries, also reflects this state of affairs. Kazakhstan is likewise marked by a consid-
erable plurality of civil-society actors, a fact which is due above all to a more open po-
litical course pursued during the early phase of the transformation process – as compared 
with today’s situation. In the meantime, however, the political environment has developed 
adversely and, with the exception of a few remaining low-circulation weekly or monthly 
newspapers, the media are almost completely under the control of the president (be it via 
the government apparatus, be it via family members). Tajikistan, finally, has managed to 
gain considerable ground since the 1997 peace agreement, including in the areas of plural-
ism and participation.  
Two other Freedom House ratings may serve to illustrate this category – on the one hand, 
the state of development of civil society and on the other the existence of independent 
media: 
 
 
Table 5: Freedom House – Rating of civil society in Central Asia 
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan 
4.50 5.00 5.50 6.75 7.00 
Scale from 1 (high) to 7 (low) 
Source: Freedom House (2002, 21) “Civil Society Rating” 
Table 6: Freedom House – Rating of independent media in Central Asia 
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan 
5.75 5.75 6.00 6.75 7.00 
Scale from 1 (high) to 7 (low) 
Source: Freedom House (2002, 21) “Independent Media Rating” 
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These ratings also clearly indicate a “cultural boundary” running between Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan on the one hand and the three other Central Asian countries on the other. 
While the point is not at all to level out the differences between Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan, the difference between them and the other Central Asian countries is nevertheless 
sizable. Another striking fact is the unusually high value for development of civil society in 
Kyrgyzstan (4.50.), which contrasts sharply with the – in absolute terms – lowest value of 
7.00 for Turkmenistan. 
Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
Impartial police and judicial authorities, independent courts, a government tolerant toward 
political dissidents, and respect for due process of law are central institutional guarantees 
for the ability of a society to resolve conflicts constructively and nonviolently. Forums in 
which tolerance can be practiced within society, which, in other words, bring together 
different ethnic groups, political parties, or estranged neighboring communities to jointly 
and cooperatively search for solutions to day-to-day problems, are, accordingly, a social 
prerequisite for the success of nonviolent conflict resolution. In institutional terms, the 
Central Asian countries here too show a poor overall balance, again with marked inter-
nal differences. Looked at in terms of the legal conditions needed for impartial police and 
judicial authorities and independent courts, the situation in the more open and markedly 
reformed countries - above all Kyrgyzstan, but also Kazakhstan – is considerably better 
than in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, though without being really satisfactory. Another 
Freedom House rating may serve as an illustration here: the Constitutional, Legislative and 
Judicial Framework Rating (Table 7). 
The same applies for the even more problematic aspect of the actual implementation of 
rule-of-law principles like impartiality, due process, and presumption of innocence by the 
judicial authorities. Here too, all Central Asian countries have serious deficits. The most 
recent cases of dubious legal proceedings against prominent members of the opposition in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are clear evidence of this, even though they are not compara-
ble with the mass convictions of alleged Islamists in Uzbekistan and the show trials that 
have been conducted in Turkmenistan. But a governance by the political leadership geared 
Table 7: Freedom House – Rating of the rule-of-law framework in Central Asia 
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Turkmenistan 
5.25 5.75 6.00 6.50 7.00 
Scale from 1 (high) to 7 (low) 
Source: Freedom House (2002, 21) “Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework 
Rating” 
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to political opportuneness is only a part of the problem. A second, not less critical, element 
is state judicial and police authorities that operate independently of government control, 
including the law itself. This takes us back to the issue of corruption addressed above. For 
corruption is not only widespread in the administrative machinery, it is also – and, in the 
view of many experts, in particular – rife within the police and judicial apparatus (a prob-
lem which also plays an important role in connection with the security risks referred to 
below). The confidence of citizens in the impartiality of the judicial authorities is 
negligible, and only very few people regard the system of justice as a legitimate and effec-
tive means of settling individual or collective conflicts.89 What this means is that one 
fundamental building block of civil conflict resolution is largely missing. 
The institutional weakness of the Central Asian countries must be viewed in the context of 
highly different national developments in the field of civil society, with the different na-
tional capacities this implies to engage in constructive, nonviolent forms of conflict resolu-
tion. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan government policy has until now been to dis-
pute the existence of any real legitimate conflicts, since these would stand in contradic-
tion to the self-image adopted by the paternalistic state. Conflicts are treated not as consti-
tutive elements of developing societies but as a threat to the existence of the political sys-
tem. Against this background it is simply not possible to openly play out value- or interest-
related conflicts in society. If conflicts do erupt, there are no “dams” that might serve to 
block violent escalation. For this reason Uzbekistan’s supposed “stability” is in the end 
built on a highly unstable foundation. Occasional events like the killing of policemen and 
other representatives of state power in 1997 in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley 
demonstrate this no less clearly than the ruthless use of force by the IMU in its attacks in 
1999 and 2000. Both in Kyrgyzstan and in Kazakhstan the social conditions for coop-
erative conflict resolution between competing interest groups are fundamentally 
better. Incipient efforts to install functioning structures of local self-administration, and in 
this way to decentralize decision-making competences, are steps in the right direction. 
Such steps can furthermore fall back on the tradition of self-organized community struc-
tures which have been revived in many places within recent years. On the other hand, 
authoritarian steps backward of the kind recently observed in these two countries are a 
counterproductive approach to dealing with criticism and expressions of dissatisfaction and 
threaten to provoke precisely the violence that they purport to be combating. 
In sum, we find that massive governance deficits persist in all Central Asian countries. 
Not only is the interplay between state and society for the most part not suitable to bringing 
emerging conflicts to a legitimate solution acceptable in principle to the conflict parties, it 
often even contributes to escalating conflicts or to aggravating the modes in which they are 
played out. Below the level of this general finding, we can make out some important dif-
                                                                
89  On the police, see ICG (2002c, I): “The police are feared, mistrusted and viewed as ineffective in 
protecting the population from crime.” 
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ferences between the countries concerned. Against the background of very different ex-
periences, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have made the greatest progress toward greater le-
gitimacy and conflict-resolution capacities in their political systems. Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan still have the longest way to go. Kazakhstan is positioned somewhere in be-
tween, still somewhat closer to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  
The dimension of the problem can be illustrated with reference to a question that is fre-
quently asked in Central Asia and worries many observers: What happens if the presi-
dent dies, or is, for one reason or another, suddenly no longer available? In every one of 
the five Central Asian countries confidence in the stability of the system is very highly 
dependent on the person of the respective head of state. But due to the low civil conflict-
resolution capacities in society, some observers fear the very worst scenarios, down to 
and including civil war, for the supposedly most stable countries of the region, Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan. 
3.2 Economy 
Problems in coming to grips with transformation and rapid change 
All Central Asian countries suffered economically from the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
High inflation rates, unemployment or vocational uncertainty, irregular and insufficient 
government benefits (like pension payments) led in the first half of the 1990s to a deep 
uncertainty among the populations of these countries. Highly respected population groups 
(teachers, doctors, scientists) lost their social status, and professional groups that had ear-
lier not even existed gained considerable influence in the economy (e.g. bankers). Major 
migration movements materialized. The political elite was rapidly shaken up, and although 
this did not mean any genuine change in elite structures, it did lead to a forced generation 
change. These changes most markedly affected Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan the governments sought to alleviate the social impacts of radical change, 
but without being able to spare their populations inflation, income losses, and social inse-
curity. In view of the civil war there, the people of Tajikistan were forced wholly to rely on 
their own resources. 
In the meantime the picture has become further differentiated. Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan have completed the most crucial processes of economic and social change. Efforts 
there must now focus on harnessing a stable economic upswing to alleviate a new, wide-
spread poverty (pro-poor growth), although no one would be willing to rule out the possi-
bility of a new recession, particularly in Kyrgyzstan. In any case, a – decelerated – process 
of structural change will continue, giving rise to further uncertainty and experiences of 
downward social mobility. For Kyrgyzstan, for example, dramatic estimates assume a 
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youth unemployment ranging between 80 and 90 %.90 Due to its resource wealth (and 
larger domestic market) Kazakhstan has the potential to mitigate any possible future 
shocks. Kyrgyzstan on the other hand is in a far worse position, especially in view of its 
high foreign debt.  
The most radical economic changes are still to come for Uzbekistan and Turkmeni-
stan. Turkmenistan may be able to continue, for a while, to fund its unproductive, unre-
formed economic and social system from revenues from exports of raw materials (even 
though there is some reason to assume that rent-seeking strategies of the elite and general 
distributional inefficiencies are substantially contravening the mitigating effects of this 
policy). Uzbekistan, on the other hand, is faced with a more difficult situation. High popu-
lation growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s and a shortage of jobs in the country’s most 
densely populated areas (mainly in the Ferghana Valley) require economic growth rates 
just to stabilize the national economy that are as good as impossible under the conditions 
presently given. What this means is that large segments of the population are threatened 
with further social decline and a lack of future prospects. Without systemic change, a 
socio-economically motivated crisis, starting out e.g. in the Ferghana Valley, is certainly 
conceivable in the long run. Unlike the situation in Turkmenistan, however, a discussion 
over economic-policy strategies is definitely underway in Uzbekistan, at least in expert 
circles. Below the level of radical system reform, experiments are being conducted with 
individual free-market elements (e.g. stepped-up promotion of SMEs). However, such 
approaches have remained foreign bodies in a setting dominated by a government deter-
mined everywhere to assert its control. 
Growing socioeconomic disparities 
A sharp decline in economic output and a subsequent upturn in growth in all Central Asian 
countries led first to a rapid material and social decline of large segments of the popu-
lations and then to a highly selective recovery. It may generally be said that the costs of 
transformation have been (and, thanks e.g. to declining quality in the education and health 
sector, continue to be) far more broadly distributed than the later gains.91 Even though no 
comparable statistical income-distribution data (Gini index) are available for all five coun-
tries,92 recent figures (1998) show, e.g. for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, distribution 
patterns far more inequitable than those noted for all Western European countries. For 
                                                                
90  USAID (2002, 5). 
91  On the consequence of this for reform policy, the danger of a “freeze on partial reforms,” see 
Hellman (1998). 
92  The 2002 World Development Indicators cite for the five countries different reference years 
ranging from 1996 to 1999. Since the same period experienced the most dynamic divergence in 
the development of the economies of these countries, the individual county data cannot be reaso-
nably compared; see World Bank (2002a). 
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Kyrgyzstan a value was determined in 1999 which is likewise above the Western European 
average, although the disparity is considerably lower than in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
The available data would seem to indicate that market liberalization in Kyrgyzstan has led 
to less inequality than the continuation of a paternalistic state-run economy, with its selec-
tive introduction of individual market elements (privatization of small and microenter-
prises) in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  
There is too little reliable data available to permit any precise comparative statements 
concerning the incidence of income poverty in the Central Asian countries, although it can 
generally be said that income poverty has become a mass phenomenon, a new experi-
ence for the generations living today, and one that is, in this form, difficult to deal 
with for many people. There are, in addition, enormous regional disparities within the 
Central Asian countries,93 and these hold special intrasocietal conflict potential, since 
they make it possible to subjectively link experiences of socioeconomic injustice with 
regional and/or ethnic identities. 
Competition for natural resources 
Fertile land, clean water, and a healthy environment are scarce resources in Central 
Asia. Almost everywhere, people lack at least one, in many cases two, of these three fac-
tors; and in ecological disaster areas like the region around the Aral Sea, the contaminated 
weapons testing facilities in Kazakhstan, or the densely populated, monoculturally farmed 
areas in the Ferghana Valley, salinized soils, scarce and heavily polluted water, and a 
general ecological degradation are joining forces with population growth and intermittently 
very high population densities to form a potentially fatal mixture. We can illustrate some of 
the potentially most conflict-laden factors on the basis of a number of selected natural 
geographic and demographic data (see Table 8). 
In all Central Asian countries large tracts of land are desert, steppe, or high mountainous 
and are therefore are practically uninhabitable. What this means is that actual average 
population density is many times higher than the ostensible statistical average. In particu-
lar, the percentage of land under cultivation, 4-11 %, is very low. In the desert countries 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan extensive irrigation systems are used to maintain agriculture, 
while at the same time water is an extremely scarce resource that depends on inflows from 
neighboring countries, and the Aral Sea continues to dry up. In a parallel development, 
these two countries, together with Tajikistan, have experienced substantial population 
growth in the last twenty years. A growing generation now sees itself confronted with a 
combination of ecological degradation and relative shrinkage of – in any case scare –
resources. 
                                                                
93  See Müller (2003, III). 
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In summary, the picture emerging in the field of economy shows clear-cut regional differ-
ences, and, on the whole, gives some reason for concern. Against the background of its 
total population, its central geographic location, its lack of a plausible development strat-
egy, Uzbekistan must be seen as the Central Asian country with the largest long-run 
socioeconomic risk potential. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the countries with the re-
gion’s lowest per capita incomes, are likewise encumbered with severe socioeconomic 
burdens. Moreover, they are, through the Ferghana Valley, linked closely with devel-
opments in Uzbekistan. By comparison, Kazakhstan has been the most successful coun-
Table 8: Natural geographical and demographic factors 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Area 2,717,300 km² 198,500 km² 143,100 km² 488,100 km² 447,400 km² 
Population 15 million 5 million 6.5 million 5.5 – 6 million 25 million 
Average popula-
tion growth, p.a., 
1980-2000, in  % 
0.0 1.5 2.2 3.0 2.2 
Average popula-
tion growth, p.a., 
2000-2015, in  % 
(forecast) 
0.2 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.3 
Geography approx. 90 % 
steppe 
approx. 90 % 
mountains 
approx. 90 % 
mountains 
approx. 90 % 
desert 
approx. 90 % 
desert 
Arable land 11 % 7 % 5 % 4 % 11 % 
Rural population 
density (rural. 
population per 
km2 of arable 
land) 
22 236 611 173 342 
Freshwater 
resources per 
capita (thousand 
m3) 
7.4 9.5 12.9 11.7 4.6 
Share of fresh-
water from other 
countries (in  %) 
31 0 17 98 86 
Sources: EBRD (2002a); EBRD (2002b-d); EBRD (2001a-b); World Bank (2002a); Gumppen-
berg (2002a); in part author’s calculations 
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try of all in managing the process of economic transformation. The difficult social 
situation of a large portion of the population and the country’s substantial ecological bur-
dens are at least in part mitigated by the country’s large agriculturally utilizable areas, its 
positive economic development over recent years, and its current investment potential, 
which is largely due to its wealth in natural resources. Still, national experts are cautious 
even in Kazakhstan. A survey of experts conducted in the summer of 2002 by a Kazakh 
research institute arrived at an overall assessment indicating there is reason to anticipate 
growing economic, social, and ecological risks in the future, with the ecological dimension 
threatening to become an extreme risk factor, while the anticipated economic and social 
risks are seen as “above-average” or “high.”94 Long-term negative developments in many 
resource-rich countries of the world also give reason for caution in coming up with overly 
optimistic prognoses. 
3.3 Sociocultural factors 
Political instrumentalization of cultural and other differences 
Central Asia is marked by a diversity of ethnic, linguistic, religious, regional tribe- or clan-
related, and other cultural identities which break national populations down into a large 
number of different identity groups. However, the cleavages between these various charac-
teristics are often cross-cutting in nature and thus serve to create multiple identities that 
are not per se suitable for purposes of political mobilization.  
Violent conflicts have erupted along local regional identities in the recent past in the 
south of the Central Asian region (Tajikistan, Ferghana Valley). Here, particularly unfa-
vorable socioeconomic circumstances had created the conditions among the (younger 
male) population for an openness to violence which was channeled by rival parts of the 
political elite in their own specific interests.  
Aside from this recent history of conflict, however, Central Asia is also marked by a tradi-
tion of cultural diversity and tolerance. In its own way, the Soviet Union continued this 
legacy by proclaiming equal rights for all ethnic groups, by pressing for industrialization 
and urbanization, with their side-effect of creating a widespread sense of “multicultural-
ism” for segments of the populations, and by making available a lingua franca, Russian, 
which served in particular to link the region’s elites. This legacy is alive even today. But 
political developments since independence have also cast light on the limitations of Soviet 
nationality policy. In the early 1990s the system’s coercive character provoked the emer-
gence of national and religious liberation or revivalist movements which were devoted to 
the search for the roots of the respective national identities and thus automatically served to 
reinforce social cleavages. To be sure, most ethnic national movements soon lost much of 
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their new support, when the Central Asian governments themselves took charge of promo-
tion of national ethnic groups with a view to creating a new, post-Soviet legitimacy for 
themselves. At the same time, the political leaderships were at pains to prevent the emer-
gence of any major tensions among the different ethnic groups. The (proud) reference to 
the multiethnic character of the nation, which was already a cornerstone of the Soviet 
ideological edifice, is today an essential element of political rhetoric in all Central Asian 
countries. It is generally thought that in recent years a more relaxed attitude has emerged 
toward the Russian language, which, in the years following independence, was pushed into 
the background in all Central Asian countries (though to different extents) in favor of the 
respective national language. 
One factor that has turned out to be more problematic, however, is the way in which the 
Central Asian countries have dealt with resurgent religiosity. In Uzbekistan official 
efforts to suppress all religious currents other than a government-controlled Islam were 
instrumental in the emergence of the militant IMU and the growing sympathy enjoyed 
by the Hizb ut-Tahrir.95 In Tajikistan, too, stigmatization of the Islamic-oriented opposi-
tion as “Islamists” by President Rahmonov in the early 1990s contributed only to radicaliz-
ing the opposition. However, the situation following the civil war appears to have a thrust 
in the opposite direction. By involving Islamic forces in the present coalition govern-
ment, Tajikistan has set the clearest signal of all countries of the region for religious toler-
ance. Due to the religious traditions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the initial situa-
tion there was more relaxed. The respective governments saw no threat in the resurgence 
of a traditional Islamic popular religiosity of the kind long cultivated by the nomadic peo-
ples, and were accordingly more tolerant. For the same reason, though, the more strict, 
dogmatic Islamic religious practices common in the Ferghana Valley are likely to 
remain more or less alien to the Kyrgyz elite in Bishkek. Recently the Kyrgyz government 
has been increasingly warning of Islamist movements, pointing both to Hizb ut-Tahrir and 
the IMU, which is now claimed to have reconstituted itself as the “Islamic Movement of 
Central Asia.” The countermeasures undertaken by the security forces have been concen-
trated on the south of the country. Whether and to what extent these are real threats, or 
whether the government is merely seeking to discredit the political opposition from the 
south by linking it with militant extremists, as critics of the government suggest, is a ques-
tion that can at present not be answered. 
Regional identities, defined neither in strictly ethnic nor in strictly religious terms, are in 
some cases just as important in Central Asia as the allegedly primordial characteristics 
mentioned above. For instance, one factor that unites ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the 
Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley is a certain resentment of the south toward the north of 
the country, while Christian Kyrgyz in Bishkek have much in common with the Russian-
descended population living there. Furthermore, in the urban areas of Tashkent, Bishkek, 
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or Almaty “mixed marriages” between members of different ethnic groups and religious 
denominations are a perfectly natural part of everyday life, while for many people there is a 
clear-cut civilizational divide between town and country, particularly when these people 
are first-generation town-dwellers. 
The ethnic, religious, and other cultural diversity of Central Asia would seem to sug-
gest the existence there of major potential for tensions. But in view of international 
realities this potential should not be overestimated. There are hardly any attempts to 
openly mobilize individual identity groups. In many cases overlapping identities tend to 
run counter to any overly one-sided instrumentalization of identities. Even so, it is impor-
tant not to overlook individual risk potentials. The greatest risk would be a mobilization of 
border-area ethnic minorities by their neighboring “motherland”; in concrete terms – and 
in view of the ethnic and military givens: attempts by the Uzbek government to mobilize 
Uzbek minorities in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, or Turkmenistan. At present, however, there 
are no overt signs of this. 
3.4 Security 
Legacy of violence  
Tajikistan in particular, a post-conflict country, has had to grapple with the difficult leg-
acy of widespread social violence. It is here that we encounter the phenomena typical 
associated with civil war – a low threshold of violence, widespread possession of fire-
arms. The other Central Asian countries have no comparable history of violence. The 
rioting in the Ferghana Valley in 1989 and 1990 has remained singular in this respect, and 
the main sentiment resulting from it has been fear, not any willingness to escalate violence. 
Still, there are some worrying signals. The use of massive government force as a means 
of repression against opposition members, as in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, could 
one day spark a similar reaction against the ruling regime and its representatives. In this 
respect, the attacks undertaken by the IMU must to be understood as a warning. In Kyr-
gyzstan, particularly in Bishkek, there have recently been reports of growing, excessive 
violence on the part of youthful street robbers, a fact that has aroused concern about a 
general decline in the threshold of violence, and in recent years a sizable number of eco-
nomically motivated contract killings in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has attracted 
public attention. While violence as a means of conflict resolution is generally taboo in 
society, it is not necessarily out of the question if the matter concerned appears to justify 
violence. 
Arms proliferation and irregular armed units  
In the Central Asian countries, and particularly in Tajikistan, widespread possession of 
small arms is, as mentioned above, a serious problem. Furthermore, starting out from the 
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north of Tajikistan, the activities of the IMU in 1999 and 2000 have made the Ferghana 
Valley, with the surrounding mountainous regions, into an important center of trafficking 
in small arms. There is speculation on possible connections between arms-trafficking and 
the crisis regions in the Caucasus. Problems faced by central government institutions, 
particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in extending their authority to the remote sec-
tions of the Ferghana Valley have paved the way for the activities of criminal gangs. The 
war against terrorism and the stationing of Western troops have, however, led to a new 
situation there. There are hardly any reliable data available on the current situation, but 
there are many indications that the extent of illegal arms-trafficking has declined in the 
region, even though the related criminal structures are still in place. Like drug-trafficking, 
the arms trade is, for many of those involved, not least an economic survival strategy in 
a region which offers hardly any regular chances for individual economic advancement. 
Furthermore, it may be assumed that one reason why many small arms came into circula-
tion in the early 1990s in Central Asia, as in other parts of the former Soviet Union, was 
that military personnel offered weapons for sale from the inventories of the former Soviet 
army to improve their insufficient pay levels. The involvement of underpaid Russian sol-
diers stationed in Tajikistan – whose tasks should actually include suppression of arms 
sales – in trafficking in arms and drugs has been widely documented. 
In Tajikistan an additional threat is posed by landmines that were set out by enemy units 
in the civil war and have until today not been cleared for lack of suitable equipment and 
adequate funding. In 2002 alone 60 people, most of them women and children, fell victim 
to mine incidents. Most of the minefields are located along the border to Uzbekistan, but 
thousands of mines are also suspected in other former front-line areas. Many farmers face 
grave danger to life and limb in tilling their fields. In February 2003 the OSCE launched an 
initiative on a coordinated, internationally supported mine-clearance program.96 The min-
ing of the Uzbek border to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan likewise poses a danger to the 
civilian population. This situation is now reported to have improved, in part in response to 
international pressure, although the danger has not yet been fully eliminated for the popula-
tion living in border areas. 
Nothing is known about the existence of major irregular armed units in Central Asia – with 
the above-mentioned exception of the IMU, whose present situation remains unclear. Past 
estimates (1999/2000) assumed figures somewhere between several hundred and several 
thousand fighters, though most of them are unlikely still to be under arms today. In other 
words, the IMU no longer appears to pose a military threat, although it may still be in a 
position to use terrorist attacks to spread fear and uncertainty. 
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Uncontrolled government security forces 
In many countries of the world the regular military forces are in a position to exert consid-
erable pressure on civilian governments, to secure unjustified privileges for themselves, 
and to weigh heavily on society at large as a quasi-parasitic organization. This description 
does not apply for the armies in Central Asia. The military is relatively weak and has only 
very limited political influence. This stands in marked contrast to the interior ministries of 
the Central Asian republics, which, in the old Soviet tradition, are almost exclusively 
centralized police authorities that have quasi-military units of their own to suppress internal 
unrest, and which cultivate a strong esprit de corps: Their influence on politics is some-
times considerable, and their day-to-day activities often largely elude effective gov-
ernment control. Viewed in the context of government reform geared to the model of 
good governance, they represent one of the most powerful veto-wielding groups.  
In none of the Central Asian republics has there been any structural reform of the internal 
security forces in line with the economic and social changes that have been effected in at 
least some of these countries. Looking at the present state of the internal security forces in 
Central Asia, a study by the International Crisis Group, which calls for urgent and compre-
hensive efforts in the field of police reform, regards these security forces as worse in many 
respects than they were in Soviet times: more corrupt, less concerned with the needs of 
the population, more deeply involved in organized crime, and often no longer under 
the control of the political leadership. The security sector, the study further notes, suffers 
from a lack of equipment and poor pay, a lack of qualified staff and enormous corrup-
tion.97 Kyrgyzstan’s interior ministry receives only a quarter of its funds from the national 
budget. The remaining funds are acquired through a mixture of economic activities, extor-
tion, and other involuntary levies (fines etc.). In other Central Asian countries the situation 
is similar, or worse (Tajikistan). Citizens have very little trust in the security forces, and by 
using excessive force (torture, abuse during arrests procedures, etc.) the security forces are 
themselves contributing to even further lowering the threshold of violence in society. 
These “security forces” are thus one of the major sources of insecurity for the societies 
of Central Asia. In individual prominent cases at any rate, the security forces have proved 
more than willing to be instrumentalized to carry out political orders going beyond estab-
lished law, and in day-to-day life they are primarily concerned with satisfying of their own 
needs and interests. By contrast, the task of guaranteeing the protection and security of the 
population, much in the sense of human security, plays no more than a subordinate role. 
On the whole, though, the picture that emerges in the field of security is, while worry-
ing, not an especially alarming one. The risk that the security situation may deteriorate 
and develop negative intrinsic dynamics due to inherent crisis factors must be assessed as 
more or less small. Viewed in combination with other crisis factors, however, the situation 
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assumes a far more threatening aspect. The reason for this is that the type and structure of 
the problems given in the security sector give little reason to expect that a stable security 
situation would do much to effectively prevent an escalation of violent conflict that 
might emerge in connection with a persistent deterioration of the political and eco-
nomic framework and related growth in conflicts of interest. 
It is also clear that the canon of problems faced by these countries in the security sector is 
marked by more common elements shared by all Central Asian countries than is the 
case in the fields of governance and economics. The factors that play a role here obviously 
include the Soviet legacy and the inherent tendency of certain security risks (drugs, weap-
ons, illegal armed units) to cross borders. 
3.5 External factors 
Negative impacts of external intervention 
None of the Central Asian states is subject to massive external intervention with any 
clearly definable thrust. Below this threshold, however, we can identify a number of factors 
with economic, political, and military impacts that must be seen as at least ambivalent 
and could possibly, within a given conflict constellation, serve to aggravate a conflict. 
In Russia’s view Central Asia is its natural geostrategic “sphere of interest,” and Russia is 
engaged in the region in a number of different ways. Russia’s positive influences include 
its efforts to avoid heating up the multifarious problems of the Russian-descended minori-
ties in the Central Asian countries by indulging in confrontational rhetoric and its commit-
ment to search for more or less pragmatic solutions. On the other hand, one negative factor 
is the large measure of congruence between the political notions held by the Russian lead-
ership and the authoritarian methods of rule adopted by the Central Asian presidents. This 
finds expression in particular in Russian support (including military) for the massive sup-
pression of the Islamic opposition in Central Asia. The fact that Russia’s notions of stabil-
ity for Central Asia are closely linked with continuity in the leaderships in place in the 
region means that the Russian government exerts absolutely no democratization pressure 
on the political regimes in the region. 
Kazakhstan’s Caspian oil was early to attract the interest and economic engagement of 
foreign oil companies, which were interested both in developing the country’s oil wells and 
in building new pipelines. While Turkmenistan was of far less interest because of its 
smaller reserves and unfavorable political-economic framework, Kazakhstan managed to 
attract substantial foreign investment into its oil sector. For the industry itself this moderni-
zation meant new jobs and higher incomes, while for the economy as a whole it meant 
growth driven by greater exports and more purchasing power. At the same time, though, 
this offered the political elite considerable opportunities for self-enrichment. President 
Nazarbayev is accused by his opponents of transferring a large share of the proceeds from 
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the oil business to private bank accounts abroad, in this way deceiving the population on a 
grand scale. Even though the president himself vehemently disputes these accusations, they 
do contribute to further exacerbating the confrontation between the government and its 
opponents. 
The problematic consequences of foreign aid for the Central Asian countries include the 
high foreign debt of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Both countries are now categorized by the 
World Bank as “highly indebted low-income countries,” its most difficult category.98 As 
regards Kyrgyzstan, some local observers are also of the opinion that the country has long 
since exceeded its absorption capacity for external aid. Too many donor-induced measures 
and advisory projects have, it is claimed, failed to achieve effects or have deflected the 
government from developing a coherent strategy of its own. The widely publicized an-
nouncement of Western donors at a Consultative Group Meeting in October 2002 that 
Kyrgyzstan would be provided additional aid amounting to US $ 700 million over the 
coming years is not seen as particularly helpful by critics in view of the widespread view 
held in the south of the country that the government in Bishkek had in the past itself prof-
ited from foreign financial aid money while the rest of the country felt no positive effects. 
Although it is generally difficult to cite facts to prove such allegations, they are a clear 
indication that donor coordination and respect for the principle of country ownership need 
to be improved considerably in the case of Kyrgyzstan.99 
The most powerful recent change in the constellation of external influence on the Central 
Asian countries was brought about by the stationing there of Western armed forces in 
the context of the anti-terror coalition. One of the undoubted positive effects has been a 
short-term stabilization of the security situation the Ferghana Valley due to a weakening of 
the IMU. On the other hand, the long-term effects are far more difficult to predict. One of 
the fears expressed is that the alliance between the region’s authoritarian rulers and West-
ern governments could drive the political opposition into the camp of extremist, anti-
Western movements and thus, in the long term, contribute to polarizing the political situa-
tion, in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular. 
Negative impacts of the regional / international setting  
One of the greatest regional security risks must be seen in the internal borders between 
the Central Asian countries, which have already been addressed.100 The different eco-
nomic-policy strategies pursued by the governments concerned, divergent notions on secu-
rity policy, corrupt border and customs authorities, borders that cut apart grown social 
                                                                
98  World Bank (2002c, 121). 
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100  See also above, p. 43. 
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relationships and separate individual territories from the mother country, and disputed 
border demarcations constitute massive obstacles to the development of productive eco-
nomic relations and peaceful exchanges that foster the willingness of people to cooperate. 
In this connection a central role falls to Uzbekistan, which borders on all of the other Cen-
tral Asian countries and thus far has left largely untapped the chances offered by efforts to 
overcome its narrow, autarkist notions of security. 
It must also be noted that the structural stability of each individual Central Asian republic 
is closely linked with the stability situation prevailing in neighboring countries. Severe 
socioeconomic, political, or economic crises in one country would necessarily set in train 
refugee movements to neighboring countries and could therefore entail an expansion of 
these crises. Concern about a “domino effect” of this kind has until now had a moderating 
influence on the governments in the region. Still, the prevalent atmosphere continues to be 
one of distrust vis-à-vis the alleged intentions of Uzbekistan, but also of Kazakhstan. 
Furthermore, the water issue is closely linked with the problem of an insufficient willing-
ness to cooperate among the Central Asian countries. A solution which took into account 
the needs of all countries concerned would focus on new forms of cooperation to break out 
of the logic of the zero-sum game and at the same time pay adequate attention to the ques-
tion of energy supply for the small, resource-poor countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A 
comprehensive approach of this kind would, however, presuppose trust, and trust could be 
built only on the basis of integrative institutions and the step-by-step development of solu-
tions, an approach which would entail positive effects going beyond the narrow technical 
purpose intended.101 
As a neighbor region of Afghanistan, Central Asia is also immediately affected by the 
development of the political and social situation there. A deterioration of the security situa-
tion in Afghanistan would once again drive refugees across the borders to the north. Should 
it prove impossible to establish an effective government authority in all of Afghanistan’s 
territory within the foreseeable future, there would be every reason to fear a renewed dete-
rioration of the drug problem in the region. At the end of the 1990s estimates were that 
80 % of the heroin traded worldwide stemmed from Afghanistan. The Central Asian coun-
tries have developed into one of the central drug transit corridors to Europe. Success in 
combating the drug trade in Central Asia is therefore closely linked to the situation in 
Afghanistan. 
In a different way, Kyrgyzstan is linked with its neighboring region to the north. The num-
ber of Kyrgyz citizens who earn their livings outside the country and support their family 
members at home is estimated to be about 500,000 (10 % of the total population!). The 
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transfers made by these migrant workers contribute substantially to the disposable in-
comes of the population in Kyrgyzstan. The largest share of these (mostly illegal) migrant 
workers is employed in Russia, primarily in Siberia.102 Recently Russia has repeatedly 
announced its intention to expel these people. Should this project in fact be realized, it 
would have immediate consequences for the social situation in Kyrgyzstan. 
Commodity prices in the world market are another potential crisis factor for the Central 
Asian republics. In recent years low cotton prices have caused substantial problems for 
both Uzbekistan, one of world’s major cotton producers, and Turkmenistan, and the situa-
tion also has effects on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Moreover, gold exports are of major 
importance for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan - like also Turkmenistan - is 
mainly dependent on the price of crude oil, although it also exports sizable amounts of 
nonferrous metals as well as titanium, uranium, and gold.103 
Altogether, Central Asia is embedded in a regional and international environment which 
involves no immediate threats, though it does involve a number of risk factors. Some are 
difficult to influence (commodity prices), while others are in some ways open to political 
influence by neighboring countries or Western donors. 
3.6 Result 
It is first of all important to note that there is no acute violent conflict underway in any 
of the five Central Asian countries. One country, Tajikistan, is in an advanced phase of 
post-civil-war deescalation and consolidation (a phase, though which – to remain with the 
image of the conflict cycle – could in principle swing back to escalation at any time). 
While the other four countries have experienced isolated violent internal conflicts in the 
recent past, they are, generally speaking, in what may be referred to as a pre-conflict phase, 
i.e. in the phase of a possible emergence and escalation of violent conflict.  
There is little reason to anticipate either an immediate outbreak of violent internal 
conflicts or any threat of international conflicts. In the long term, however, the region is 
faced with considerable risks bound up with the negative dynamics of the conflict poten-
tials to be observed in most Central Asian countries. 
If we transfer the conflict potentials identified in the five focus areas and crisis factors 
discussed above to the three problem levels of “structural causes of conflict, constructive 
conflict-resolution capacity,” and “conflict-aggravating security risks,” we come up with 
the overview presented in Table 9 (below).  
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Table 9:  Crisis and conflict potentials in Central Asia, broken down by problem areas 
Structural causes Constructive conflict-resolution 
capacity 
Conflict-aggravating  
security risks 
● Substantial economic 
uncertainties persist 
● Widespread income 
poverty is a new, diffi-
cult experience for many 
people 
● Income disparities have 
grown substantially 
● Major regional dispari-
ties exist within the 
countries concerned 
● Social infrastructure 
(healthcare, education) 
has deteriorated 
● A large cohort of young 
people are without jobs 
and perspectives 
● Fertile land is becoming 
increasingly scarce due 
to population growth and 
environmental degrada-
tion 
● Poverty and environ-
mental degradation are 
causing more and more 
diseases 
● National borders cleave 
grown sociocultural and 
economic spaces 
● Natural resources are 
unevenly distributed 
among the countries 
concerned 
● Certain (regional, ethnic, 
religious, etc.) identity 
groups feel systemati-
cally discriminated 
against or are persecuted 
● As conflict mediators, 
government institutions 
suffer from legitimacy 
deficits, corruption, and 
weakness in their imple-
mentation capacities 
● The legal system lacks 
trust among the popula-
tion 
● Civil-society activities 
are mainly weakly devel-
oped and are sometimes 
massively obstructed 
● Government intolerance 
toward and use of force 
against opposition pro-
vokes counterviolence 
● Government denial of the 
existence of legitimate 
conflicts encourages  
conflict escalation 
● Western aid regarded as 
overly regime-oriented 
(major investments, mili-
tary, DC) could serve to 
undercut a conflict-
moderating role for  
donors  
● The threshold of vio-
lence within societies 
is declining 
● Government security 
forces spread uncer-
tainty, not security 
● Due to the civil war in 
Tajikistan, many weap-
ons are circulating the-
re as well as in 
neighboring regions 
● Organized crime (traf-
ficking in drugs and 
arms) is undercutting 
the government’s mo-
nopoly on power and 
encouraging the spread 
of an illegal economy 
● Acute crises in one 
country have the poten-
tial to spread quickly to 
neighboring countries 
● Dependence on ex-
ports of raw materials 
may lead to unforeseen 
socioeconomic ten-
sions 
● Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan’s high external 
debt is saddling the 
populations with addi-
tional burdens 
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Proceeding on this basis, we will then sum up the crisis and conflict potentials in Central 
Asia, broken down by individual countries and specific geographic areas. The emphasis 
will be on those factors which deviate positively or negatively from the overall picture of 
the region. Of all the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, with its lower poverty rates, 
more stable economic situation, lower population growth, and greater utilizable land area, 
has the relatively lowest level of structural conflict causes, even though the country’s major 
ecological burdens must be seen as a particularly negative factor. Although the ability of 
state and society to resolve conflicts constructively is not very highly developed there, 
Kazakhstan does have a more or less broad spectrum of civil-society organizations that in 
principle can be seen as a potential basis for cooperative efforts to seek solutions to press-
ing problems. Geographically, Kazakhstan is farther removed than the other Central Asian 
countries from some of the crisis-aggravating security risks besetting the region; however, 
an increasing propensity to violence in society, the country’s problematic security forces, 
and a high degree of dependence on commodity exports continue to be virulent problem 
factors. 
Under the present conditions, Uzbekistan must be seen as Central Asia’s most endangered 
country over the long run. The severe structural problems dogging the country include an 
economic development stagnating at a low level in a setting urgently in need of reform, a 
large and extremely young population, a high population density in the habitable parts of 
the country, and a lack of reliably stable sources of government revenue. These problems 
are exacerbated by a general absence of established cooperative conflict-resolution mecha-
nisms and a government policy of repression which contributes to the escalation of vio-
lence. Furthermore, the country’s central geographic location links it with nearly all poten-
tial regional flash points in Central Asia, in particular with the Ferghana Valley and Tajiki-
stan. 
Kyrgyzstan is likewise marked by substantial structural conflict potentials. A gradual 
economic upswing has thus far had hardly any effects on the predominantly very poor 
population in most parts of the country. No solution has yet been found for the country’s 
high foreign debt. The tensions between the country’s south and north have increased, and 
the events of 1990 are reminder enough that violent conflicts could also break out along 
ethnic divides. Kyrgyzstan is closely bound up, through the Ferghana Valley, with its 
neighbors Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as with regional security problems like drug-
trafficking. Despite the recent political disturbances, however, Kyrgyzstan has the rela-
tively best social prerequisites of all the Central Asian countries for civil conflict resolution 
and the search for participatory solutions. Much will depend on whether or not the gov-
ernment manages to activate this potential for purposes of constructive crisis management. 
Since 1997, following the civil war, Tajikistan has developed more positively than many 
observers had dared to hope. It nevertheless remains the region’s poorest, most underde-
veloped, and most traumatized country. Bordering directly on Afghanistan, it is also (still) 
the Central Asian country most threatened in its external security. Furthermore, in no other 
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country in Central Asia is the state monopoly on power less secure. Tajikistan’s high for-
eign debt is an additional problematic factor. At the same time, however, no other country 
in Central Asia has made greater progress on the road from violent conflict to civil conflict 
resolution.  
Turkmenistan shows an overall balance equally as unfavorable as Uzbekistan’s but ag-
gravated by a complete absence of legitimate conflict-resolution capacities. The country 
does, though, benefit from more or less stable export revenues which it can, at least for the 
time being, use to mitigate negative socioeconomic effects, and it is faced with considera-
bly lower population pressure – although its population has grown enormously in the last 
20 years.  
Regionally, two crisis potentials that have the form of country-overlapping problems 
deserve to be mentioned separately: first, a pervasive water scarcity which, far from being 
merely a possible source of a cross-border water-distribution conflict, is even today, in its 
ecological consequences, adversely affecting agriculture and the living conditions of peo-
ple living in degraded zones like the Aral Sea region; second, as a geographic focus, the 
Ferghana Valley. In its combination of structural, process-related, and conflict-
aggravating crisis potentials, this region stands out like no other region in Central Asia. 
Here, in a zone of transboundary ecological degradation, the following problems come 
together in one small area, mutually reinforcing one another: socioeconomic and demo-
graphic pressure from Uzbekistan, the status of a structurally weak, ethnically highly het-
erogeneous, and in part ungovernable periphery in the case of Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan’s 
poverty and security problems. 
Apart from a possible “major “ crisis in the Ferghana Valley, however, it is important not 
to disregard the small, “quiet” crises besetting more remote peripheries. In the view of 
many people living in the remote western parts of Uzbekistan (Autonomous Republic of 
Karakalpakstan) and the province Khorezm, both of which are affected by the Aral Sea 
disaster), or in the poor, mountainous region of Gorno Badakhshan, which makes up one 
third of Tajikistan’s territory, the Ferghana Valley is still a comparatively rich - because 
fertile - region which, thanks to its geographic location, benefits from worldwide attention, 
while elsewhere the hopeless situation of the population is hardly known, even in the capi-
tal. 
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4 German bilateral development cooperation with the 
Central Asian republics 
4.1 Principles 
4.1.1 The BMZ’s Central Asia strategy  
The “Central Asia strategy of the BMZ” of December 18, 2001, is the central conceptual 
basis of official German development cooperation with the countries of Central Asia.104 In 
it the BMZ expressly derives the special attention accorded by Germany to this region from 
the goal of crisis prevention (Point 1: “Contribution of the BMZ to crisis prevention nec-
essary”). In its “endeavor to contribute to crisis prevention” the BMZ is now set to go 
appreciably beyond its previous, very limited engagement. The strategy therefore proposes 
according the status of a partner region to the whole of Central Asia and intensifying 
cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan “will 
be included in this partnership once its general environment, especially in terms of democ-
ratization, is developing more favorably than at present.”  
The Central Asia strategy is based on a very critical analysis of the economic and political 
situation in the countries concerned. The strategy notes that these “countries are faced with 
substantial socioeconomic reform tasks and that their political systems are still far from 
being stable democracies with active civil societies.” This, in connection with widespread 
poverty, “makes them vulnerable with regard to extremist tendencies, also, and especially, 
of Islamist origin.” 
Accordingly, the BMZ defines its contribution as support of these countries “in their 
social and economic development towards democracy and market economy.” The BMZ 
places alongside a bilateral approach its intention to undertake “efforts … to strengthen 
cross-border cooperation among the countries,” pointing in particular to the problems 
water, energy, and the environment. Finally, “special priority” will be accorded to the 
Ferghana Valley. 
Proceeding from this goal profile, the BMZ has defined three fields of cooperation on 
which the German contribution will concentrate: 
● Strengthening of democratic structures and the rule of law  
● Support for economic reforms and poverty reduction  
● Promotion of cross-border cooperation 
The first field, strengthening of democratic structures and the rule of law, basically sets 
out four points of departure: continuation of an existing regional legal advice program; 
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support for the grassroots work of political foundations and private-sector institutions as a 
contribution toward building civil society and strengthening democracy; decentralization 
of political power and decision-making competences, again involving political foundations 
and private-sector institutions; and measures (capacity-building / education, dialogue func-
tions) aimed at strengthening the media. 
A very broad spectrum of approaches is cited in the field of support for economic reforms 
and poverty reduction. Specifically linked with the issue of economic reforms are: different 
forms of economic-policy advice; initiatives on reform of the banking system; help with 
the development of vocational training systems; promotion of business and trade and 
advisory services for business startups. The direct aid measures envisaged include em-
ployment programs (in the sense of job-creation measures) and food-for-work programs 
targeted on youth unemployment; these programs are at the same time intended to contrib-
ute to the rehabilitation of a local and regional infrastructure, and they include different 
measures in the field of healthcare (combating tuberculosis, family planning, mother-and-
child programs, basic health services). 
The field of cross-border cooperation focuses on three approaches: further development of 
an existing anti-desertification program; projects in the field of drinking-water supply; 
and participation in coordinated, internationally harmonized measures designed to find a 
regional solution to the water problem, the idea being to address the issues of water use, 
energy production, and agricultural irrigation in one common context. 
4.1.2 The German government’s Central Asia strategy  
A “German Government Central Asia strategy,” which was worked out under the leader-
ship of the Foreign Office and approved by the Federal Security Council on March 18, 
2002, serves as a political reference framework for the work of federal ministries with the 
countries of Central Asia.105 In essence, this document reaffirms the strategic goals set out 
in the BMZ’s strategy, in particular the aim of using dialogue and support measures to help 
“promote peaceful social, ecological, and market-oriented economic development,” the 
objective being to “creat[e] ... democratic and transparent political structures.” The 
document refers in particular to possibilities for an active participation of the population, 
respect of human rights, rule of law, social justice, and sustainable management of natural 
resources. More directly than the BMZ strategy, however, the German government’s Cen-
tral Asia strategy also cites among its objectives “support [for] the independence and sov-
ereignty of our Central Asian partner countries and, in particular, their fight against ter-
rorism and organized crime.” 
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The document also cites as an aim “the development and application of effective strategies 
and instruments of crisis prevention, peaceful conflict settlement and post-conflict peace-
building.” The aim here is “to help prevent violent conflicts in the Central Asian crisis and 
conflict area in good time.” 
To implement these goals, the strategy assigns a “central role” to “increased development 
cooperation by the German government.” Particular emphasis is also placed on “cross-
border approaches” in the environmental sector, but also on providing more support for 
education and science. The document also explicitly calls for close coordination with inter-
national partners (above all in the framework of EU, UN, OSCE).  
4.2 Instruments 
4.2.1 Priority area WIRAM 
In the process of concentrating official German development cooperation (DC) on selected 
priority areas, the German government reached agreement, in 2001/2002, with the govern-
ments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to define “economic reform 
and market systems development” (WIRAM) as a priority area of bilateral cooperation 
with these countries. The respective portfolios of German technical and financial coopera-
tion are in the process of being restructured in compliance with this new priority. 
For a number of reasons, the choice of this priority area appeared reasonable and promising 
both for the German side and for the partner countries concerned. In the view of the partner 
governments an incomplete transformation of economic systems, with the many social, 
economic, and ecological burdens this state of affairs implies, is the greatest social and 
political problem they face. In the region of Central Asia (as in the whole of the former 
Soviet Union) Germany enjoys an extraordinary reputation when it comes to economic 
issues and is seen as the motherland of the “social market economy,” the aim of which is to 
seek a balance between the hardships of a capitalist economy and the social security that 
was once provided by Soviet state socialism.106 Of the ten possible priority areas of Ger-
man DC, WIRAM proved to be, from the German perspective, the one area under which 
most measures in the current portfolio could be subsumed and which therefore involved the 
lowest reorganization costs. Moreover, formation of a uniform priority area for all coun-
tries concerned is a good way to simplify a coordinated regional approach. 
                                                                
106  The fact that this view was already represented among the Central Asian governments in the 
early 1990s is demonstrated by the preliminary work that went into the establishment, from 1992 
on, of a multiyear government advisory service for Kazakhstan by German economics experts. 
See Hoffmann (2001). 
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Abstracting from institutional interests, the crisis analysis presented here might just as well 
lead us to the conclusion that the priority area “democracy, civil society, and public ad-
ministration” would not have been any less justified for the Central Asian republics. Possi-
bly, even better arguments could be advanced in favor of this approach. On the other hand, 
there is reason to doubt that it would have been possible to gain the consent of partner 
countries for a priority of this kind, which might have smacked somewhat of political 
interference. 
4.2.2 Regional approach  
One field not affected by the priorities set in bilateral cooperation is the BMZ’s regional 
approach to support, in the context of which cross-border measures are carried out in 
Central Asia. In the framework of this approach the aim is to implement a regional legal 
advice program as well as healthcare measures (in particular tuberculosis prevention) and 
environmental projects. Pro-democracy measures are likewise set to be embedded in this 
context. The cross-border approach must be seen as an attempt by the BMZ to provide 
instruments in line with the aims of the Central Asia strategy without rejecting the instru-
ment of prioritization for Central Asia. 
4.3 Priority areas of ongoing activities 
Altogether, Germany is at present still the third-largest bilateral donor in Central Asia after 
the US and Japan and has - measured in terms of the number of sectors involved - the most 
broadly diversified portfolio.107 At present, there is very little cooperation with Turkmeni-
stan due to the political framework given there. Only two older projects continue in the 
region of Tashaus, one of them concerned with improvement of healthcare services, the 
other with promotion of private-sector agriculture. The agricultural project is hobbled by 
the narrow latitudes set for private-sector activity in Turkmenistan. A study and expert 
fund is still available to ensure a more or less rapid reentry if the opportunity arises. The 
following sections present an overview of priority activities in the other four countries, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
4.3.1 Kazakhstan 
The largest portion of the measures underway in Kazakhstan is associated with the 
WIRAM priority area. As far as financial cooperation is concerned, these include above all 
measures aimed at promoting the financial sector by providing a credit line for SMEs. 
Technical cooperation likewise focuses on promotion of SMEs and business startups. 
                                                                
107  EU (2002, 15). On the volume of aid as per ODA criteria, see the overview at the beginning of 
Chapter 5. 
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InWEnt is organizing measures in the field of management qualification. In addition, there 
are projects designed to support the national statistics agency and the securities exchange. 
Besides WIRAM, there are also activities underway in the health and energy sectors as 
well as in the field of legal advice. In the health sector FC funds are being used to support 
an anti-tuberculosis project which is also being conducted, in a similar form, in Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan in the framework of cross-border cooperation. Likewise in the context of 
cross-border cooperation, Kazakhstan is receiving in TC support for a legal advice project. 
In the energy sector a feasibility study is being conducted in the framework of FC to exam-
ine the possibility of rehabilitating an existing hydroelectric power plant and building a 
new one.108 
4.3.2 Kyrgyzstan 
Even now, most of the measures underway in Kyrgyzstan are bound up with the priority 
area of WIRAM. Aside from projects in the financial sector, though, FC funds are also 
being used to conduct projects in the electricity industry and in the health sector. The sup-
port being provided in the energy sector is set to be concluded in the near future, while the 
health-related projects are set to continue in the framework of cross-border cooperation. 
TC already has a clear-cut orientation to the field of economic reform. Here the focus is on 
projects on advice on economic reform, export and investment promotion, vocational 
training, support for rural financial systems, and the deployment of several integrated 
experts in various industry associations. In addition, however, the work underway here 
includes one environmental measure (Issyk-Kul biosphere reserve; in the framework of 
cross-border cooperation) and several projects in the south of Kyrgyzstan (Ferghana Val-
ley). These are components of an established project designed to promote private farms and 
their support institutions (province of Osh) as well as two new projects designed to pro-
mote self-help initiatives in rural areas (provinces of Osh and Jalal-Abad) and food secu-
rity, regional cooperation, and stability in the province of Batken.109 This last-named pro-
ject which got underway only in September 2002 and covers three areas includes the goal 
of strengthening the conflict-resolution capacities of local actors.110 
4.3.3 Tajikistan 
Up to 2002, Germany provided only emergency aid to Tajikistan. At present, a TC and FC 
portfolio is being developed, and, as an exception, agreement has been reached with the 
Tajik government on basic education as a second priority in addition to WIRAM with a 
                                                                
108  Information from BMZ, KfW, and GTZ. 
109  Information from BMZ, KfW, and GTZ. 
110  For more information on this project, see Section 4.3.3 on the food security program in Taji-
kistan. 
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view to meeting substantial needs in this sector. Furthermore, in 2002 anti-terror funds 
were used to conduct education measures aimed at reintegrating combatants.111 
The food-security program, which has been underway since 1995 in the framework of 
emergency aid, and is being conducted by the GTZ on behalf of the BMZ, was extended in 
2002 to form a regional program including additional components in southern Kyrgyzstan 
(Batken) and northern Afghanistan. For the present total of four local components (the 
program is being conducted in two regions of Tajikistan), additional funds amounting to 
nearly € 8 million have been provided for the period up to 2005. Altogether, the regional 
program, which is managed from Dushanbe, is set to run until 2007. In keeping with the 
selection of crisis-prone target regions – and in compliance with a condition set by the 
BMZ – the program will explicitly contain crisis-prevention and conflict-resolution ele-
ments.112 In this connection, the GTZ recently commissioned a report looking into possi-
bilities of and approaches to promotion of tolerance in the framework of community devel-
opment programs in the target regions of the food-security program.113 
4.3.4 Uzbekistan 
At present, FC funds are being used to conduct a broad pallet of measures in Uzbekistan. 
However, a concentration on the WIRAM priority area as well as on the cross-border areas 
of health, legal advice, and environment / resource protection is also in the making. An FC 
project in the telecommunications sector has been completed, a further project in the trans-
portation sector (Tashkent airport) is set to be completed in the medium term. Furthermore, 
FC funds are being used to support an additional project in the drinking-water sector. The 
cross-border approach is being used to support projects in the health sector, while a credit 
line for SMEs is being provided in the framework of WIRAM. In TC a clear-cut concentra-
tion on the fields of economic reform and development of a market economy has already 
emerged. Projects are being carried out to promote initial vocational training, to support the 
development of a training bank (a contribution to the establishment of a dual training sys-
tem), to promote export development, and to provide advice to the government tax authori-
ties. Besides this, a multicomponent project is being conducted on the recultivation of 
desiccated Aral Sea soils and promotion of agriculture; the project is set to be continued in 
the future in the framework of the regional approach. While there are also plans to direct 
special attention to the Ferghana Valley, this geographic focus has not yet been imple-
mented.114 
                                                                
111  Information from BMZ and GTZ. 
112  Interview with Dietrich Fezer, GTZ-ESP, Dushanbe, 17/20 March 2003. 
113  Oral information from GTZ. 
114  Information from BMZ, KfW, and GTZ. 
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4.4 Activities of other German institutions in the field of 
crisis prevention and conflict resolution 
4.4.1 Foreign Office 
Since 2000 the German Foreign Office (AA) has been promoting, from its budget section 
“Peacekeeping Measures” (FEM), individual crisis-prevention and conflict-resolution 
projects conducted by German and international nongovernmental organizations and 
designed to support peacekeeping measures of the United Nations or other international 
organizations. Since April 2001, the AA has supported the so-called zivik Project (civil 
conflict resolution), which was implemented by the Berlin Institut für Auslandsbeziehun-
gen (ifa) and plays a role in identifying and selecting suitable project applications for FEM 
funding and advises NGOs on application procedures and project implementation.115 
In 2001 two of 63 approved projects had a direct reference to Central Asia. These were two 
projects in Tajikistan, one on technical support for local parties, the other on promotion of 
dialogue with moderate Islamists. In 2002 five of 75 approved projects had a focus on 
Central Asia, three of them had a cross-border approach. These projects focused on pro-
motion of intellectual competence and training of multipliers in the field of crisis 
prevention in Central Asia. Altogether, in 2002 roughly 75 NGO projects were supported 
with an overall volume of over € 9 million from the FEM budget section. Nearly € 3 mil-
lion of this was allotted to a total eleven projects in the context of Central Asia and Af-
ghanistan.116 
4.4.2 Political foundations 
Of the German political foundations, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) and the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) are represented in Central Asia with programs and 
regional offices. Both foundations attach great importance to the goal of crisis preven-
tion and the building of civil conflict-resolution capacities in their work in the region. They 
see their role primarily in supporting local civil-society and political actors in providing 
dialogue forums and promoting and/or initiating discussions on important issues and prob-
lems both within these countries and between the countries of the region.117 
                                                                
115  See http://www.ifa.de/zivik/. 
116  Written information from the project and interview with Barbara Unger, zivik project head, 
Berlin, 24 Oct. 2002. 
117  Interviews with Günter Fichtner and Dr. Reinhard Krumm, FES, Berlin, 25 Oct. 2002 as well as 
with Dr. Lars Hänsel, KAS, St. Augustin, 12 Nov. 2002 and Dr. Heinz Bühler, KAS, Tashkent, 
20 Nov. 2002. 
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Represented by a foreign staff member, the FES has been present in Tashkent since April 
2003; it also has two offices run by local staff in Almaty and Bishkek, which are super-
vised from Tashkent. For its activity in Central Asia the FES has identified three regional 
focus areas: security cooperation, economic development, and state and society. Measures 
directly bound up with crisis prevention and conflict resolution include, among others, in 
particular involvement in finding solutions in the problems areas water, energy, and the 
environment (focus area: security cooperation), promotion of pluralistic structures, promo-
tion of dialogue between state and civil society (focus area: state and society).118 
The KAS likewise manages its activity in Central Asia from a regional office in Tashkent 
which has been run by a foreign staff member for several years now. Since the summer of 
2002 an additional temporary foreign staff member has been employed there, especially to 
look after projects in Tajikistan, but also to handle regional tasks. In its geographically 
broad “Regional Conception Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Caucasus, and Iran. 2003 
to 2005,” the KAS names seven priority fields, which largely coincide substantively with 
the two above-named FES focus areas (security cooperation; state and society) and accord-
ingly are clearly relevant to crisis prevention and conflict resolution: promotion of democ-
ratic structures; building and development of rule-of-law structures; municipal self-
administration; security dialogue; interethnic / interdenominational dialogue; promotion of 
regional cooperation and integration; media work.119 
In other words, both foundations mainly focus on areas that are of major importance for the 
promotion of civil conflict-resolution competence in Central Asian societies. 
Furthermore, the Hanns Seidel Foundation is active in Kyrgyzstan in the training and 
advanced training of local administrative staff. 
4.5 Crisis prevention and conflict resolution in German 
development cooperation with the Central Asian 
republics  
There are no more than limited points of contact between the goals of crisis prevention 
and conflict resolution – as formulated in the principles set out by the German govern-
ment and the BMZ for cooperation with Central Asia – and the WIRAM priority area. A 
discussion paper recently prepared for the GTZ on the structuring of the WIRAM priority 
area, for instance, lists only two fields of activity (business-startup and microfinance pro-
grams aimed at reintegration of former combatants and civil war victims as well as financ-
ing of reconstruction measures) that intersect with the priority area “peace development 
                                                                
118  Graphic: “Die Arbeit der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in den zentralasiatischen Republiken,” FES, 
Berlin, December 2002. 
119  KAS (2002, 15–19). 
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and crisis prevention.” Both are concerned only with post-conflict situations.120 In addi-
tion, reference could be made to the role of the private sector as a stakeholder in civil 
conflict resolution as well as to the long-term effects of successful economic reforms on 
mitigating the structural causes of conflict and undercutting economies of violence. But 
these are, for now, more or less theoretical connections. WIRAM has hardly any concrete 
instruments for dealing with serious deficits in a partner country’s civil conflict-resolution 
capacity. Indeed a conceptual integration (“mainstreaming”) of a crisis-prevention perspec-
tive into the WIRAM priority area has yet to be accomplished. Any such attempt would 
presumably run up against structural limits. As a very comprehensively reform-oriented 
priority area, WIRAM presupposes a relatively higher degree of governance capacity than 
other, more specific priority areas (e.g. education, health, energy). Crisis regions, on the 
other hand, are generally regions in which poor performance is more common than good 
governance. In other words, the recently initiated conceptual discussion over the best way 
to deal with poor-performing countries in German DC appears to be extremely urgent for 
Central Asia as well121. 
In view of the goal divergence between the commitment to WIRAM and a far more 
broadly conceived approach of the kind formulated in the political strategies, there is at 
present a marked tendency to resort to the regional approach as a way to find room for 
time-tested measures that no longer fit the bilateral portfolios. Indeed, measures that might 
appear reasonable in the sense of intensified crisis prevention (in particular with a view to 
giving greater emphasis to the priority area in the Ferghana Valley, which is mentioned in 
the BMZ strategy, but hardly to be found in practice), even though they do not fit in with 
WIRAM, could – and for good reasons – be funded through a regional approach. But one 
thing that speaks against this is the fact that the financial resources available for the re-
gional approach are far lower than those available for bilateral measures. 
Viewed in terms of the three fields of cooperation identified in the BMZ’s Central Asia 
strategy, i.e. democracy / rule of law, economic reform / poverty reduction, and cross-
border cooperation, the instruments involved may thus be said to show a marked im-
balance. The by far largest share of funds is made available for one component of these 
three fields (economic reform), while the other components, which would be of particular 
significance from the view of a policy devised with an eye to crisis-prevention, are consid-
erably more poorly endowed. 
                                                                
120  Altenburg / Radtke (2002, 35 and 37). 
121  On this debate, see BMZ (2002). 
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5 Crisis prevention and conflict resolution in the Central 
Asia strategies of other donors  
The most important multilateral donors in Central Asia include the World Bank, the Asian 
Development bank (ADB), the European Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The 
bilateral donors with major DC commitments in the region include especially the USA, 
Japan, Germany, and Switzerland. Table 10 presents an overview of the data on the ODA 
flows committed to Central Asia in 2000 and 2001 by the most important donors. How-
ever, the data do not fully reflect the relative weight of the multilateral donors, since they 
do not include the share of the financial commitments of development banks that not does 
not fall under the ODA criteria. This applies in particular to the commitment of the EBRD, 
but also to that of the ADB and the World Bank. In the case of Uzbekistan the World Bank 
also envisioned for the first time a commitment for the 2002-2004 budget period at IDA 
terms instead of the IBRD loans that had exclusively been granted the country until 
then.122 
The following sections look into the Central Asia strategies of the most important multilat-
eral and bilateral doors with a view to determining how much importance they attach to the 
field of crisis prevention and conflict resolution in Central Asia and what shape they have 
given to their commitments. Account is also taken of indirect references to crisis factors or 
conflict potentials. Among the multilateral donors, only the European Union and – in a 
qualified sense – UNDP have until now made crisis prevention and conflict resolution 
focal points of their strategies. As an organization specialized in crisis prevention, the 
OSCE plays an important role in Central Asia. The development banks are at best only 
indirectly relevant here. The picture is different when we look at the bilateral donors. 
The US, Switzerland, and the UK (which is included here because of its conceptual ap-
proach, and despite its relatively low level of financial commitment) have made crisis 
prevention and conflict resolution an essential element of their strategies for cooperation 
with the Central Asian countries. Only Japan has in this regard lagged behind until now. 
We note that the donors who pursue a targeted crisis-prevention strategy do so on the 
basis of comprehensive regional plans for Central Asia, while the development banks 
(and UNDP) continue to work with the traditional instrument of the country strategy. One 
reason for this is the specific institutional logics of the development banks and the UN 
institutions, although this may also indicate that regional strategies offer more leeway in 
addressing the at times politically sensitive issue of crisis prevention and conflict resolution 
with the emphasis it deserves. Furthermore, individual country strategies are not in a posi-
tion to adequately factor in many regional conflict potentials. 
                                                                
122 World Bank (2002b, IV). 
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Table 10: Official development assistance (ODA) provided by the most important donors 
 in 2001 (2000) 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Total 
Multilateral       
World 
Bank/IDA 
- (-) 27 (52) 35 (23) - (-) - (-) 61 (75) 
ADB 3 (4) 58 (21) 3 (12) - (-) 4 (1) 68 (39) 
EU/TACIS 4 (5) 11 (15) 29 (13) 3 (3) 6 (11) 53 (46) 
EBRD 3 (1) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 7 (2) 
UNDP 1 (1) 1 (2) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 7 (7) 
UNHCR 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 5 (5) 
Arab develep. 
agencies 
2 (0) 5 (2) 4 (0) - (-) - (-) 11 (3) 
Bilateral       
US 56 (58) 28 (25) 40 (23) 14 (8) 50 (36) 189 (149) 
Japan 44 (83) 23 (48) 5 (2) 16 (1) 31 (82) 119 (216) 
EU members,  
total  
20 (16) 14 (11) 10 (7) 2 (1) 23 (15) 69 (49) 
Germany 8 (10) 7 (5) 5 (3) 1 (1) 14 (9) 35 (28) 
Spain 7 (2) 0 (0) - (-) - (-) 3 (0) 10 (2) 
France 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (4) 5 (6) 
UK  1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 5 (4) 
Netherlands 2 (0) 2 (2) 1 (0) 0 (-) 1 (0) 6 (2) 
Sweden 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (2) 1 (-) 0 (0) 3 (2) 
Switzerland 0 (0) 5 (7) 7 (5) - (-) 1 (1) 13 (13) 
Turkey 1 (2) 2 (2) 0 (0) 1 (3) 0 (0) 5 (7) 
0: rounded zero (value lower than US $ 0.5 million)  
-:  no activity  
Source: DAC, Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid - Disbursements 
 (Table 2a), 
 http://www.oecd.org/scripts/cde/viewbase.asp?dbname=cde_dac; 14 May 2003 
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5.1 World Bank 
The central management instrument used by the World Bank Group for development coop-
eration is the country strategy (“Country Assistance Strategy”); these strategies are as a 
rule revised every three years. As an instrument, crisis prevention and conflict resolu-
tion have yet to find their way into the country strategies for the Central Asian coun-
tries. The World Bank’s situation analyses refer to economic risks, including macroeco-
nomic factors and socioeconomic problems like poverty and unemployment. Great weight 
is also attached to the issue of governance, which is analyzed critically with a particular 
view to transparency, legitimacy of government action, and responsibility of government 
actors. 
The programs planned are concentrated on issues of economic reform policy, infrastruc-
ture, healthcare, and poverty reduction. Increasingly, however, issue complexes that may 
be regarded as crisis potentials are also coming in for attention. To cite an example, the 
World Bank’s most recent Tajikistan strategy of February 2003 provides for a program on 
management of water resources in the Ferghana Valley that is set to include all three 
neighboring countries. As yet, however, there are no concrete plans to embed such meas-
ures in an action framework oriented explicitly to conflict and crisis prevention.123 
5.2 ADB 
The ADB’s current country strategies are set out in the “Country Strategy Program Up-
date” documents published in August / September 2002 and valid for all Central Asian 
countries except Turkmenistan. The documents contain no systematic reference to con-
flict potentials or a strategic orientation in the sense of crisis prevention. As in the case of 
the World Bank, however, some indirect references are made in the context of promotion 
of good governance. In addition, specific problem potentials are mentioned in the coun-
try strategies: the environment in Kazakhstan, an improved security situation in Kyrgyzstan 
in connection with the stationing of foreign troops there, drug trafficking in Tajikistan, 
youth unemployment and the need for regional cooperation in Uzbekistan. 
Of the program areas supported by the ADB, the issue of “regional cooperation” has par-
ticular relevance to crisis prevention. The ADB seeks in this context to provide dialogue 
forums for economic cooperation between the Central Asian republics, and it supports 
cross-border infrastructure projects.124 
                                                                
123  World Bank (2001, 2002b, 2003). 
124  ADB (2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d). 
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5.3 EU/TACIS 
The current European Union strategy for Central Asia is set out in a joint document for the 
overall region adopted in October 2002.125 The “Strategy Paper 2002-2006” at the same 
time contains the TACIS Indicative Programme for 2002–2004. The central objective of 
the new EU strategy is defined as promotion of stability and security in the Central 
Asian countries and support for their efforts aimed at sustainable economic development 
and poverty reduction. Cooperation is set to take place along three “tracks”: a program on 
promotion of regional cooperation; a regional support program implemented at the national 
level; and a poverty-reduction program in selected pilot regions. Two of the three higher-
level goals to be pursued on all three “tracks” are: “promotion of security and conflict 
prevention” and “elimination of the causes of political and social tensions.” 
In its structure, the analysis of the region presented in the strategy paper is oriented to 
important aspects of conflict analysis. As “common problems” of the region, it addresses: 
democratization; terrorism, fundamentalism, and security problems; demographic pressure; 
and socioeconomic development and poverty. The “shared challenges” of the Central 
Asian countries addressed in the paper include: border disputes; shared use of natural 
resources; access to world markets; and investment. Accordingly, the EU strategy is de-
signed to address, in parallel, all three problem levels of crisis prevention and conflict 
resolution:  
● long-term structural social, economic, ecological, and demographic problems;  
● the area of process-oriented crisis prevention (good governance, protection of basic 
civil rights, promotion of civil society, confidence-building between the countries in-
volved, and integration within regional projects);  
● acute security issues (help in the fight against terrorism; the fight against drugs; and 
border surveillance. 
At the same time, the EU Commission is seeking to more clearly focus the concrete meas-
ures on a limited number of fields as well as on programming of a longer-term character 
than has usually been the case with the two-year national action programs in the framework 
of TACIS. One of the intentions here is to achieve more sustainability. 
5.4 EBRD 
The issue of crisis prevention and conflict resolution plays no role in the EBRD’s (five 
separate) country strategies for the Central Asian countries. The strategies do, however, 
contain an openly critical assessment of the economic and political reform polices of 
the governments concerned. In the case of Uzbekistan, for instance, the 2001 strategy 
                                                                
125  EU (2002). 
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speaks of only “slow progress” toward multiparty democracy and development of a market 
economy. The new Uzbekistan strategy adopted in March 2003 goes even further and 
speaks in unmistakable terms of “setbacks.” The EBRD has now decided to condition 
stepped-up activities in Uzbekistan on seven “benchmark criteria” which not only refer to 
economic reform measures but also, and in particular, call for respect of basic human 
rights. Two months prior to its annual meeting in Tashkent in early May 2003, which was 
seen by human rights groups as highly problematic because of the choice of venue,126 the 
EBRD thus sent out a clear political signal. The extreme case, however, is the country 
strategy for Turkmenistan of July 2002, which is marked by even stronger political condi-
tionality and makes any appreciable engagement on the part of the EBRD dependent on 
substantial improvements in the political and economic framework.127 
In the EBRD strategies the references to issues of democratization, good governance and 
the rule of law are restricted to the background analysis and the formulation of necessary 
prerequisites. The orientation of the measures in the Central Asian countries is in keeping 
with the classic portfolio of a development bank. Three areas are foregrounded: develop-
ment of the private business sector; development of the financial sector; improvement of 
infrastructure and resource use. No crisis-prevention perspective is provided for in the 
measures selected. 
5.5 UNDP 
Like nearly all multilateral donors, UNDP’s active involvement in Central Asia is based on 
individual country strategies (“country cooperation frameworks”).128 As a UN organiza-
tion, UNDP is particularly reliant on the willingness of its partner countries to cooperate, 
and the country strategies therefore reflect an intensive process of discussion and negotia-
tion with partner governments. Against this background it is not surprising that while the 
focus area crisis prevention and conflict resolution has found its way into the strategy 
for Kyrgyzstan, it is not to be found in the strategies for Uzbekistan and Turkmeni-
stan. There is no talk of any resolute crisis-prevention strategy in the case of Tajikistan 
either, but the country strategy does include a focus on approaches to dealing with con-
flict impacts (reintegration of ex-combatants, reconstruction) as well as on containment of 
long-term conflict potentials (by strengthening governance capacities, local self-
administration, etc.). 
The strategy for Kyrgyzstan goes even further by setting out “preventive development,” 
together with decentralization, as one of three independent program components in the 
program segment “Political and administrative governance.” This program segment also 
                                                                
126  Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5 May 2003, 2 and 11, and 6 May 2003, 13. 
127  EBRD (2001a, 2001b, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2003). 
128  UN (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2001). 
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contains some additional components like “Reform of public administration” and “Support 
for democratic institutions.” In addition, the components of this segment are complemented 
by a component “Development of civil society,” which is part of the second program seg-
ment (“Social governance”). Thus the issue of crisis prevention and conflict resolution in 
the UNDP strategy for Kyrgyzstan is both seen as an explicit element of one program 
component and supported substantively by a number of additional program components. 
The “Preventive development” component in Kyrgyzstan has led to targeted measures in 
the particularly crisis-prone regions of Batken and Osh in the Ferghana Valley. In 
selected communities identified on the basis of regular local conflict analyses, local or-
ganizations are trained in methods and instruments suited to constructively mitigating 
conflict potentials and jointly overcoming concrete problems of local development, most of 
which can be seen as the actual causes of conflict at the local level. Another component of 
the program is preparation of “early warning reports” at the local and regional level; these 
are an important supplement to conflict-related macroanalyses and are intended to make 
possible a more precise adaptation of the program to local conditions. At present thought is 
being given to an expansion of the program to Tajikistan. Uzbekistan, which originally was 
also set to be included as well, has completely withdrawn after having engaged in some 
initial negotiations.129 
5.6 OSCE 
Although the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is not a donor, or in-
deed even a development agency in the classic sense of the term, it does play a prominent 
role in international efforts concerning security and crisis prevention in Central Asia. 
As successor states of the Soviet Union, all of the Central Asian republics were officially 
accepted as members of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 
January 1992, which two years later spawned the OSCE. These countries have thus com-
mitted themselves to the principles set out in the OSCE documents. Unlike e.g. the case of 
the Council of Europe, though, these are purely political, voluntary commitments which 
have no binding legal effect. 
The OSCE operates not with country or regional strategies but on the basis of its charter. In 
accordance with the three “baskets” of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which established 
the basic principles of the CSCE, the OSCE’s activity today extends to three “dimen-
sions”: the human, the political-military, and the economic / ecological. The OSCE thus 
raises the claim to pursue a comprehensive approach to security, one keyed to a great 
range of security-related issue, including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- 
and security-building measures, human rights, democratization, and economic and envi-
                                                                
129  Interview with Ruslan Monolbaev, UNDP, coordinator of the “Preventive Development” com-
ponent, Bishkek, 29 Nov. 2002. 
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ronmental concerns. In addition, problems of regional international cooperation and – more 
recently – issues bound up with religion and religious freedom have been moved into the 
foreground in Central Asia. 
In the context of its mandate, the OSCE was active as mediator between the belligerent 
parties in bringing the Tajik civil war to a close.130 And if conflict resolution and peace-
building were at the center of efforts in Tajikistan in recent years, the concern in the other 
four Central Asian republics is crisis prevention.131 In organizational terms, the OSCE is 
represented in all five countries with so-called “OSCE centers” led by ambassador-level 
diplomats and in part  with additional field offices in special crisis regions. The field mis-
sions are supported in organizational and conceptual terms by the OSCE’s central offices, 
in particular the Secretariat in Vienna and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Hu-
man Rights in Warsaw. Within the Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Center constitutes 
an important pillar of the organization’s activities. Other institutions of particular relevance 
in Central Asia include the offices of “High Commissioner on National Minorities” and the 
“OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.” 
The “core business” of the OSCE centers on the ground – as well as of the OSCE as a 
whole – is, translated into the language of development cooperation, policy dialogue in the 
dimensions outlined above. In addition, however, an important and growing role is played 
by issue-specific seminars, trainings, and other education and training functions conducted 
with the participation of nonstate, civil-society actors. The OSCE’s activities in the fields 
of freedom of the media, human rights, protection of minorities, prison reform, police and 
judiciary reform, but also election observation, often extend into sensitive areas of internal 
national affairs.132 However, the impacts developed by the OSCE in this connection are 
seen, even by OSCE staff, as at times very limited. Since the highly comprehensive secu-
rity strategy subscribed to by the OSCE as an institution is, in this form, in practice not 
shared by the Central Asian governments, they are not particularly willing to support the 
OSCE in its concerns, to respond actively to its initiatives, or indeed to make active use of 
its good offices as a mediator in conflicts.133 Moreover, due to its cooperative decision-
making structures the OSCE is in most cases not able to point, publicly and clearly, to 
obvious deficits, a fact which at times costs it the confidence of civil-society actors. On the 
other hand, due to its unique design the OSCE has genuine possibilities to initiate policy 
dialogue in all crisis-relevant focus areas, which are often not available to the classic 
donors involved in development cooperation, even after years of effort. 
                                                                
130  Seifert (1999). 
131  Gumppenberg (2002b, 5). 
132  Interviews with OSCE ambassadors István Venczel, Almaty, 4 Dec. 2002, and Marc Gilbert, 
Dushanbe, 19 March 2003. 
133  Gumppenberg (2002b, 5). 
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5.7 The United States 
Crisis prevention and conflict resolution play a central role in the US’ DC strategy for 
Central Asia. At present, USAID, the official US development assistance agency, is operat-
ing on the basis of a uniform Central Asia strategy which is dated July 2000 and was 
drafted for the period between 2001 and 2005.134 The strategy defines “mitigating poten-
tial for conflict through active dialogue and civil society, employment and income growth, 
and improved health and environmental conditions” as the primary cross-cutting goal for 
all sectors.135 In addition, one secondary cross-cutting objective is reduction of corrupt 
practices. The priority sectors of USAID measures are set out in four primary sectoral 
objectives for all five Central Asian partner countries: support of SMEs and trade; an open, 
democratic culture; improved use of critical water and energy resources; primary health-
care. In addition, two country-specific objectives are pursued in Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan: improved tax administration and responsible local government. 
The great importance attached by USAID to crisis-prevention and conflict-related meas-
ures in Central Asia even before September 11, 2001, derives from a conflict analysis in 
the strategy paper which proceeds on the assumption of a variety of overlapping and inter-
related conflict causes.  
In July 2001 USAID published its “Peaceful Communities Initiative” (PCI), a program 
component designed – in a way similar to UNDP’s “Preventive Development” approach – 
in particular to support the objective of crisis prevention and to contribute to mitigating 
conflict potentials and eliminating the causes of conflicts at the local level in selected 
communities close to the border in the Ferghana Valley. Additional funds for crisis-
prevention measures in Central Asia made available by the US government following the 
September 2001 terror attacks led to the creation, in May 2002, of the “Community Ac-
tion Investment Program” (CAIP), which operates in the same way but has a larger 
volume of funds and is projected for a longer period of time. In addition to the Kyrgyz part 
of the Ferghana Valley, the measures now extend to many other regions in Central Asia, 
including Raasht Valley in Tajikistan, the south of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbeki-
stan. Implementation of the CAIP (like the PCI before it) is in the hands of international 
NGOs, which are themselves responsible for implementing the project components set out 
in contract profiles. The NGOs contracted are Mercy Corps, the Aga Khan Foundation, 
ACDI/VOCA, and the Cooperative Housing Foundation. In addition, CAIP funds are being 
used to finance a UNDP project in Tajikistan.136 
                                                                
134  USAID (2000). 
135  USAID (2000, 3). 
136  Interview with Wayne McDonald, Robert Birkenes, und Laura Harvey, USAID, Almaty, 3 Dec. 
2002. See also “Conflict Prevention” on USAID’s website: http://www.usaid.gov/regions/ 
europe_eurasia/ car/caip_pci.html, 13 May 2003. 
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5.8 Japan 
Although Japan is the largest bilateral donor in Central Asia next to the US, it is the only 
major bilateral donor whose Central Asia strategy makes no mention of the issue of crisis 
prevention and conflict resolution.137 According to information of the Japanese devel-
opment agency, JICA, on the Internet, the agency has no general strategy on this issue, 
either, which could serve as a frame of reference.138 Japanese DC in Central Asia is basi-
cally geared to dispatching experts and making funds available in the fields of market 
systems development, qualification, and basic infrastructure. JICA has tended to avoid 
potential crisis regions like the Ferghana Valley and Tajikistan in recent years since a 
Japanese UN staff member was killed in Tajikistan in 1998 and a Japanese mining engineer 
was abducted in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1999.139 
5.9 Switzerland 
With its DC engagement focused on the two countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Swit-
zerland is one of the most visible bilateral donors in Central Asia. Despite this focus on 
only two countries – including some cautious activities in Uzbekistan – Switzerland has 
also summarized its strategy in a paper on Central Asia as a whole; it was last updated in 
November 2002.140 In it “governance, security and conflict prevention,” represent one 
of five priority areas of cooperation. The other four areas are: macroeconomic framework 
conditions; development of the private sector; management of resources and infrastructure; 
and health. Furthermore, gender and the environment are set out as cross-cutting issues.  
In the framework of its priority area “Governance, Security and Conflict Prevention,” 
Switzerland subscribes to a strategy of institutional support and capacity-building for local 
partners, in particular marginalized groups and actors with a special interest in peaceful 
conflict settlement (“peace constituencies”). The aim here is to strengthen local capacities 
for peaceful conflict settlement, to promote the development of tolerance in civil society, 
and to support the development of transparent and participatory political decision-making 
processes and a functioning legal system. The measures are based on a critical assessment-
taking of the political and social context which views the situation in terms of the influence 
on it of a paternalist and Soviet-style authoritarian legacy, emphasizing the importance of 
regional and clan-based power structures and underlining lack of participation, rapidly 
                                                                
137  See the Internet document “Country and Region-Specific Aid Studies. Central Asia and Cauca-
sia,” http://www.jica.go.jp/english/activities/regions/04asi.html, 08 May 2003. 
138  See http://www.jica.go.jp. 
139  Interview with Kiyoshi Ishii, Resident Representative, and Yoshiko Yamanaka, Program Officer, 
JICA Bishkek, 29 Nov. 2002. 
140  SDC / SECO (2002). 
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diminishing standards of living, closed borders, competition for resources, and criminal 
networks as potential causes of conflicts.141 
5.10 The United Kingdom 
The UK is one of the countries that were early to make crisis prevention and conflict reso-
lution an important field of action of their development cooperation. In its current strategy 
for Central Asia and the southern Caucasus, which dates from October 2000, the British 
development agency, DFID, emphasizes, as the main challenge facing the region: “Conflict 
remains a central problem for the region, posing real threats to regional stability.”142 While 
this statement applies particularly to the southern Caucasus, it also explicitly refers to 
Central Asia. Looking at conflict causes, DFID points to the Soviet legacy and the great 
number of current conflict potentials resulting from it, but also to acute problems like 
unemployment and drug-trafficking. Mention is also made of particularly conflict-prone 
regions like the Ferghana Valley. 
Among the eight countries of the region of Central Asia and the southern Caucasus, the 
2000 DFID strategy identifies three priority countries: Armenia, Georgia, and Kyr-
gyzstan – the only Central Asian country mentioned. This selection was geared to the 
criteria of poverty and the seriousness of the economic and political reform efforts that 
have been undertaken. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in particular are seen as having made 
no more than “very limited progress on reform.” 
For its priority countries DFID defines three key focus areas: good central and local public 
administration; favorable framework conditions for economic growth, including rural 
development, basic services for the poor, and adequate environmental protection; and a 
good healthcare system that is open to all segments of society. The aspect of crisis preven-
tion and conflict resolution is addressed in three additional regional focus areas that are not 
restricted to the priority countries: democracy and human rights, civil society, strengthen-
ing of citizens’ capacities; integration of these countries into the world economy; and 
improved regional stability based on measures designed to prevent and mitigate conflicts. 
In other words, crisis prevention is an important field of action for DFID in Central Asia 
as well. 
                                                                
141  SDC / SECO (2002, 16 and 14). 
142  DFID (2000, 2). 
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6 Conclusions and recommendations  
The present analysis of the conflict and crisis potentials in Central Asia has made it clear 
that the region is faced with substantial medium- to long-term risks and that the region 
is in need of measures with crisis-prevention effects. The strategies of the German 
Government and the BMZ take this need into account by assigning an important place to 
the objective of crisis prevention. In principle, the combination of the fields promotion of 
democracy, economic reform, and poverty reduction, and support of regional cooperation 
is well suited to taking sustainable action aimed at reaching the objective of crisis-
prevention. In these fields it is possible both to tackle structural conflict causes with a long-
term perspective and to address deficits in conflict-resolution capacities and immediate 
security risks with a view to the short- and medium-term perspective. The decision to 
define the Ferghana Valley as a cross-border priority region may also been seen as a rea-
sonable and meaningful decision. 
At the instrumental level, however, German DC has difficulties in translating the highly 
comprehensive aspirations expressed in its political strategies into concrete measures. 
Three main reasons appear to be responsible for this state of affairs: (1) The priority set in 
the field of WIRAM can hardly be said to suggest the use of measures with an immediate 
reference to crisis prevention. Looked at in terms of crisis prevention and conflict resolu-
tion, WIRAM is concerned almost exclusively with long-term, structural effects. (2) Trans-
ferring successful measures from the bilateral portfolio to the framework of cross-border 
cooperation (in connection with portfolio adjustment) reduces the financial leeway for 
projects in the narrower context of cross-border promotion of democracy or direct crisis 
prevention and conflict resolution. (3) The process of translating the crisis-prevention and 
conflict-resolution strategies into manageable instruments of TC (and FC) still is in its 
infancy. 
In principle, there are for these reasons three possible approaches to giving a higher profile 
to the objective of crisis prevention and conflict resolution: 
1. A highly flexible design of the WIRAM priority area which also leaves space for 
measures focusing on procedural and security-related crisis factors. 
2. A specific design of the regional approach making use of measures with a more direct 
reference to crisis prevention. 
3. A more intensive use of the instruments currently being developed for crisis preven-
tion and conflict resolution within German DC as well as of the experiences of other 
bilateral and multilateral donors. 
These approaches, for which recommendations are formulated below, should be used in 
combination. A more pronounced use of the instruments of crisis prevention and conflict 
resolution is a necessary prerequisite for the two other points, for which reason it will be 
dealt with first. 
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6.1 Use of the instruments of crisis prevention and conflict 
resolution 
With a view to crisis potentials and latent, smoldering conflicts in the region, the role 
desirable for German DC should be defined along the possible alternatives suggested by 
“working in, on, or around conflict.” If the intention here is to continue to pursue the 
existing Central Asia strategies, the “working around conflict” variant would not be rele-
vant in this case. 
The present DC portfolio for the region should be subjected to a conflict-related impact 
analysis to identify unintended negative impacts, but also positive effects that have not yet 
become evident. The results of this analysis should be used to correct the negative impacts 
identified and to activate positive potentials. 
Selection of new measures and programs should be based on conflict-related impact analy-
ses that identify the relative value of the measure within the crisis scenario and hoped-for 
positive effects and point to negative effects that it may not be possible to exclude. 
The condition required for conflict-related impact analyses is a joint analysis of existing 
conflicts and crisis potentials shared by the key German DC organizations and the actors 
and groups of actors concerned. Such country-related conflict analyses should be prepared 
for in a dialogue between the BMZ, the implementing agencies, and the staff on the 
ground, and should be continued on a regular basis. Regular country dialogues could, for 
instance, be conducted with the implementing agencies with a view to exchanging crisis-
relevant information and coming up with a joint situational analysis. More emphasis should 
be given to debriefing experts deployed abroad and identifying the inputs contributed by 
other ministries (AA, BMI, BMVg) as well as by academic institutions.  
Sensitization of DC staff, both in Germany and on the ground, to the issue of crisis preven-
tion and conflict resolution should be supported through targeted training measures which 
contain – apart from subject matter of a more general nature – a concrete orientation to the 
region of Central Asia. 
6.2 Design of WIRAM 
Within the priority area of WIRAM more efforts could be undertaken to tackle “more 
political” issues, like the need for decentralization of decision-making competences (e.g. 
in the field of local business promotion). 
Special attention should be accorded to projects with a marked component in rural areas, 
several of which are already underway. Such projects should be strengthened and enlarged. 
In this context preference should be given in particular to projects with a high degree of 
participation (e.g. credit cooperatives) which may serve as a counterweight to the feeling of 
powerlessness widespread among local populations. 
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In regions which are marked by high levels of tension (the Ferghana Valley) and in 
which an illegal economy has become established (trafficking in drugs, arms), measures 
with a high employment effect could contribute to “recivilizing” the economy. 
The pending formulation of the priority strategy for the Central Asian republics should 
accord prominent significance to the objective of crisis prevention and conflict resolution. 
6.3 Design of the regional approach 
In view of the asymmetry of the fields of action involved, what would be called for in the 
long-term, as soon as existing obligations expire, is to shift funds from the bilateral port-
folios to the regional approach in order to be able to support new measures in the field of 
democracy promotion that have relevance for crisis prevention. 
For measures in the field of promotion of democracy it would be possible to seek to gain 
a stronger involvement of private-sector organizations in addition to the political founda-
tions; the former could, for their part, cooperate with nonstate partners on the ground and 
provide help in developing NGO networks. 
Projects in the area of democracy promotion should also be aware of and address the great 
importance of informal rules and networks in the societies in transition in Central Asia. 
This can help to gain a better understanding of conflict situations and the ways in which 
crises can be prevented and would have positive effects on conflict-related impact analy-
ses.143 
Efforts should be stepped up to in fact implement cross-border projects – which are at 
present, in concrete terms, often bilateral measures due to resistance on the partner side – 
as genuinely regional measures. New regional projects should be designed in such a way 
as to allow them to at least be enlarged at any time to include participation of individual 
countries that may be initially expected to resist them. 
One important integrative force in the region of Central Asia is the sciences, the reason 
being that the Central Asian republics show a high degree of similarity as far as the legacy 
of science-friendly Soviet socialization is concerned. This potential could be harnessed by 
regional measures in a great variety of fields (the environment, health, promotion of de-
mocracy, etc.) to intensify regional cooperation. 
                                                                
143  See the initial draft version of the Working Group on Development and Peace’s (FriEnt) “Meth-
odischer Leitfaden zur Netzwerk- und Akteursanalyse,” which was field-tested in the summer of 
2002 in a rural region in Kyrgyzstan. 
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6.4 Further-reaching considerations 
To provide an effective contribution to crisis prevention and conflict resolution, it is essen-
tial to aim for more coordination with international donors and other (state and nonstate) 
partners. It would therefore be important to work at this level for a joint crisis analysis, an 
identification of priorities, and broad guidelines for use in defining a division of tasks. 
International standards like the DAC Guidelines can serve here as a meaningful frame of 
reference. 
A more marked presence of the BMZ in partner countries would be highly conducive to a 
more effective coordination of donors. At present German DC staff in Central Asia is often 
perceived by foreign partners (including other donors) as unable to enter into commitments 
since local representatives (as a rule GTZ) lack a political mandate. 
As far as individual countries are concerned, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan play a particularly 
important role at present. Since the political framework in Uzbekistan severely restricts 
any attempts to influence circumstances there, it is important to do whatever is possible 
to counteract any destabilization from the outside. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should 
therefore also be supported as an important “bridge” to the Ferghana Valley as a means of 
preventing social or political disturbances there from spreading to the overall region. This 
would call, among other things, for a solution of the debt problems of the two countries. 
The BMZ should consider supporting an inclusion of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the 
HIPC initiative or working elsewhere for debt relief for the two countries. Such support 
could also be conditioned on movement on the issue of democratization. 
Stabilization in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should also be seen as a means to demonstrate to 
Uzbekistan the chances implied by a greater willingness to engage in cooperation. 
Corresponding crisis-prevention-related DC projects should therefore seek not to reinforce 
boundaries but to be seen as an open invitation to the Uzbek side. At the same time, it 
would be important not to rule out a certain measure of gentle pressure on the Uzbek gov-
ernment not to cut itself off from regional cooperation projects. Measures of particular 
interest to the Uzbek side (vocational training, financing of infrastructure) could be condi-
tioned on consent to cross-border projects. This could also extend to projects conducted 
by other donors if such projects appear meaningful in the light of the objective of crisis 
prevention and conflict resolution. 
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Annex 1: Map of Central Asia 
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Annex 2: List of institutions and agencies contacted in Germany and the 
 Central Asian republics  
Germany  
BMZ, Directorate 201; BMZ, Directorate 304; Foreign Office, Directorate 207; GTZ 
Eschborn; GTZ CCD Project, Bonn; KfW, Frankfurt; FriEnt Working Group, Bonn; Insti-
tut für Auslandsbeziehungen – zivik Project, Berlin; Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin; 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation, St. Augustin; German Institute for International and Secu-
rity Affairs (SWP), Berlin. 
Tashkent, November 19-23, 2002 
German Embassy in Tashkent; GTZ Coordination Office; GTZ project “Promotion of 
agriculture in Uzbekistan”; Konrad Adenauer Foundation; Institut für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit of the Deutsche Volkshochulverband; ZEF/CDR, Khorezm Project; Brit-
ish Embassy; Europe House - TACIS/EuropeAid; Asian Development Bank; UNHCR; 
World Bank; Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Repub-
lic; Center for Economic Research; “Izhtimoiy Fikr” public opinion research institute; 
ZAKOVAT Social Foundation. 
Bishkek, November 25 –29, 2002 
German Embassy in Bishkek; GTZ Coordination Office; Swiss Cooperation Office; 
USAID; JICA/JOCV; OSCE Center; UNDP – Political and Administrative Local Govern-
ance Programme; CAMP Project (Central Asia Mountain Partnership); Office of the Presi-
dent of the Republic; Ministry of Finance; International Institute for Strategic Studies 
under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic; American University of Kyrgyzstan; Interna-
tional Crisis Group; INTRAC – the International NGO Training and Research Centre. 
Almaty, December 1–5, 2002 
German Embassy in Almaty; GTZ Coordination Office; KfW; Friedrich Ebert Foundation; 
USAID Regional Mission for Central Asia; World Bank Central Asia Regional Office; 
UNDP; OSCE Center; Delegation of the European Commission; Institute for Economic 
Research; Kazakhstani Institute for Socio-Economic Information and Forecast; Assessment 
Risks Group; Institute of War and Peace Reporting; Center for Conflict Management. 
Dushanbe, March 15-22, 2003 
German Embassy in Dushanbe; GTZ Food Security Program; Aid Coordination Unit in the 
Office of the President of the Republic; Center for Strategic Research in the Office of the 
President; National Association of Political Scientists; “Shark” Research Center; Party of 
Islamic Rebirth; UNTOP; UNDP; EuropeAid/TACIS; OSCE Center; Swiss Cooperation 
Office; ACTED. 
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